The Missouri in the Civil War Message Board

Part 1 Study of Little Blue Oct. 21, 1864

Battle of Little Blue, Mo. Oct. 21, 1864
Phase 1: Moonlight stationed Maj. Martin Anderson with two companies at the Lexington and Independence road bridge. He sent Capt. Green with Co. I to a ford two miles south of the bridge and Capt. Joel Huntoon with Co. H to a ford four miles distant. Moonlight made his headquarters near the bridge. He posted the rest of his 600 men and four 12 pounder mountain howitzers on a range of hills two miles west of the ford behind stone walls. Companies C, D and K held his center and were the last troops to withdraw from the battlefield. Company E had command of the four howitzers..

At 7 a.m. the fight began. Stallard commanding Marmaduke’s escort drove the Federals from the main bridge which Major Anderson of the 11th Kansas Cavalry burned. Anderson then joined Moonlight’s command at the stone walls. Clark sent Burbridge’s Regiment under Lt. Col. Preston to the ford one mile above and Lawther to the ford.one half mile below.

Phase 2: Lawther attacked Moonlight prematurely with his own 10th Missouri Cavalry. Moonlight drove Lawther back with Companies B and I which charged a rebel force behind a stone wall and killed and captured nearly the entire group..

Phase 3: Help was on the way. Marmaduke ordered Stallard to support Lawther and Clark arrived with Col. Colton Greene’s regiment. Greene dismounted about 150 men, formed across the road, and immediately engaged the enemy, who attacked him. Williams' three-gun battery was unlimbered fifty yards behind Greene. Greene repulsed two attacks, but was flanked and pressed back. Wood arrived on field and stabilized the line front by forming on the Confederate right. Greene was wounded in the fight.

Phase 4: 11 a.m. Blunt arrived with Jennison’s and Ford’s Brigades. He placed Jennison on Moonlight’s right with the 3rd Wisconsin occupying Jennison’s left and the 15th Kansas his right.. Ford’s brigade was divided. Walker’s 16th Kansas Cavalry was placed on Moonlight’s left, McLain’s battery was placed in the center of the line and the 2nd Colorado Cavalry took position on Moonlight’s right.

Hunt placed one section of McLain’s Battery in position to check a rebel advance across a deep ravine, 700 yards in the front. The two guns opened fire on a rebel battery and compelled its withdrawal after its horses had been wounded. The other two sections were directed against rebels who threatened Ford’s left flank. After ten minutes of rapid firing, Curtis ordered the battery to fall back, its position being too exposed.

In the meantime Hunt took position in a field 400 yards in advance of the main line with Blunt’s body guard and four howitzers. This position being too exposed, Hunt fell back to some farm buildings where he was supported on his right by Maj. Smith’s 2nd Colorado Cavalry.

Blunt launched an attack with the 15th Kansas Cavalry, 11th Kansas Cavalry and 2nd Colorado Cavalry also advanced on foot against the Confederate line which fell back to its original position. To make matters worse, the Confederates were running out of ammunition.. Wood’s Battalion inflicted severe casualties on the Federals who fell in piles 2 or 3 high in front of him.

Phase 5: Kitchen arrived with his 7th Mo. Cavalry and with Davies’ Battalion. They took position on the Confederate left. He found the battery fleeing to the rear and the road full of retreating men, all of them followed by the enemy who were rapidly pursuing. Davies’ troopers saved one of the cannon while Kitchen checked the enemy who fell back to their first line, the stone wall.

Phase 6: Learning of the crucial condition of Marmaduke’s division, Price sent orders to Shelby to ride to the front. Having heard the artillery fire, Shelby was already en route to the front when he received Price’s order. He arrived at the point when Blunt had fallen back to his position behind the rock walls again.

Shelby dismounted his division except for Nichols’ regiment and waded across the Little Blue. He formed Jeff Thompson’s Iron Brigade on Clark’s left with Gordon’s regiment next to Kitchen’s. (Clark’s Report p. 683 and Shelby’s report p. 657). Jackman supported Thompson.
(Shelby’s Report, p. 657) Fagan’s Division came up and supported Shelby but was not immediately engaged. (Price’s Report in OR Vol. 41, Part 1, p. 634)

Shelby did not make much progress against the Federals behind their stone walls until his artillery arrived after great difficulty. It took up a splendid position it opened up a heavy fire on the Federals. Shelby then sent Nichols’ Battalion to attack the Federal left while Thompson attacked in front. At this point the Federals fell back. (Shelby’s Report p. 657) Nichols broke the Union line in his front and drove it back. (Jackman’s report, p. 675)

At the front of Shelby’s attack were the guerillas under George Todd. His men killed Major Smith of the 2nd Colorado Cavalry. His regiment had been ordered to support a battery of howitzers that had been placed on the right and in front of a farm house by Maj. Hunt. The rebel fusilade became so intense that Moonlight with the 11th Kansas Cavalry came to the front again and formed on the left. A rebel bullet hit Smith in the heart and he toppled dead from his saddle without a word. (Hinton, p. 330).

