The Alabama in the Civil War Message Board

5th Alabama Infantry Regiment - Gettysburg Day 1

A month after the Battle of Chancellorsville, General Lee began a move north with the ANV. At two o'clock in the morning on June 3, 1863, the 5th Alabama and her brigade mates left their camp at Grace Church, Virginia, and began their journey for "parts unknown". By June 27, 1863, they were camped just beyond the Carlisle Barracks in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. However, on June 30, 1863, the men were on the move once again, breaking camp at 3:00 A.M., but this time, heading south.

At about ten o’clock in the morning on July 1, 1863, as Rodes’ Division approached the town of Gettysburg which was still several miles away, they heard cannonading. It was apparent that he two armies had met once again, this time for the bloodiest of contests.The conflict had begun that morning at about 7:30 AM, when the lead elements of the Federal Army 1st Corps had engaged Confederate soldiers from Henry Heth’s Division of General A. P. Hill’s Corps, on the Chambersburg Pike. Several roads converged on the town of Gettysburg and this acted like a vortex, drawing in Division after Division of the two armies. At about 11:00 A.M., at some unidentified point on the Carlisle Road, the division encountered videttes of Union General Devin’s Cavalry Brigade. Major Eugene Blackford was sent for hastily by General Rodes, who told him that they were close up on the enemy in the town of Gettysburg and that Lieutenant General A. P. Hill had blundered, and it was feared he would bring on a general engagement before any body was up. Early's Division was fifteen miles behind and. General Edward Johnson's nine. Blackford was directed to deploy his corps across the valley to their left, and do his best to make the enemy believe that they had heavy infantry supports, whereas there was not a man. Blackford complied with his orders and drove off the cavalry opposing them in the pike. The Federal cavalry repeatedly charged, but Blackford’s men rallied coolly and promptly, sending the enemy back every time with more empty saddles.

As Rodes drew nearer to Gettysburg, he could hear more artillery fire, then infantry fire at about 11:30 A.M. The general noted that all the fighting was taking place on the ridges west of town, to his right. Instead of proceeding directly southward into the town, he thought it would be better to swing to the right and advance down the high wooded ridge there (Keckler’s Hill, the northern extension of Oak Hill) in order to strike the Union lines on the flank. He explained his thinking in his battle report by saying he thought he could “strike the force of the enemy with which General Hill’s troops were engaged upon the flank, and that, besides moving under cover, whenever we struck the enemy we could engage him with the advantage in ground.”

While General Rodes brought his Division towards Gettysburg, Union Major General Abner Doubleday, who had assumed command of the Federal 1st Corps following the death of General Reynolds, used the time to redeploy the Union 1st Corps. His new line extended across the northwest approaches of the town, from McPherson's Woods north to Oak Ridge. At about 12:00 PM, Federal reinforcements arrived and Major General Oliver Howard ordered his XIth Corps through the town onto the field northwest of town. Howard assumed overall command of all Federal forces, replacing Doubleday, since he was the senior officer present. Howard placed Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr’s Division south of Gettysburg along Cemetery Hill, and rushed the two other divisions north of Gettysburg to lengthen the 1st Corps line.

The men of Rodes’ Division had marched about fourteen miles that morning. South of the intersection of the road between Hunterstown and Mummasburg, where the Carlisle Road descends from the high ground of Oak Ridge to the Gettysburg Plain, Rodes’ column, except for Doles’ Brigade, veered right from the main road. Rodes’ main column followed a lesser road that paralleled Oak Ridge on the west and led to Herr Ridge at the Chambersburg Pike. Doles’ Brigade continued on the main road and descended into the plain to guard Rodes’ left as the division approached the battlefield. Iverson’s Brigade was then deployed in front of the 8000 man Division and advanced with increased caution. Rodes’ veteran infantrymen shed their blanket rolls and knapsacks in piles by the roadside as they broke into double-time towards the sound of battle.

