Ultimately, after marching about 3,000 men across the Arkansas River and returning to Ft. Smith on 11-6-64, BG Thayer decided to obey the following orders from MGs Halleck and Steele, as given in the Official Records:

41-4-218, 10-24-64. To: BG John M. Thayer, Com. Dist. of the Frontier at Ft. Smith {received the night of 10-26-64}; From: MG H. W. Halleck, U. S. Army Chief of Staff {for Grant} at Washington City:

1. Price will be closely pursued from Missouri to the Arkansas River. {all commanders}
2. If necessary to concentrate all of your {Thayer’s} forces in Fort Smith, do so.
3. A supply train to Ft. Smith will start from Little Rock, not Ft. Scott, soon {10-30-64}.

41-4-308, 10-29-64. To: BG John M. Thayer, Com. Dist. of the Frontier at Ft. Smith; From: MG Frederick Steele, Com. Arkansas at Little Rock:

If Price should return in the direction of your outpost, draw them {Thayer’s outposts} into Fort Smith with all of the public property possible. I {Steele} am anxious to give Price a blow on his return. He has gone into Kansas and it is likely that he will pay you a visit. … Your supply train will leave tomorrow {10-30-64}.

Two days before the Presidential election, and with little reliable information available on either Confederate or Union forces operating in the region, Thayer thought he was doing the responsible thing, given the existing "fog of war." He followed his orders to the tee. Ft. Smith was saved and President Lincoln got re-elected. However, BG Thayer soon got transferred from Ft. Smith to St. Charles, a small post way below Little Rock on the Arkansas River. So much for Thayer following weasel-word orders written by Halleck. As a minimum on 11-6-1864, LG Grant would have wanted Price's Army drowned in the middle of the Arkansas River!

A month later, MG George Thomas, commanding at Nashville, almost lost his command for not promptly attacking LG John B. Hood, starting to dig in just south of Nashville. Again, Grant feared that Hood, like Price, would soon escape (retreat) back to Alabama (from Grant's defensive-minded Union commanders) without paying a "price" for such action. Grant believed that to delay destroying Confederate armies in the open field only led to more (not less) Union casualties, primarily non-combat deaths from diseases, bad food and exposure.