After Shelby became engaged the Federals held this position for an hour against Confederate attacks. (Clark p. 683)

At 3 p.m. the Federals began to retreat from the field. (Moonlight) The 11th Kansas gave up its line of stone walls. Walker poured a flank fire into the rebs and covered their retreat.
Shelby pursued with Thompson’s Iron Brigade. (Price’s Report in OR Vol. 41, Part 1, p. 634)

Phase 7: The Federals reformed half a mile west of the stone walls. Taking position on the left of the road, McLain directed his fire to the woods in his front and to his right, checking the rebels who were advancing there.

Phase 8: McLain halted two miles east of Independence on the right of the road. In front and to the right the ground was open. On the left was a body of woods through which Blunt’s men fell back. After his troops retreated from the wood, Blunt himself directed the battery fire which was joined by the howitzers. The rebel rifle fire slackened and Blunt ordered a charge which cleared the wood. This allowed the battery and 11th Kansas Cavalry to pass to the rear.

Phase 7: Using the 2nd Colorado Cavalry, the 16th Kansas Cavalry and a portion of the 11th Kansas Cavalry, Ford fights a 7 mile rearguard action all the way to Independence pressed by the Iron Brigade.. Ford formed half of his brigade in one line and then fell back to a second line. Then he repeated the same process over and over again. (Hinton p. 101)

The division reached Independence as the sun was setting. (Moonlight) On the edge of town the Federals formed three lines, one behind the other. In the front line, the 16th Kansas Cavalry held the rebels at bay until driven back to the 2nd Colorado which formed the second line. The two regiments held this second line for a time and then fell back onto the town. Meanwhile the 11th Kansas Cavalry re-supplied itself with ammunition and covered the retreat through the streets to the railroad bridge west of town. (Hinton p. 103)

George Todd was killed in this last struggle. (Britton p. 449) He was believed to have been killed a bit later by Col. Hoyt of the 15th Kansas Cavalry. (Hinton, p. 105)

Hinton says the battle lasted 8 hours. For the first 3 hours Moonlight fought alone. For the last 5 hours, Blunt fought a vastly superior force until night ended the conflict in the streets at Independence.
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Blunt’s Report: Early on the morning of the 21st I was directed to move with all the volunteer force back to the Little Blue, and just as the command had commenced to move I received a dispatch from Colonel Moonlight informing me that the enemy were advancing in force; that he had burned the bridge, and was engaging their advance. The command was now pressed forward as rapidly as possible, but on arriving upon the field I found that the small force under Colonel Moonlight, although making a stubborn resistance, had been forced back by superior numbers, and we had lost the strong position on the west side of the Little Blue, before alluded to, and where I had hoped to have held Price in check until General Rosecrans' forces came up on his rear, had circumstances have permitted me to remain there, as I had suggested the day previous. As soon as the troops could be got into position, a gallant attempt was made to push back the enemy and retake the ground we had lost, when their line was driven back nearly a mile, but the vastly superior numbers of the enemy enabling them to push forward heavy flanking columns on my right and left, compelled me to fall back in the direction of Independence. The retreat was conducted in perfect order, every foot of ground being stubbornly con- [end of p. 574]
tested, and the troops exhibiting a degree of coolness in the face of an overwhelming enemy seldom equaled. The fighting lasted nearly six hours, the enemy's fire ceasing abut 4 p. m., when he refused to advance against my last line of battle formed on the east side of Independence. At 5 o'clock the command moved in column to the main camp of the militia on the Big Blue, where defensive works had been constructed, arriving there about 8 p. m.
The Fourth Brigade, under command of Colonel James H. Ford, Second Colorado Cavalry, consisting of the Second Colorado Cavalry, Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry, and First Colorado Battery, which had been detached from the Third Brigade by order of the commanding general, reported to me for orders on the morning of the battle of the Little Blue and participated in all the operations of the day, and to Colonel Ford and his command is due great credit for their coolness and gallantry. To Colonel Thomas Moonlight and the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry for their gallantry displayed in resisting the advance of the enemy on the morning of the 21st until re-enforcements arrived, as also their gallant conduct in covering the retreat at Lexington on the 19th, special commendation is due, nor can I omit to make special mention of Major R. H. Hunt, of the staff of the commanding general, for the gallant service he rendered with the howitzer battery of the general's escort. Report of James G. Blunt in OR Vol. 41, Pt. 1, Pages 574-575