The move onto Keckler’s Hill greatly slowed down the advance of Rodes’ men, both by the height of the ridge there and the denseness of the woods. The troops continued along the crest of the ridge, and then moved southward, with Iverson’s Brigade still deployed in advance. The rest of the division followed in column. As the ridge widened out, Iverson was shifted to the right, and O’Neal was formed to his left, with Dole’s down in the valley to their far left. Blackford’s Sharpshooters filled the gap between the top of the ridge and Dole’s men below. General Robert Rodes, after advancing for a mile through the dense woods emerged on Oak Hill, and was able to observe the enemy line. Oak Hill was a high ridge and Rodes could clearly see that they were not the first ones there. Rodes noted that the enemy lines were about half a mile away, and in order “to get at these troops properly….it was necessary to move the whole of my command by the right flank, and to change direction to the right.” The Brigades were ordered to quickly take position in line of battle.

Rodes’ Division was deployed as follows: Daniel’s Brigade took the far right, Iverson’s Brigade the centre, and O’Neal’s on the left. As noted earlier, Dole’s Brigade had been sent out on the extreme left, by the Carlisle Road with Blackford’s sharpshooters between them and the rest of the brigade. General Rodes detached the 3rd Alabama from O’Neal’s Brigade and sent it right to fill the gap and connect with Daniel's Brigade. He also detached the 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment from O’Neil’s Brigade and held it to the rear as a reserve. Ramseur’s Brigade whose men were still arriving, were to form a second line and were also to be held in reserve.

The men of the 5th Alabama Infantry were on the extreme left of O’Neal’s Brigade and had to move rapidly, frequently at a run, as the division made a right wheel from the Newville Road to Oak Ridge. Once the regiment reached the ridge, the men found that “The ground was very rough, In places the regiment moved through orchards, gardens, over wood and stone fences, which, with the rapidity of the march, fatigued the men, causing many of them to faint from exhaustion.”

Private Samuel Pickens of Company D said much the same: “Our Regiment was on the left of the Brigade and as it moved forward it made a partial right wheel and thus kept us at a double quick march all the time; and as it was an excessively hot day and we were going through wheat field and ploughed ground and over fences, it almost killed us. I was perfectly exhausted and never suffered so from heat and fatigue in my life. A good many fellows fell out of ranks being completely broken down and some fainted.”

While shifting his infantry to the right, General Rodes brought forward two of Colonel Thomas H. Carter’s artillery batteries and posted them in front of the woods on the crest of Oak Hill, approximately a quarter mile in front of his first infantry line. They opened fire on the enemy sometime soon after 12 noon. As Rodes deployed his troops down the slopes of Oak Ridge and across the Mummasburg Road, Federal artillery responded to the Confederate guns and Union infantry waited unobserved, just across the field behind a stone wall. During the process of deploying his Division, the situation began to change. The two Federal Divisions that Union General Howard had sent north through the town, began to emerge and extend the Union line of battle to the left of Rodes’ position. Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfenning's Division was placed to the right of Doubleday's I Corps. Schimmelfenning's line extended from the Mummasburg Road, eastward to the Carlisle Road, however, there was a gap of about 400 yards between his division and the right brigade of I Corps, commanded by General Baxter. Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow Division was then positioned to the right of Schimmelfenning's Division and extended the Federal line to the Harrisburg Road. Barlow’s line extended out to a knoll creating a salient. The new Federal line would not have to wait long to be tested. Shortly after Howard had completed his deployment the Confederates would attack.

