Richard, according to "Hancock’s Diary" (Hx. of the 2 TN. Cav.: pps 241 & 572 ), the brigade that Forrest used to capture Streight’s command 4 months before Chickamauga numbered “about 500 effectives,” while 10 months after Chickamauga, Forrest had brigade strengths of: Patterson- 700; Johnson- 800; Gholson- 600; Neely- 600; Crossland- 900; and Rucker’s brigade (not his Legion) was 900. Of course, one-fourth of them would have been held back holding horses.

Quoting myself again, “Just before Chickamauga, 11 Confederate cavalry regiments in Bragg’s stepchild Army of Tennessee had been made into infantry, due to their lack of horses. With thousands of mounts recently stolen by the Yankee invaders, the Rebels’ reserve of equestrian resources was running dry: dead Union mounts were often just recently stolen Rebel horses. The loss of horses was more devastating to the Confederacy than the loss of Schweinfurt’s ball-bearing plants later were to Nazi Germany -both such losses led to social paralysis.”

You might want to lower your estimates about the size of Forrest’s brigades at Chickamauga, Richard, especially when scores of men had just “deserted” at places like Loudon and Concord Tennessee; the 6th N.C. Cav. was decimated by desertions at Loudon on 9/1-2/1863 [Bradley, "River of Death"; Curry, 107; NARA CSR’s Group M-268; Manardan, "Vol. II" of his NC Rosters].

I still suggest that you (or that gentleman who was confused about the high and low casualties and strength among Forrest’s command at Chickamauga) take Pegram’s report of what he had left after losing 25%, and multiply that by 1.33 to reconstruct Pegram’s pre-battle numbers, and please give my apology and regards to Frau Jana.