Blunt’s Reminiscences: On the following morning General Curtis acceded to my request to move back to the position I had left the previous evening, on the Little Blue, and taking with me the troops that I had previously with me, and those that I had asked to be forwarded to me the evening before, I lost no time in getting the command in readiness to move, and just as they were filing out of the streets of Independence, a telegram was handed me from Col. Moonlight (I had sent to him the night before, an operator with an instrument, and a ground wire to tap the line) saying that he had burned the bridge, that the enemy was crossing in force at several points (fording) and that he was making all the resistance that he could. I now pushed forward at a rapid speed, hoping that Col. Moonlight would be able to hold them in check until I could get in position on the ridge before alluded to, but upon arriving upon the field I found that although Col. Moonlight with the Eleventh regiment, had been making a desperate resistance, they had been driven back nearly a mile. Deploying the other regiments into line and dismounting them, they dashed forward and pressed the enemy back for a distance of half a mile, when our flanks becoming endangered by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, we were compelled to call back. About this time Gen’l. Curtis came up and by interfering with the dispositions of my troops without conveying his orders through me, threw the command into confusion that might have been avoided. He soon after left the field and gave me no more trouble during the day, except on his return to Independence, he ordered back my ammunition wagons which I had ordered to the front, which circumstances came near proving dis [page ends] asterous to the whole command. My entire available force did not exceed three thousand men, with which to contend against Price’s entire command, and my purpose now was to fight for time, that Rosecrans’ force might come up in the enemy’s rear, and to enable the militia of Kansas to concentrate on the border.

With the small force at my command I formed two lines, fighting each alternately while the other was falling back and taking a new position, and thus the fight continued from 9 o’clock a.m. unti 4 o’clock p.m., when the enemy refused to advance upon our last line, formed on the east side of Independence. In this day’s fight our loss was slight while the enemy were punished severely. I have never for a moment doubted that had I been allowed to remain on the Little Blue the night of the 20th, and received the reinforcements I asked for, the contest would have been settled there in a manner entirely satisfactory to our arms. I had no doubt of my ability tin that position to have held the ground until Pleasanton could come up when we could have crushed Price’s command. “Blunt: Civil War Experiences” in Kansas Historical Quarterly, pp. 256-257)

Report of Maj. Robert H. Hunt: 21st, went to Little Blue, distance nine miles, where we met the enemy in force fighting and driving Colonel Moonlight. By your direction I placed McLain's battery in position and opened fire on the enemy, with what result I cannot state. I also placed two mountain howitzers connected with your body guard in position in the open field, but finding it too much exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters I directed an advance of your body guard howitzers and two other howitzers of the Eleventh Kansas Volunteer Cavalry. They took position in shelter of friendly house, supported on the right by Colonel Ford; had no support on the left. As I met the Eleventh retreating I saw Major Ross and begged of him to have Colonel Moonlight retrace his steps and support me, which he did. Artillery opened on the enemy with canister and spherical case at short range and drove them back like sheep. Here is where the brave Major Smith sacrificed his life in behalf of his country. Colonel Ford asked when I would retreat. I replied when he would. He remarked, that although we drove the enemy from our front they were flanking us. At this juncture I received an order from the commanding general [to fall back], which was just int he nick of time. We retreated firing, keeping the foe at a respectful distance. Lieutenant Gill, of your body guard, lost 15 horses out of 40 killed, and after I put my saddle on another he was wounded. And let me here say that Lieutenant Gill, Captain Johnson, and their men behaved like heroes, and Colonels Ford's and Moonlight's commands resisted successfully every charge made by the rebels; too much credit cannot be awarded them. Major Ross, of the Eleventh Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, was with me almost through the entire day, rendering invaluable services by his presence and encouragement. He lost 1 horse in killed and 1 wounded. The artillery and cavalry which were under my observation maintained several positions for a time until, outnumbered by the enemy six to one, were compelled to retreat, but fighting every inch. The last artillery firing that was done was by Lieutenant Gill, and supported by the cavalry portion of the body guard, commanded by the lamented Captain Gove, which was about midway between the Blue and Independence. Here the artillery did good work. Rebels having congregated in shelter of a house, distant about 600 yards, Lieutenant Gill and Sergeant Miller dropped several shells in their midst, sending two into the house and exploding after they passed through the roof. This I learn from prisoners. Many were killed [page 543 ends] and wounded. One of Lieutenant Gill's horses was killed, several wounded; had to leave one set of harness the enemy pressed so close. Colonel Walker, of the Sixteenth, maintained a position to our rear and left, keeping the enemy from flanking us. He commenced the retreat, but sufficiently maintained his position until the artillery passed him. I observed that the Sixteenth, under Colonel Walker and Major Ketner, did good work. Many things of importance occurred before and after this, but as they came under the commanding general's own notice I will not mention them. I remained with the rear of the column until they arrived at the Big Blue. In the retreat there was no confusion, the enemy was too badly punished to press us too closely. It was after dark when I reported at headquarters, which was established at the Big Blue fifteen miles. Report of Maj. Robert H. Hunt in OR Vol. 41, Pt. 1, pages 543-544.