Troop dispositions were nearly complete when General Rodes brought his division forward towards the battlefield northwest of the town at about one o’clock in the afternoon under a severe shelling. Rodes’ entire line enjoyed cover and protection from the woods on Oak Hill, except for Dole’s Brigade and part of O’Neal’s Brigade. General Rodes grew concerned over the effect of the Union artillery fire on the exposed portion of his line, particularly on O’Neal’s Brigade. To Colonel O’Neal and Colonel S. B. Pickens of the 12th Alabama, the annoying Union artillery fire seemed to last more than an hour. Page’s and Reese’s batteries were brought forward and placed on the eastern slope of the ridge to deal with the Union artillery. However, Rodes soon came to the conclusion that O’Neal’s line needed to be shifted to avoid the “annoying” Federal artillery fire. Therefore he directed O’Neal to fall back from the line he occupied to a new position in the rear, “so as to obtain some little shelter for the troops.”

The Confederate line ran on an east-west course for about a full mile from the Carlisle Pike to the Forney Woods west of the Mummasburg Road with three brigades in front and two in reserve. The 5th Alabama Infantry was further to the rear and under the personal command of General Rodes. He held them to aid Blackford’s men who were covering the gap between Dole’s Brigade in the lower valley, and the rest of the line. O’Neal’s three regiment brigade (6th, 12th, 26th Alabama) held the center of the line from the foot of Oak Ridge to the crest of the hill. At about 1:30 P.M., these men were sent forward to dislodge skirmishers from the 97th New York and other regiments under Union General Baxter that had crossed the Mummasburg Road and were at the foot of Oak Hill. The Union defenders enjoyed an advantageous position. The flank of the Union I Corps appeared to be exposed when General Rodes sent his brigades forward. Evidently he did not know of the Union XI Corps troops in position to cover the right flank of the I Corps.

Meanwhile, the 5th Alabama on the left of the O’Neal’s Brigade and about 600-800 yards behind the McLean barn, lay down behind a fence and witnessed an artillery duel between one of their batteries, likely the Morris Artillery under Captain Page, stationed about 150 yards in front of them and a Yankee battery away to their left. Five or six dead horses and one or two broken caissons or gun carriages were left by their battery when it moved off.

Federal reinforcements continued to arrive and take up position off to the left of Rodes position. As the 45th New York emerged from town on the Mummasburg Road, Colonel von Amsburg ordered the four right companies under Capt. Francis Irsch to deploy as skirmishers "to the right of the Mummasburg Road as far as he could towards the east." Von Amsburg promised to follow with the balance of the regiment as soon as the men had closed up and caught their breath."

Irsch spread his four companies out, facing Oak Hill, and stepped off. The Confederate battery, stationed near Wilbur McLean's farm situated at the base of the hill, proceeded to lob shells at Irsch's deploying line, but with little effect initially. This battery was that of Captain R. C. M. Page's Virginia Battery (4 Napoleons), belonging to the artillery brigade of Thomas Carter and which was being watched by the men of the 5th Alabama from their reserve position. Page's battery had been dispatched by Rodes to dispute the advance of the XI Corps, which he presumed intended to attack his left flank.

General Rodes noted in his after battle report that O’Neal’s men attacked with alacrity but a fair degree of confusion. He also stated that they were not moving “in accordance with my orders as to direction.” He had personally instructed both Iverson and O’Neal as to the direction of their attack. O’Neal men advanced from a position about four hundred yards behind the McLean barn with a strong line of skirmishers out front. After about two hundred yards the men came out of the woods and soon struck the Federal skirmishers. These were men from the 88th Pennsylvania which occupied the right of Union General Baxter’s line.

From their position further to the Confederate left, Irsch's New Yorkers soon observed the dark lines of Col. Edward A. O'Neal's Alabama Brigade emerge from the woods on Oak Hill and advance along the slope and base of the hill towards Robinson`s right flank. Irsch's men peppered the 26th Alabama on O'Neal's left with a flank fire but failed to check it. As mentioned, to assist Doles on the extreme left, the Alabama sharpshooters under Major Eugene Blackford were deployed in a long line extending from Oak Ridge (the northern extension) to the Harrisburg Road, near Blocher's Knoll (known today as Barlow's Knoll). It was Blackford's keen eyed riflemen that brought the first accurate fire upon Irsch's New Yorkers.

