The point is the Confederate high command was correct in the inability of an army to supply itself in north Arkansas, while they were incorrect in the Union's ability to invade. Taken in context, there was no conspiracy to abandon Arkansas. The driving force to concentrate Confederate forces for a counterattack was Beauregard with the idea of protecting the Mississippi River Valley and with his ultimate goal being St. Louis. This was actually the most favorable of the two plans being considered as far as Arkansas was concerned. The other idea being kicked around was concentrating forces to defend the Middle South, the strategy more or less adopted after the defeat at Shiloh and the eventual abandonment of Corith. Far from being an abandonment of Arkansas it was Arkansas' best chance of salvation and the Confederacy's best attempt to protect the Mississippi River Valley and maintain a connection with the Trans-Mississippi. Of course, it did create problems with the people and government of Arkansas who saw themselves as abandoned and resulted in near mutiny and wholesale desertion from the Arkansas regiments in the Army of Mississippi/Tennessee.