Dale,

Zulavsky's criticism seems a mixed bag in my opinion. Although he seems to have been correct, I doubt it was apparent at the time the decision had to be made. Had Asboth known of the prepared position ahead of time, bringing up the arty would have been the natural choice (sending the cav in pursuit as soon as the position began to unravel.) But since Asboth was clearly unaware of the strength and relative preparedness of his opposition, his course at the time seems reasonable. Once the first charge was unexpectedly checked he had to make a fast decision.

While in retrospect pulling back would have been safer, there is another component to consider. Were the CSA cavalry in the town still partially mounted and visible? From the descriptions in your book it appears they were. If he could see visible mounted cavalry, then disengaging carried potential peril. (It is also possible that he was concerned about what would happen to his other force if he paused. He would have been out of communication with them for a time and the defenders had the interior lines--a potentially dangerous combination.) A typical tactic for cavalry in such a situation would be to charge the mounted force and drive it off, rather than withdraw. Cavalry operated on momentum and when facing another cavalry force it was far better to give than receive.

If there had been no mounted force visible in town, and instead only dismounted defenders, would Asboth have used his howitzers to reduce the position instead? I suspect he would have, but that the presence of mounted troopers made the critical difference in the aggressiveness of his tactics.

That's all just speculation on my part though.

Best wishes,

Shawn