"Under a terrific artillery and sharpshooter fire," Irsch worked his skirmish line forward. Losses began to mount as Blackford's crack shots found their targets and Page's gunners found the range. Despite the intense fire Irsch pushed on for perhaps 400 yards when he ordered his men to lie down behind nearby fences. With the advantage of cover the New Yorkers opened a rapid and deadly fire with their Remington rifles. Irsch sought stronger measures. A request was dispatched to Dilger to engage O'Neal’s Brigade with canister and shrapnel. Dilger gave them shrapnel, concentrating the fire of all six guns upon O'Neal's infantry while the 45th New York skirmishers kept up a steady fire as the Southern infantry passed across their front. Colonel Dobke alertly began to shift the remaining six companies of the 45th towards the gap between the 1st and l1th Corps. While Dilger's guns duelled with Page and Irsch kept Blackford's Alabamians at arm's length, Schimmelfennig's 3rd Division came streaming onto the field. On the heels of Dilger came Colonel Stephen McGroarty's 61st Ohio, a slim 143 electives. McGroarty was instructed to deploy his regiment as skirmishers and extend the right of the 45th New York towards the Carlisle Road. Following the Ohioans came the balance of the 1st Brigade, now under Col. George von Amsburg of the 45th New York. Col. Adolph von Hartung's under strength 74th Pennsylvania, 134 strong, was deployed as skirmishers and went into position on the right of the 61st Ohio, along a dirt lane that ran from the Carlisle Road towards Wilbur McLean's farm in the shadow of Oak Ridge. As the senior officer Hartung assumed command of the skirmish line which now numbered nearly 425 men and extended from the Mummasburg Road to the Carlisle Road. On the left of the line, Irsch's New Yorkers dislodged Blackford's troublesome sharpshooters from Hagy's orchard giving the left end of the skirmish line a firm anchor and denying the Confederates a fine concealed position from which to pop away at the Federals. As mentioned, the Alabama brigade advanced somewhat confusedly, owing, it is said, to a misconception as to the direction which it should take. In reality, it was due to the continuous arrival of Federal reinforcements on their left flank. They were being pummelled from front, side, and at times, rear. Of course they were confused as to the direction to face!

O’Neal’s initial attack scarcely advanced to within two hundred yards of Baxter’s line before it was turned back. It was all over in about twenty to thirty minutes. Dobke's concentrated fire, combined with Irsch's, Dilger's, and two regiments of Baxter`s Brigade was more than O'Neal's three regiments could stand. "The enemy began to break and run," recalled a member of the 45th, and Irsch roused his skirmishers to their feet and sent them in a rush for Wilbur McLean's farm, where many Alabamians had sought shelter from the fire. The tough Germans scrambled through McLean's outbuildings and barn and emerged with a sizeable number of butternut prisoners who they ordered to the rear."

During the attack, the 6th Alabama was on the right of O’Neal’s Brigade and would have been screened from direct fire coming from the Union XI Corps. However, the 26th Alabama was on the left flank, and would have taken most of the punishment delivered by XI Corps infantry and artillery. The 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment entered this fight seriously understrength, short of field and company officers. Just eight weeks earlier, the regiment had ended the battle of Chancellorsville under command of a Lieutenant. At Gettysburg the 26th Alabama was under temporary command of Lieutenant Colonel John C. Goodgame of the 12th Alabama Infantry Regiment. In his report of the battle, Goodgame says "the loss of the Regiment was heavy." However, Goodgame clearly was displeased with the behaviour of his troops on July 1st. One of the few clear statements in his skimpy after-action report is this: "Some 40 were taken by the enemy, but it is my opinion, that every man could have escaped being captured had they done their duty." The 26th Alabama on the left crumpled under fire and fell back. The severe, unexpected, enfilading fire from the left had destroyed O’Neal’s attack and they had retreated in great disorder. “I never saw troops so scattered and in such confusion. We were under heavy fire from the front and a cross fire from the left and pretty soon had to fall back to a fence where the Brigade was rallied by Colonel O’Neal and General Rodes.” O’Neal, who had been wounded eight week earlier leading his men in the Battle of Chancellorsville, for whatever reason, had not gone forward with the Brigade. He was with the 5th Alabama Infantry when found by General Rodes during the confused retreat. Rodes was not pleased with his Brigade commander, but that would have to wait, as the battle was raging.

