Here are some official communications that offer clues as to the whereabouts of Gurley's Regiment in the summer and fall of 1863:
7/8/63 by command of Gen Magruder: S O #183-VIII.
1. Gen Bankhead will proceed as rapidly as possible, at the head of two Regts of his command, viz, Gurley’s and Hardeman’s, and the Arty Co of mountain howitzers, all equipped, to support Gen Steele in the Indian Territory.
To expedite his movements, Gen Bankhead will use the transportation sent to the Northern Sub-District by Capt Biwke. If this is not on hand, and does not arrive in time, and he has not sufficient transportation, Gen Bankhead will impress the necessary transportation to move these reinforcements rapidly.
2. Col. A. W. Terrell, cdg Regt of Cav, will at once proceed in person to Bonham, and take command of the Northern Sub-District, in the absence of Gen Bankhead
7/9/63 Bonham, Hqs N Sub Dist, Gen Bankhead to Capt Turner-I have the honor to report my arrival at this place on the 7th. Gurley’s Regt, under Lt-Col Battle, reached here yesterday
Because of the scarcity of water in this neighborhood, I have established the encampment at Warren, 15 miles from this place, where I have an abundance of water and grass...
8/11/63 Magruder to Gen Boggs, Chief of Staff: I have the honor to state that, in compliance with the instructions of Lt-Gen Smith, the Bgde from the northern sub district, with Acting Gen Bankhead in command, has been ordered to report to Gen Steele at Fort Smith. I had not sent this Bgde forward, for the reason that the aspect of affairs on the coast induced me to believe that more danger of in invasion lay in that quarter than in the wheat-growing region of the State at that time. This belief has been entertained by me for some time. The limited number of troops now under my command renders it impossible to hold certain positions on the coast. The occupation of any of these points, particularly from Saluria to Galveston, both of these points inclusive, would necessitate the withdrawal of my force from the other points on the coast, for the reason that by holding any of these places he would secure that railroad, and thus be enabled to place his force in our rear.
After a consultation with Gen Scurry, Col Sulakowski, and Col Terrell, I have been led to adopt the following course as regards the disposition of certain Regts: I have ordered Acting Gen Bankhead to proceed to Fort Smith with Gurley's and Hardeman's Regts and a company of light Arty, and also with any other forces he may have in hand. Gurley's Regt is nearly full, but Hardeman's Regt consists of only eight Co’s, few of which are full...
8/23/63 HQs N Sub Dist, Army of Tex, Camp Bankhead, Gen Bankhead to Capt Turner-I have the honor to report, for the information of the major general cdg, that Gurley's Regt, under Lt-Col Battle, moved forward today for Boggy Depot. Krumbhaar's Btry follows tomorrow and Hardeman the next day. The scarcity of water requires that I should move up by detachments, as there is but little water within 37 miles of this place, and not enough for my entire command at any one point. I shall halt at Boggy Depot until I hear from Gen Steele, as I will not leave the Fort Gibson road open until I am ordered to do so, because the consequences would be visited on the major-general, and I believe he relies on my judgment to avoid any sharp criticism or military disasters. If this section of country should be raided over because the Fort Gibson, road was left open, the whole country would rise in condemnation of the order which moved my command from a salient position.
I will be enabled to support Gen Steele with an effective total of about 1,200. This includes Showalter's and Bourland's commands. I have been compelled, however, to arm them with some of the guns intended for Col Terrell, and will not be able to send back more than 300 stand of arms. This need cause no disappointment, as the Tex-made guns are so indifferent that I would not use them if I had shot-guns or the ordinary hunting rifle. But many of Bourland's command, and all of Showalter's, are without arms, are without arms, and I was compelled to take this poor apology for a weapon or leave these troops behind. I should have left here to-day with the advance, but the ordnance supplies will only reach here tomorrow, and I preferred to see to their proper distribution myself...
9/24/63 Camp at Riddles, C.N. 50 miles from Ft Smith, Bankhead to Magruder-I send you a copy of an official communication received from Gen Price's HQs. I suppose that I am transferred now to his command. On my arrival in the Territory, I was ordered up to support Gen Cabell, who was falling back before a superior force of the enemy, in the direction of Red River. I interposed my troops about 30 miles north of Waldron, in Scott County, Ark, but found the enemy going back to Fort Smith, and Cabell going southward. I remained at Waldron until I heard from Gen Cabell, informing me that he was ordered to Little Rock. Returning to this point, I received the enclosed from Gen Price, and am waiting Gen Steele's instructions before taking up the line of march. I regret exceedingly to leave your district, and hope yet to serve under you in the field. I received your letter inclosing the order announcing the action of Gen Smith appointing me brigadier, but [E. J.] Gurley is not going to respect that. He protested to Gen Steele against my "assumption" of the command, and is here now, but not on duty. Gen Steele forwarded his protest to Gen Smith. His course has had a bad effect on the Regt, and I am in hopes Gen Smith will act promptly and settle the question definitely. Gurley's course is insubordinate, and in keeping with the general conduct of Tex officers and men. I think, however, from all indications, that my command, with Gen Price's, will very probably be forced back to Red River. If Price could not hold Little Rock, he will probably be forced farther back.
10/26/63 Shreveport, W. C. Schaumburg, Major & AIG, TM Dept to Gen Boggs, chief of staff-I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the semi-annual inspection made by me of the District of Ark & the Indian Territory. I find it impossible to make it in so detailed a form as I would wish, and can only hope to poi out a few general evils which I find to exist, remedies for which it will be hard to find save in an entire reorganization of the troops and a more rigid enforcement everywhere of regulations and orders.
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The post of Boggy Depot, in Indian Territory, commanded by Col Bass, with garrison of five Co’s from the 20th Tex Regt, is in about the same condition as Washita. No drill, no discipline, and of poor military appearance. They have never been drilled in Bn drill but once. Col Bass, if one judges from the fruits of his labors, is an officer of no competency. Capt [W. H.] Wooten, post QM and acting ACS, is attentive to duty, and, though not perfectly conversant with the papers of his office, is, I think, an efficient officer. His expenditures are extravagant.
Gen Bankhead's Bgde, composed of Gurley's Tex Regt Cav, Hardeman's Tex Regt Cav, & Krumbhaar's Btry, is in poor condition as a Bgde. The discipline of the two Regts is quite poor. Their drill is far below what it should be. Gurley's Regt, commanded by the senior Capt, presented a very poor appearance. I called on the three senior Capt’s to drill the Regt in Bn drill, and each of them in turn admitted his incompetency to do so; finally the senior Capt made the attempt, and failed most signally. Col Hardeman's Regt was better than Gurley's, but very deficient in all things. The drill was poor, discipline poor, arms badly kept and military appearance not good. Krumbhaar's, Btry was in very good order; discipline good; drill very good; military appearance fair. The caissons and carriages were not kept clean, but the ammunition was well packed and the boxes free from anything foreign to their proper contents. The clothing of these men I found to be much better than any I had seen. Capt [E. A.] Burke, Bgde QM, displays energy and efficiency; his papers were in good condition and returns up to date. He had quite a supply of clothing (at least one suit per man) on hand not issued. His disbursements were not as extravagant as other quartermasters.