Everything was perfectly quiet on the morning of May 19, 1864. Before noon, Ewell's Corps advanced about two miles to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, who were reported to have drawn off from their front. The route selected by Ewell was a wide arc, initially taking his column away from the Union defences on the Brock Road. The Confederates turned back to the northeast on the Gordon road and crossed the Ni River. Shortly after crossing the river Ewell split his infantry away from the main road and moved east on a wagon trail to the ruins of the Stevens farm. General Stephen Ramseur’s Brigade of North Carolinians led the way east and into the heavily wooded area that separated them from the Union line. Battle’s Brigade formed in support of Ramseur. There was open terrain in front of the woods that benefitted the Federal forces by forming a natural kill zone, however, the trees allowed Ramseur’s men to move undetected into close proximity to the Union pickets. Also helping to disguise their movements was the onset of an afternoon shower. The passage through the forest restricted the Confederate movement. The column became stacked up along the narrow track. Deploying the line of battle under these circumstances was a slow process. Unfortunately for the Confederates it was time that they could not afford to spare.
Federal reinforcements began to arrive and take position. The timely arrival of the 1st Massachusetts and the 2nd New York pushed the initial Confederate attack back and gained a brief respite for both sides. The Federals used the time to consolidate their line. The 1st Massachusetts fell in on the left of the 4th New York with the 2nd New York on their left. The battered Confederates of Ramseur’s Brigade regrouped as the remainder of Rodes’ Division deployed. Colonel Bryan Grimes fell in on Ramseur’s left with his brigade of North Carolinians. Battle’s Alabama brigade deployed on Ramseur’s right. The small Georgia Brigade of General George Doles formed the reserve. To the north John Gordon’s Division formed a line consisting of two brigades; BG William Terry’s Virginians and Col Zebulon York’s Louisianans. Gordon’s line extended beyond the right end of the Federal line and had unfettered access to the Union supply train stalled on the Fredericksburg Road. Understandably the temptation proved too much for the hungry Confederates. The Confederate line fell into disorder as the men began looting the undefended wagons. The disruption created another delay which would cost the Confederates dearly.

Hearing the growing battle in the north Grant dispatched his aide Horace Porter with instructions for Tyler to release his remaining regiments, the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, 7th New York Heavy Artillery, and the 8th New York Heavy Artillery, to assist in the fight. Grant also promised further reinforcements from Warren’s Corps. He intended not only to halt the enemy movement but to seize the initiative and go on the offensive. He had the opportunity he had been waiting for. A portion of the Army of Northern Virginia was isolated and out of the trenches and he meant to “destroy them, if possible.”

Suddenly, more Federal troops appeared on the field. Realizing the danger, the Confederates looting the wagons abandoned their booty and beat a hasty retreat back to their regiments. The Confederates now faced a solid wall of blue that despite rapidly mounting casualties were resolved to stay the line. Gordon’s chance had been lost. Instead of attacking Captain Augustus Brown’s lone company he now faced a line reinforced by more than 2500 muskets, with more on the way. The battle had reached a turning point. Ewell was faced with a difficult decision. He could either back away claiming that his probe had found the Union right too strong or he could continue the fight. He chose the latter attempting to interfere, as Lee had hoped, with Grant’s operations. A general attack across the entire line was ordered.
Ewell’s attack began on the right, where Rodes entire line charged forward into the area around the Harris residence. The 1st Massachusetts heavy Artillery received the brunt of the attack with assistance from the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery on their left. The massed firepower again proved too much for the attackers. One participant noted that “to escape in the midst of such fire…seemed almost miraculous.” On the far right of Rodes’s line Grimes’ North Carolina Brigade also suffered from the fire of Barnes’s artillery. The initial attempt repulsed, the hard fighting Tar Heels tried again only to meet the same fate. A third attempt fared no better. The massive throng of Federals, inexperienced though they might have been, could dominate the field by volume of fire.
The Confederate left came nearer to success. The Union right, now held by the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, contained “an opening between the right of our line” and the Fredericksburg Road. In an effort to exploit the hanging flank Gordon’s men were maneuvering to gain the rear of the enemy line. In a stroke of luck a provisional battalion of veteran’s from the 1st Maryland and 87th Pennsylvania were returning from furloughs as guards on “a long train of wagons, conveying provisions and ammunition” to Spotsylvania. When the commander, Colonel Nathan Dushane, heard the battle in his front he marched his men to the sound of the guns. The battalion ran headlong into the enemy’s flanking element. Dushane’s battalion, alone and badly outnumbered, “was forced to retire to the road.”They were reformed and again readied for the uneven struggle. The outcome looked exceedingly grim but just as they were about to be overwhelmed by the Confederates the last remaining unit from Tyler’s division of artillerymen, the 8th New York Heavy Artillery, arrived and drove the Confederates back. The far right of the Union position was restored.