When Iverson started forward around 2:00 P.M., things went awry at once. He too, committed the unpardonable sin for a Brigadier General of not going forward with his troops. With the words "Give them hell," he sent his men ahead while he himself stayed in the rear, where he was unable to correct what soon proved to be a fatally flawed alignment. Worse, Iverson ordered his men forward without reconnoitring the ground ahead or putting out skirmishers. Thus "Unwarned, unled as a brigade, went forward Iverson's deserted band to its doom," wrote the scribe of the North Carolina regiments. With the retreat of O'Neal's Brigade, Iverson's left flank was exposed to Federal fire. Iverson's men veered toward a stone wall, and Union Brigadier General Henry Baxter's entire brigade rose up from behind it and ambushed the surprised Confederates, pouring in a deadly fire at point-blank range. In the initial volley, about 500 men of Iverson's men fell in a straight line. It was perhaps the most intense one-sided minute of slaughter in the War. The Federal forces poured volley after volley into Iverson's brigade. Iverson's advances was slowed then stopped. Seeing an opportunity, the Federal brigade of Brigadier General Henry Baxter counterattacked taking over 400 prisoners from Iverson's Brigade. Many North Carolinians who didn't fall in the first volleys waved white handkerchiefs and were quickly taken prisoner. This brigade was at the time spoken of as having behaved badly, owing to a mistake of General Iverson who reported to General Rodes, in the midst of the fight, that one of his regiments had raised the white flag and gone over in a body to the enemy. The only foundation for this report was that two of his regiments were almost entirely surrounded in consequence of the giving way of the Alabama brigade and the concentration of the enemy at that point, and were all either killed or captured almost to a man. The gallant resistance, however, which they made may be shown by a statement coming from General Rodes himself: that, riding along behind where their line had been, he thought he observed a regiment lying down, as if to escape the Yankee fire. On going up, however, to force them into the fight, he found they were all corpses. A Captain rallied some of the remaining men of the Brigade and led them until the Federals had been chased through Gettysburg. At that point General Iverson attached his remnants to General Ramseur's command. For the rest of the battle, he was without authority, and his men were not again engaged.
General Daniel, advancing, found himself opposed to a very heavy force of the enemy, which he charged and drove back to a railroad cut running in a diagonal direction across his front and past his right flank. Here he found, directly across the cut, and two hundred and fifty yards to his right and rear, some of General A. P. Hill's troops, lying down, while the enemy were firing heavily on his flank and rear; a battery, some four or five hundred yards off, near a barn, being especially troublesome. He sent two messages to the officer commanding these troops, hoping to get him to unite with him, and thus carry the field by a combined attack. Once this regiment got up and moved some twenty yards to the front and again resumed its recumbent position. Finally General Daniel’s had to leave his line, guarded by the 2nd North Carolina Battalion and a regiment, under a galling fire from the enemy, and move the other three regiments by the right flank to a point where they could cross the cut and form his line anew for a charge, which was most gallantly executed, the enemy scarcely saving their artillery and making no more stands until they reached Gettysburg.

When General Rodes came rushing back from the area in front of the Forney Woods to try and find out what had gone wrong on the Division’s left flank, as mentioned earlier, he had found Colonel O’Neal with the 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment, in a support position behind the attacking regiments. He was very upset at the lack of judgement shown by the new Brigade commander and would subsequently have him replaced, but now there was work to do.

