PRICE’S RAID
Gen. Jo Shelby’s Reply to Pleasonton
An Inside View of the Expedition of 1864
Some Interesting Facts that Have Not Yet Been Made Public
(From the Sedalia Democrat)
In a recent number of your newspaper I read a statement from Gen. Pleasonton of his exploits while in pursuit of Gen. Price in 1864. Pleasonton, while glorifying himself attempts to make a very unkind thrust at Gen. Grant, one of the greatest soldiers the world has produced. In his letter to the Philadelphia Press, which you copied, Gen. Pleasonton says:
“Gen. Price crossed the Arkansas with 25,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery.”
The truth of the matter is that Gen. Price, on the evening of September 22, 1864, crossed the said river with less than 6,000 cavalry and eight pieces of artillery, his cavalry consisting of Fagan’s and Marmaduke’s divisions - less than 3,000 each. On Black River he was joined by Shelby’s division, about 3,500 strong, and one battery (Collins’) of four rifled guns captured from Gen. Steele at Mark’s Mill, Ark. Therefore, Gen. Price moved north into the state of Missouri with three divisions, as mentioned, and with less than 9,000 fighting men and twelve pieces of artillery.
The first point we felt the enemy was in the neighborhood of Doniphan, Ripley County, Missouri. His force was light and in his retreat he applied the torch to the town and as we passed it was only a heap of ashes. This was the work of Maj. Wilson and his command, of whom much has been said of recent years.
No fighting of importance occurred until Pilot Knob was reached. Marmaduke’s and Fagan’s divisions were there and did all the fighting, Shelby’s division being sent to the right some twenty-five miles to intercept any force the enemy might try to throw forward and re-enforce the troops at Pilot Knob. In was never Gen. Price’s intention to enter St. Louis, as Pleasonton states. His object was to reach the Missouri River and give the Southern element an opportunity to enlist. Could he have established himself no doubt he would have carried out 50,000 men. They would have followed him in preference to all others, for no other man could have kindled the same enthusiasm that Gen. Price would have aroused.
Pleasonton admits he had 9,500 men before Gen. Smith joined him with 4,500. He afterwards alludes to Col. Benteen’s brigade of 700, but he forgets to tell that he was re-enforced at Lexington by Gen. Blunt with 3,000. He also omits to say that Gen. Curtis’ force of 3,500 including some Colorado troops, fell in with Gen. Blunt at the Little Blue. He forgets also to state that the Kansas troops were rushing in from every quarter of Kansas to his assistance, and that the Kansas troops from 1856 to the close of the war had always proven themselves equal to the best, and as a general thing their officers always led their men with conspicuous bravery.
I find therefore, that Gen. Pleasonton, by the time he reached the Little Blue, had nearly 22,000 men under his command. The number of pieces of artillery I am unable to state. Gen. Price with about 9,000 men, had this force to resist. Besides, hundreds of wagons, with women and children, were flocking to him daily, anticipating another order similar to Order No. 11. Recruits were rapidly gathering all of whom, however, were unarmed, and these only served to encumber and embarrass his movements. They sought him for protection and he gave it to them. Gen. Price’s men had no difficulty in driving the enemy until he was in the vicinity of Westport, and then was the first and only time that he ever during the entire expedition, brought his three divisions into line of battle, and then merely for the purpose of giving his immense train time to move in such a manner as to enable him to protect it. After some gew hours of hard fighting the enemy gave ground and finally retreated, Gen. Price also withdrawing his command and slowly moving southward.
It was at this point that they charged Gen. John McNeal with neglect, if not wanton inefficiency. As I have said before, had Gen. McNeal ventured a charge, Gen. Marmaduke would have destroyed him. Shelby’s division being to the right and the rear of the point McNeil would have been compelled to strike, would have at once closed in on him and not one of his command could have escaped.
Gen. Price never laid siege to Jefferson City as Gen. Pleasonton asserts. Shelby’s division, having driven the enemy over the Osage River, pushing them into Jefferson City. Price’s command passed in view of Jefferson City. Collins’ Battery was ordered to open on the city, but Gen. Price hearing the guns rode immediately forward and ordered the firing to cease, saying emphaticly, “Not a brick in the capital shall be injured.” Gen. Fagan afterward fought and held the enemy in check about Boonville - the three divisions alternately fighting the enemy under Pleasonton until we reached the neighborhood of Westport. The reader must bear in mind that Curtis’ and Blunt’s forces were directly in Gen. Price’s front; that the Missouri River covered Price’s right flank, and that the entire country on the north side of the river was open to Pleasonton to communicate with Blunt and Curtis. With an able General like Smith, having 4,500 picked veterans to close up in Price’s rear, and with a prairie country on Gen. Price’s left flank, the reader will also wonder (as all of us then did) why Price could march at pleasure from the Osage River to the Kansas line without the slightest annoyance, except in the rear.
