An earlier interesting discussion thread, regarding the transfer of Van Dorn's troops to Mississippi in 1862, talks about how northwest Arkansas was stripped of men and material to pursue the war east of the river. It was "deja vu all over again" for poor old Arkansas, because that event was preceded six months earlier by a similar transfer of troops from northeast Arkansas. When Brigadier-General W. J. Hardee took his brigade to Kentucky in the fall of 1861, he left the Pocahontas/Pitman's Ferry area ("the gateway to Arkansas") with virtually no defenses.

Colonel Solon Borland, commanding the 1st Arkansas Mounted Volunteers (redesignated 3rd Arkansas Cavalry), was left in charge of Pitman's Ferry with his own understrength regiment, and the Clark County Artillery (minus its guns, which Hardee snagged). Following is one of a series of plaintive letters Borland wrote about his situation. If there is any interest in this, I'll be happy to post some other Borland letters.

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HEADQUARTERS,
Pocahontas, Ark., November 20, 1861.

Col. W. W. MACKALL,
A. A. G., Western Dept., C. S. Army, Bowling Green, Ky.:

COLONEL: Yours of the 4th, by mail, missent to Powhatan and forwarded from that office, was received last night.

You communicate the direction of General Johnston that I shall send my "surplus ammunition and supplies to Memphis."

I can briefly answer this by saying that I have no surplus here of either class of these stores. But it is proper I should add that an exaggerated and somewhat extraordinary misapprehension seems to exist in the minds of our generals, particularly in that of General Polk, as expressed in one of his letters, as to the amount of ammunition and subsistence stores at this place, estimating it as he does at some half million of dollars. The precise amount of either class I cannot ascertain as soon as it seems proper to dispatch this communication, but I will send statements as soon as they can be made out; and in the mean time do not hesitate to express the opinion that there is not more than one-fourth, even if there be as much as a fifth, of that amount.

So far from having a surplus of ammunition (except it may be of some one or two kinds, for which I have no suitable guns), I am sorry to have to say that my supply is rather short. If all that General Hardee left here had been kept here and of good quality I should not have had more than enough; but the nominal amount of that is considerably reduced by the damaged condition in which a good deal of it came here, and still further, just before I returned here, by the shipment of some 200 boxes of the best to Memphis by order of General Hardee. I doubt, however, if this lot has reached General Hardee at all, or, if so, it was probably very badly damaged; for although it reached Memphis several days before I left there, it was at the time of my leaving still on the wharf where it had first been landed, without covering of any kind, and exposed to several hard rains. The master of the steamer Kanawha Valley, who had carried it there, informed me that he had tried in vain to get some attention to it from the quartermaster and ordnance offices. I wrote from Memphis to General Hardee about this.

I beg leave to add a few words about my position, &c., here. I think General Johnston will concede that it is a very precarious one in itself, and I know it is a very embarrassing one to me. As he is aware (at any rate I so informed him at Columbus), the force left here (i.e., Pitman's Ferry, &c.) by General Hardee was very small, so small that, as I have all the while insisted, it was available for no useful purpose whatever, either of attack or defense, against such as the enemy certainly had the power and would not fail to bring against me if I should have to deal with him at all. This is obvious from the following statement of its character and numerical strength: It consisted, first, of seven mounted companies-nominally 460 men-indifferently armed, and much enfeebled by the hardest and most constant scouting service to which any troops were ever subjected, through an exceedingly sickly season, and on little more than half rations for man or horse; and, second, of two companies of infantry, about 130 men, just mustered into the service, and indifferently armed. To these have since been added eight companies of similar infantry, numbering about 500 men; and within the last few days I have added still a little further by retaining two and a half companies, together about 150 men, that were passing here. All these together, 1,240 men, being twelve-months' volunteers, with officers and men alike raw and inexperienced, poorly armed and equipped, and without an educated or experienced military man in the whole command. No cannon were left me, or what are no better than none; that is, six iron 6-pounders and two brass 4-pounders, all old, partly dismantled and dilapidated, and without equipment for transportation or active use, and all rejected as worthless and east aside by General Hardee. Of the nominal force I have enumerated, making by no means an unfair allowance for sick, details, &c., 700 would fully cover the number I could count upon for the field.

Thus situated, on the 5th instant I found my position threatened by the enemy with some 400 cavalry and not less (I had some reason to believe much more) than 3,000 infantry and a battery of artillery, reported on good authority (since proved to be true) to be within 60 miles of me and marching rapidly in this direction. This has since proved to have been one of the several columns moved simultaneously from Cairo upon Columbus, from Cape Girardeau upon Bloomfield, and from Ironton upon this place.

As now ascertained, the fate of Columbus, upon the result of which doubtless the others depended, caused them to fall back, how far is not yet known with certainty, but supposed to be to their respective starting points; circumstances warranting the expectation that their southward movement will be repeated as soon as the terms of concert can be again arranged, unless forestalled by an early setting in of such winter weather as shall make the roads impracticable-a contingency too uncertain to be relied upon where interests so vital are at stake.

Thus situated, and feeling that this position is the door into our State-which in turn is a large portion of the right bank of the Mississippi-and that in holding it I was holding the very door of our domiciles, within which were wives, children, and friends, I dared not think of abandoning it, although with the force then at my command it were little better than madness to expect to do more than sacrifice every man of us in a conflict so unequal. This I resolved upon and so announced to my men, and I have no reason to doubt that I had their unanimous and cordial concurrence.

But, not to be desperate as well as determined, I instantly called for the only help then possible in reach-the militia of the adjacent country. This call was promptly responded to with some spirit, but in a manner so hurried, inconsiderate, and tumultuous-throwing in upon me an unorganized and generally unarmed crowd of some 1,500 men within two or three days. Finding this crowd unavailable in the condition in which they came, and the result of the affair at Columbus having temporarily at least warded off the threatened attack upon me, I dispensed with the militia as such and called for volunteers, organized into companies, for thirty days' service, receiving none that are not properly organized, armed with serviceable guns, suitably equipped, clothed, &c. I fixed thirty days as the term of service, for the reason, 1st, that it would bring me the largest amount of force in the shortest time; 2d, that term would cover the period at which we would probably be attacked, if at all, as by the middle of December the weather, roads, &c., would have made active movements of any extent impracticable; 3d, that within that time General Polk, to whom I at once dispatched an account of my situation, could issue such orders in respect to it as he might deem best. Under this call I have received up to this time eleven companies of infantry and one of mounted gunners, numbering together about 700 men; and there are reported to me as on the way, to be here within a day or so, some four more companies, say 300 men.

It is not for me to do more than thus make known to General Johnston my situation, not doubting that he will order what is right to the extent of his power. But I trust it will not be deemed out of place to say to him that my situation here is very embarrassing. It is a brigadier-general's command and should be his responsibility, needing not only the capability of a commander of the qualifications suited to that rank, but the advantage to the public service which the prestige of that rank confers. I do not wish that place for myself. I did once, but in all sincerity I do not now, greatly preferring to return to my regiment or even go into the ranks. I hope, therefore, some one of suitable rank will be ordered to relieve me at once. The public interest requires it.

Very respectfully,

SOLON BORLAND,
Colonel Cavalry, Commanding.