It was now about 2:30 P.M. Rodes committed his reserve regiment, the 5th Alabama, realigned his troops and sent them forward with the 5th Alabama on the left flank of the battle line. The men had joined the Brigade at the fence near the edge of the woods of Oak Hill. Company D were assigned sharpshooter duty and moved forward into the area around the McLean barn. There were some North Carolina Sharpshooters from Iverson’s Brigade there that had spent all of their ammunition. Private William Stokes of Company D was wounded before reaching the barn and Private Josiah Brown of the same company was wounded while in the barn as a sharpshooter. The men kept up a brisk fire but it was ineffective because the Federals of XI Corps had taken a position quite far off, behind a fence in some woods on the other side of the Mummasburg Road.

Colonel Hall, having witnessed the debacle of the first attack, was not particularly eager to assault the enemy position, which was composed “of two heavy lines of infantry in front and a line of sharpshooters, supported by infantry and artillery, on my left flank.” Hall found it necessary to form his 300 man command into a “V”, the left wing facing the Union XI Corps troops and the right wing facing Baxter`s line. After the rest of the Brigade had passed on, the Sharpshooters from Company D ran out of the barn and through an open area where the bullets were flying thick. They headed forward and to the left of the McLean barn, to a lane where the rest of the 5th Alabama Regiment had taken up position.

With the Union troops continuously arriving, O`Neal`s Brigade found their position impossible to hold. According to Colonel O`Neal “the enemy had the advantage in numbers and position.” Colonel Hall and the 5th Alabama fought on until they were informed that the rest of the brigade was falling back . Colonel Hall noted that “This was done all the more conscientiously because the odds opposed were very great, and my command was under a front and enfilading fire, with no support, and suffering a very severe loss.” After a “desperate fight” of less than a half hour, O`Neal`s Brigade had once again been compelled to fall back. Private Samuel Pickens Of Company D wrote: “I never saw troops so scattered and in such confusion. We were under a heavy fire from the front and a cross fire from the left and had to fall back to a fence were the brigade was rallied by Colonel O’Neal and General Rodes.”

O’Neal’s Brigade now had to contend with Union reinforcements from General Paul’s Brigade. As the 13th Massachusetts and 104th New York took up position on Baxter’ right, they fell under a heavy fire from some of O’Neal’s men, who were “strongly posted behind a stone wall with thick underbrush.” Colonel Prey of the 104th New York, directed his three left companies to charge the wall and dislodge the enemy, which they did “in gallant style.” Prey was then able to advance his entire command to the line of the roadway. In the process the regiment captured some 35-40 prisoners, who were sent to the rear to join others just captured by the 13th Massachusetts. In the next few minutes another 15 to 20 Confederates were captured and likewise sent to the rear. The 16th Maine was the next of Paul’s command to arrive. They wheeled to the right and moved through some trees to a rail fence to face O’Neal’s Confederates. During this movement they began to receive enemy fire. Once formed at the fence, Confederate fire intensified and some officers were killed or wounded including the Color Corporal. As the Confederates withdrew, the 16th Maine counterattacked. They crossed the fence in front of them, but soon had to be recalled when they ran into heavy artillery fire.