Pleasonton tells of the sluggish Little Blue and about its ten or twelve feet of water. When Gen. Price struck the Little Blue all the Kansas troops under Curtis and Blunt were there in line on the opposite bank. We crossed in column under fire, formed line under fire, and two hour’s time the enemy were dislodged, driven from their strong position, and the march continued towards Westport, passing through Independence.
Hear what he says of the fight at Marais de Cygnes:
“At daybreak on the morning of the 25th I found Price camped on the Osage River, and bringing into action the only battery that was able to keep up, he was shelled out of his camp, and retreated some five or six miles to the Marias de Cygne River, where he took a strong position, covered by twelve pieces of artillery and 10,000 men.”
Gen. Marmaduke and Gen. Fagan, with parts of their commands, fought him at the point mentioned. Their commands had been active and fighting for thirty days, their stock was jaded, their ammunition was nearly exhausted, and they yielded finally to overwhelming numbers. Four hours later Pleasonton reached Gen. Price, who had formed and was awaiting his coming, still pushing his immense wagon-train with families of women and children and unarmed men to the south, moving them in four parallel columns at intervals of 100 yards between each division. Price awaited the attack. Pleasonton made it, was defeated and driven back with ease.
He did not disturb us after that until we reached Newtonia, in Newton County. Our pickets reported his coming. Gen. Price immediately made preparations for battle, moved his command into the prairies and formed his line of battle. Governor Thomas C. Reynolds, being with the Missouri Confederates, as he had been at all times during the expedition, took a very active part in this engagement, and did much to encourage our men and was found at all times in the front. The enemy, under Generals Blunt and Sanborn, 5,000 strong, made their appearance and charged stubbornly. We counter-charged, their lines yielded, and, while they displayed great courage, they were defeated and driven into the Grundy timber, six miles from the point of attack. This was the last of Gen. Pleasonton and his forces.
Pleasonton tells of the vast number of sheep and cattle he captured. The grass was very high and dry, and at the close of the fight of the 25th of October, when the enemy were defeated, their shells had set the prairie a fire. A great many of our wounded who had fallen in that engagement were burned to death. The wind blowing hard the flames overtook the sheep and cattle, a stampede of the stock took place, and we could not control them. He never captured one by fighting.
Again, in alluding to the Missouri Union troops, he seems to desire to leave the impression that they were only raw militia, organized for home protection. It must be remembered that those 6,000 Missouri Union troops had been in the war from the beginning. They had never refused to go where ordered; had been out of the State often, and were led by as gallant officers as the Mississippi Valley produced, among them being Col. John F. Philps [sic], of Sedalia, who was conspicuous at the front of the pursuit from the beginning to the end. Indeed these 6,000 Missouri Federals had seen and rendered as much service an any troops in the West. He does them great injustice when he attempts to leave the impression that they were not reliable.
Gen. Pleasonton also says: “It is well known that Gen. Grant removed Gen. Rosecrans after his brilliant campaign in Missouri,” etc.
Take the map - follow Gen. Price’s march - and then consider his small force. Having crossed the Arkansas River on the 23d [sic] of September, 1864, above Little Rock, he moved thence to the vicinity of St. Louis; thence up the Missouri River to the Kansas line; thence south, almost at pleasure, and re-crossed the Arkansas River about the 4th of October [sic] in the Indian Territory with an immense train and with large numbers of unarmed recruits. How could Gen. Grant, therefore, do otherwise than remove the Commander-in-chief, while those who will analyze the facts of the expedition in the future will only wonder why he did not cause the removal of all the general officers, who managed the so-called brilliant campaign.
Jo O. Shelby
Page City, MO. Oct. 8, 1881
P.S. - The battery used against Pleasonton in the last engagement (Collins’) was sold to the Mexicans and used by them in the capture of Maximilian at Queratero.
Source: Rolla (Mo) Weekly Herald, November 3, 1881.