The Arkansas in the Civil War Message Board

Harsh assessment of Gen. Curtis

Helena, Ark., October 20, 1862.

Hon. E. H. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.

Sir—When I parted with you in Washington City I supposed that before this time our army would have been in possession of all the northern part of this State; that our lines would have been advanced to the Arkansas River, and that a considerable portion of that part of the State south of the Arkansas River would also be in our possession. The people of this State were expecting all this to occur, and some of the most violent rebels had retired from the field and were quietly awaiting at their homes the time when the authority of the United States would be extended over them. The arbitrary and tyrannical acts of General Hindman, who till the middle of August last was in command in this State of the rebel forces, had displeased and disgusted many. The destruction of cotton and sugar, the property of individuals, by his orders and by his troops, among other acts, had caused this dissatisfaction. The conscript law was being enforced by him with extreme vigor and great severity. But unfortunately for us the army did not then move. In my opinion no further delay should be made in taking possession of this State.

It appears this army has been kept at this post two months and more to enable speculators and officers of the army to enrich themselves by buying cotton from loyal and disloyal men and from negroes who did not own it. If reports are true, the commandant of this department whilst in command of the Army of the Southwest made “a good thing of it.” For more information on this point call for the report of Judge Baker to Col. William Myers, assistant quartermaster at St. Louis, Mo.

It is also reported that Colonel (now General) Hovey, of Illinois, who had some “contrabands” in his camp belonging to some persons in the State of Mississippi, exchanged them for cotton, giving two “niggers” for a bale of cotton. This I suppose is not returning negroes to their masters, but fair and legitimate trade, in the opinion of that colonel. For information on this point call for report above referred to.

Before I left the city of St. Louis it was reported to me that Major-General Curtis delayed a movement to the interior of this State because I was not present to march with the army. I had previously communicated with him, and was informed a delay of a few days in joining him would make no difference. When I had information of that report I immediately repaired to this place, reported to him, and urged a movement on Little Rock. Cotton and cotton buying was the order of the day. The general said he had not supplies to march on Little Rock; that he awaited orders, &c. After a short time leave of absence was granted to General Curtis.

General Steele, by succession, became the commander of this army. Upon inquiry he found he had not adequate supplies for the army. He sent for such as were needed. He ordered the army to be prepared for a march. Though it was much demoralized by the want of discipline which prevailed, and by the troops having been employed to aid, not the Government of United States, but speculators in cotton, yet arrangements were rapidly made for the advance of this army to the interior of the State. If General Steele had been permitted to carry out his plans this army would now have been in Little Rock.

But this intended movement was arrested by the order of General Curtis to General Steele to march with a portion of the army to Pilot Knob, in Missouri. I proceeded to Cairo and sought to have this order countermanded by General Curtis, who had been placed in command of the Department of Missouri, and informed Major-General Halleck of the order and condition of affairs in this State. That order was not countermanded and there were sent from this place fifteen or twenty steamboats laden with troops and their transportation. This army, shortly after General Curtis arrived at the place, amounted to nearly 30,000. By death, sickness, leaves of absence, and furloughs this army was greatly reduced. The force now here is about 10,000, of whom 8,000 are effective. This is too large a force to coop up in this place, and too small to move anywhere if Helena is to be held by us. Indeed it has been very unfortunate for the army to have remained here. This town is unhealthy, and in my opinion the troops have suffered more sickness and mortality at this point than if the army had been in motion.

Exaggerated reports of the force of the enemy have been put forth. It was reported that General Hindman was in the northwest part of this State, ready to advance into Missouri with 20,000 to 25,000. First, he has not been there; second, no such number of troops have been in Northwest Arkansas. The senior officer in that part of the State is General James S. Rains, one of my constituents, whom I know well, and in my opinion is not fit to command a regiment. His reputation is well known in this State, and it is that of a drunkard, with but little education, and no military education except his experience for the last fifteen months.

Let us review the operations of the Army of the Southwest since it was organized, nine months ago.

It marched via Springfield to Northwest Arkansas, fought the battle of Pea Ridge; the enemy retired to the Arkansas River, and from thence General Price was ordered to the army at Corinth. General Curtis then withdrew to Missouri; marched 100 miles on the southern border of that State, and came to this point via Batesville, having been re-enforced by General Steele, who was at Greenville. He was repeatedly urged before he came to this place and after his arrival here by some of his officers to advance on Little Rock. He persistently refused to permit his army or a portion of it to go to Little Rock to occupy that point. Several gunboats have been lying here; not patrolling the river to prevent supplies being sent from either side of the river to the other. Thus arms have been sent from the east side of the Mississippi River to the west side, and supplies, such as cattle and horses, from the west side to the east side of the river for the rebel armies. The acts of the army at this place can be expressed by saying it has been demoralized, and it has aided officers and cotton traders in making fortunes with the blood of our brave men. The results of the operations of the Army of the Southwest were:

First. That we fought and gained the battle of Pea Ridge.

Second. That it has been demoralized and requires energy to put it in fighting order. General Carr, now in command, is doing all which can be done to remedy this evil, and I trust proper discipline and tone will soon prevail.

Third. That it occupies no more territory than it occupied in March last, with the exception of the ground in actual occupancy at this post.

Such have been the accomplishments of the Army of the Southwest.

What ought to be done? If we had an active and energetic commander of this department, with 20,000 men under command of General Schofield at Cassville, Mo., 10,000 under command of General Steele at Pilot Knob and vicinity, and 10,000 here (8,000 effective) under command of General Carr, the whole of the State of Arkansas ought to be occupied in the next sixty days.

The commander of this department should be a man of great energy and enterprise. I think the present commander does not possess the qualifications, and I say so not out of any personal dislike to him, but because duty compels me to say it.

It was important to have so occupied this State that no election should have been held on the first Monday of this month. At that election I suppose Governor Rector has been defeated and Captain Flanagin elected Governor. This is but an opinion, not based on information derived from the reports of the result of the election. General Hindman’s influence was thrown against Governor Rector. Rector does not belong to the ultra and extreme men of this State; Flanagan does.

Re-enforcements are needed here to enable the army to move, unless General Steele shall advance from Pilot Knob toward Little Rock, when such force as might be spared from this point might join his command at Des Arc, DeValls Bluff, or some point west of Clarendon.

If the troops at this point are destined to occupy Vicksburg re-enforcements will still be needed, in order to hold this post and in sending supplies to Little Rock, if our army shall occupy it. I advise the army of Steele shall move on Little Rock, and that this force shall co-operate with him. I also suggest that the force under command of General Schofield shall advance into this State on or near to its border, and that a portion of this army shall go to Clarksville, on the Arkansas River. If the three armies shall march as indicated the enemy will be driven from the State, and a portion of the army can then be sent to Texas or Louisiana to co-operate with such movements as may be made in those quarters.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. S. PHELPS.