A short time after, perhaps 3:15 P.M., O’Neal’s Brigade rallied and advanced to began its’ third attack on Baxter’s right. General Ramseur had entered the fray and brought two of his regiments as well as the 3rd Alabama into the fight on the right of O’Neal’s men. The remnant of Iverson's Brigade formed on the right of Ramseur under Captain D. P. Halsey, who assumed command of the brigade when reformed. Ramseur made a most gallant charge, with his usual impetuosity and daring, and, being bravely seconded by the whole line, the enemy were driven back towards and into the town. Doles, advancing parallel with Iverson and O'Neal but with a gap of five or six hundred yards intervening, came up with a column of the enemy twice his own, which was advancing out from the town. This column marched rapidly past his right flank, endeavouring to get into the gap between him and O'Neal. This movement was quickly frustrated by a change of front, which was rapidly executed by the right wing of Doles Brigade, who first fired a volley and then charged, breaking the whole Yankee column and driving it towards the town. Doles started in pursuit, but was checked by the appearance of large columns, nearly a whole corps, moving out parallel with the Heidlersburg road from Gettysburg. This last column would have forced him to have fallen back but for the timely arrival of General Early by the Heidlersburg Road. General Ewell at once put his artillery into position on the left of that road and opened fire, enfilading and silencing batteries which were then occupied in an attempt to enfilade Rodes' artillery, and in truth these batteries of the enemy were doing them a good deal of damage. General Gordon's and General Hoke's Brigades were formed on the right of the Heidlersburg road. A space was left between them for General Hays' Brigade, which had been kept in rear of the division wagon train as a guard, but which came up in time to take part in the advance which was soon made — Smith's Brigade being left to support the artillery.

Just as the enemy were out-flanking Doles, Gordon's brigade started forward to charge the enemy. And magnificently and nobly did he and his Georgia braves go to their appointed work. They cross a small stream and valley and enter a long, narrow strip of an opposite slope, at the top of which the enemy had a strong force posted. For five minutes nothing could be heard or seen save the smoke and roar proceeding from the heavy musketry, and indicating a desperate contest; but the contest was not long or uncertain. The Yankees are put to flight and our men press them, pouring a deadly fire at these flying fugitives. A group of officers gathering around a white flag with a red centre, the badge of one of their corps, were vainly endeavouring to rally their men, when a shot from one of Colonel Jones's guns killed two or three of them and the rest quickly scattered. Seeing a second and larger line near the town, General Early halted General Gordon until Generals Hayes and Hoke could come up, when a second charge was made, and three pieces of artillery, besides several entire regiments of the enemy, were captured. General Daniel, on the extreme right of the Confederate Corps, and Hoke's Brigade, under Colonel Avery, on the extreme left, reached the town simultaneously.--Doles came in near about the same time in the centre. Daniel did not enter quite so soon, as the enemy had so far outstripped him that he halted to form. Doles and Early coming in on the flank of the enemy, retreating from Daniel, caught quite a number of prisoners in the town.

Three of Early's brigades, commanded by Brigadier General John B. Gordon, Brigadier General Harry Hays, and Colonel Isaac Avery, had attacked Union Brigadier General Francis Barlow's division and turned its right flank. Barlow's demoralized division broke and ran back towards Gettysburg. The collapse of Barlow's division had a ripple effect on the remaining units of the Federal 11th Corps. One by one, the remaining units broke and ran towards Gettysburg. As Doles’ Brigade pushed past the college, they liberated hundreds of men from O’Neal’s Brigade that had been captured earlier and left there without a guard.

Eugene Blackford continues: “About 6 o'clock* the enemy advanced a triple line on my left. I rushed up there and did my best, but it was useless to do more than give them what we had, and then run for it. So we kept up a terrible popping until they came within 200 yards, the Yankees not firing again, expecting to meet a heavy force of rebels over the hill. Then sounding the retreat away we went at our best speed. I was much concerned, but could do nothing against that mass. Thus did we fight it out until the sun was well nigh down, and I almost exhausted by running up & down the line exhorting the men, and making a target of myself. My loss was considerable, mostly however in wounded. We had not gone more than 100 or so yards, when "Halt, Halt" was heard, and just in front of me to my infinite delight could be seen a long line of skirmishers of Early's Division sweeping on to the front. Soon afterwards we met his dusty columns hurrying up. I knew then that all was safe. Sounding the rally my men were soon around me, and allowing them a little time to rest, I too went to the front close after Early.” *This time may be in error. It seems most likely that this took place no later than 4:00 P.M..