The rapidly changing face of the battlefield left some of the Confederate troops trapped behind the advancing Federal units. During a brief pause in the firing several made a desperate attempt to make it back to their regiments by sprinting through the Union lines. The promised reinforcements from V Corps began to lengthen the odds against Ewell. His chance to accomplish anything but survival was gone. His Corps was now seriously endangered by the growing strength of the opposition at Harris Farm.
Ewell was not the only one to realize that the tide had turned. General Lee also saw the growing threat to his left. As Ewell discarded any further offensive moves in favor of improving his defensive posture Lee ordered General Jubal Early to extend his line in an effort to unite with Ewell. Two brigades, those of Scales and Thomas, were sent northward in search of Ewell’s right. The path of the relief column passed directly in front of General Lysander Cutler’s division of the Union V Corps. Cutler was holding the Federal entrenchments as the II Corps and the remainder of V Corps executed Grant’s flanking march to the south. The Union pickets were driven in and the advance of Thomas’s brigade reached Ewell. The veteran Georgians were shocked at the carnage on the field. They were soon engaged by the far left of Cutler’s line and the 6th and 15th New York Heavy Artillery and the advance halted. Colonel Joseph Brown’s South Carolinians joined the main body of Scales and Thomas in front of Cutler’works. With the shoe on the other foot, the Confederate commanders opted against a direct assault on the Federal works. Rosser’s cavalry also made a late appearance on the field but added little more than a short barrage from the horse artillery before his troopers rode off.

The last act of the Battle of Harris Farm was played out by the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery. In a less than vigorous effort they attempted an attack on the center of Ewell’s line. A miscalculation in the growing darkness and smoke brought their line of march in front of the 7th New York Heavy Artillery section of the line. Rattled by the unexpected ferocity of the afternoon fight the 7th became nervous about a large body of troops in their front. Assuming they were being assaulted again they loosed a volley into their fellow New Yorkers. The would be attack, dissolved having accomplished nothing more than adding to the already staggering casualty figures.

Thankfully darkness ended the hostilities. Early’s men praised their leadership for the “charge not charged”, Ewell’s troops settled uneasily into their muddy defences, and the Union line solidified without enthusiasm for offensive operations. An orderly Confederate retrograde movement began at about ten o’clock but quickly degenerated into chaos in the darkness. Many men became lost and simply fell down exhausted where they were. Scores of Confederates, lost or too tired to keep pace with the retreat, were gobbled up as prisoners. The price paid for the defence of the Federal right was staggering for both sides. Ewell admitted to 900 losses, while the Union figures were over 1100. The loss in Battle’s Brigade was not heavy, considering the animated and hotly contested nature of the engagement. Private Charles Hafner of Company D, Private Bright Waters of Company C, and Private George W. Thornton of Company E were amongst the few wounded in the 5th Alabama Infantry. Private Hiram J. Geddie of Company D and Private George W. Thornton of Company E were captured. At night the Confederates quietly retired under cover of darkness, regaining their original lines, wet and exhausted, about midnight, where they threw themselves on the cold, damp ground and slept until morning.