Bruce & Doyle I am in complete agreement with you on all the points. There may have been high expectation on the part of Price to gain momentum in Missouri, but allowing some of his subordinate commands to act in the manner they did, such as giving orders to such notorious units as Bill Andersons did far more harm than good. Besides the river movement capability, the union side controlled the rapid movement of troops via rail. All of the elements for a regular invasion just was not there. Distractions to draw off union troops from other fronts was the desired effect. Marmadukes first raid is an example of this. Once Springfield was threatened, the Army of the Frontier had to act and all operations in NW Arkansas and Indian Territory came to an abrupt halt. Again though, like in the Price Raid, subordinate officers had it in their mind to maintain a full time force in Missouri. Simply put, it wasn't logistically possible.