The 5th Alabama and the rest of O’Neal’s Brigade, who “had assembled without order on the hill, rushed forward, still without order, but with all their usual courage, into the charge” and joined in the route of the Federals through the town. Eugene Blackford once again: “We overtook them as they were entering the town, and my men took their own share in the plundering that went on. I employed myself with the aid of such men as I had with me in destroying whiskey, of which there was an enormous quantity in the town. In half an hour many men were dead drunk, and others were wild with excitement. It was truly a wild scene, rushing through the town capturing prisoners by hundreds; a squad of us would run down a street and come to a corner just as a whole mass of frightened Yanks were rushing up another. A few shots made the whole surrender, and so on until we caught them all. In what was the great error committed the troops should have been pushed on, but, no one was there to take the responsibility, and in the morning the enemy were strongly fortified. The result of this day had been glorious, 5,000 prisoners for us, and much plunder.” When the Brigade reformed, it took up a position along the railroad. That night, Blackford slept with his men in a barn on the outskirts of the town. “In it there were countless [illegible], of which they made a great soup, thickened with artichoke. This was made in the boiler used to prepare food for the cattle, but it was as good as any they ever saw.”

Indeed, of the 6,000 or 7,000 taken in the town of Gettysburg, about 4,000 were captured on the evening of the 1st of July by Rodes' and Early's divisions, this number being about equally divided between them. The fight now being over, or rather the enemy having retreated through the town, General Ewell rode into town, and, meeting with General Early, they together made a reconnaissance, in which it was discovered that the enemy were in considerably larger force than our own, and were posted on the heights of Cemetery Hill beyond the town. Here they had formed a line of battle which overlapped Ewell's on both flanks, for General Hill had not then entered the town, and had already opened from several batteries on Ewell's troops in and beyond the town. Inasmuch as we could not get a single piece of artillery to bear on them effectively, and the additional fact that but one half hour of daylight remained, and it being more than probable that it would take longer than this to carry their new position, General Ewell determined not to push the attack that evening, but to wait until next morning to renew the fight. Rodes' right rested about four hundred yards outside of the suburbs of the town, his left extending into it along the Fairfield road, near to Early's right. Rodes bore the brunt of battle on this day. His men acted nobly and suffered severely, losing almost 3000 men.

The initial Confederate attack had begun at about 1:30 PM, but was delivered in detail rather than in conjunction with the other brigades. The Confederate Batteries had opened the attack with initial success. Then O'Neal, the left flank element of the three-brigade attack delivered by Rodes, struck next. Advancing after the three Alabama regiments had been forced back, Iverson's North Carolina Brigade were literally slaughtered. Both Brigade commanders, O'Neal and Iverson, had sent their soldiers forward while they remained behind. While it isn't clear that either man could have done much had they been with their commands, both provided poor field leadership that day much to the detriment of the Confederate attack.

After their rough start, O’Neal’s Brigade held against a Federal force that was being strengthened throughout the day. Eugene Blackford would write later, “Repeatedly during the day would they advance lines of battle against us, but our men knowing what was at stake, stood firm behind a fence, and made so determined a front that the Yankees were persuaded that we were heavily supported. All this could be seen by the whole Div. in the hills to our right, whose position would have been turned at once if the enemy had gotten wind of this.”

For the wounded men, their ordeal had just begun. The scenes around the Hospitals were among the most horrific to behold. The unfortunate wounded men lay about all around moaning and groaning, while in a barn the terrible work of amputating limbs went on throughout the night, the pile of pallid limbs growing ever larger. Among the dead in the regiment was the much beloved Color-Bearer George “Teen” Nutting. A nobler, more generous or braver boy never lived. He was a great favourite and would be greatly missed. He had been mortally wounded and died a short time later on the field at his post with the colors. The loss in the regiment had been enormous. That morning they had broken camp with 380 men, but as they neared Gettysburg, a great many fell out of ranks and Colonel Hall estimated that not many more than 300 went into the fight. Of that number, 226 were lost as killed, wounded or missing.

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5th Alabama Infantry Regiment - Gettysburg Day 1
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