Moonlight’s Report: On the same day the division took up position on the west bank of the Little Blue, eighth miles from Independence, and in the afternoon the Second Brigade was left alone to watch the enemy, fight him at the crossing, and burn the bridge. It is proper to state here that the two companies of the Fifth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry were not with the brigade, as they had been left on the border of Kansas to watch the guerrillas, and when the balance of the division was withdrawn from the Little Blue the two companies of the Sixteenth also went, leaving me only ten companies of the Eleventh Kansas Volunteer Cavalry. Company G of that regiment being escort for Major-General Curtis, and Company L, at Fort Riley, my force being reduced, and the stream being fordable almost any point, it was no easy matter to hold an enemy so numerous and active, all being cavalry. Major Anderson, Eleventh, with two companies, had command of the bridge, which he set on fire and held until it was fairly burning, after which he fell back on the hill and joined the command, who then opened fire on the enemy. Captain Greer, with his company (I, Eleventh), had been stationed at a ford about one mile below the bridge, with instructions to hold the enemy as long as possible. He retired without firing a shot, but claims that it was not possible to do otherwise, as the enemy were crossing at all points.
Being thus menaced on all sides and the object for which I was left accomplished, the command slowly fell back about two miles, fighting. A favorable piece of ground here presenting itself, a new line of battle was formed on the left of the Independence road, and we slowly began to drive the enemy back over the ground again, dismounting every man for the purpose of shelter behind some walls, fences, and houses, some of which were then held by the enemy, who, after a vigorous assault, were dislodged, thus affording us an advantage which accounts for the few killed and wounded on our side, compared with the enemy, who suffered terribly. The Eleventh Regiment here behaved like old veterans, and gave renewed proof of their fighting qualities, driving an enemy greatly their superior i numbers to the very ground occupied in the morning. By this time General Blunt had come up, and other troops were being thrown in on the right to my support. About 200 of the Sixteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, of that regiment, reported to me and did splendid service on the left. Major Hunt, Fifteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, chief of artillery for Department of Kansas, reported about this time with some mountain howitzers, and rendered such service as only a brave and gallant officer can render. We thus held the enemy back for hours, a great portion of the time without any ammunition, supplying its place with lusty and defiant cheers. It became necessary to withdraw the command a short distance and take up a new position, as the enemy, ten to one, were flanking us in perfect safety. Shortly after gaining the new position I received orders to withdraw my men and mount. The first movement had to be accomplished in the very face of [page 592 ends] the enemy, and giving up to them a line of stone walls rendered the movement a dangerous one, and had it not been for the command already referred to, under Colonel Walker, opening a flank fire by my directions, I question much if the retreat would not have been a fatal one and yet it had to be done, as the ammunition train by some mistake was away in the rear, where I joined it, and supplied my command anew. By this time the entire command had fallen back, and the Second Brigade, as ordered, formed a new line of battalion the east side of Independence. About this time Captain Hunton, with his company (H) of the Eleventh, joined the command. The captain had, by my order the day previous, been sent up Little Blue about four miles to guard a ford and check the enemy, which he did in his usual gallant style, never abandoning his position, although pressed, in a manner isolated, and knowing we were being driven back on his left. The covering of the retreat from this point was given the Second Brigade, and to Companies B and H was the work assigned, under my own supervision. The enemy was held for some time at bay. A skirmish was kept up in the streets of Independence and as far as the railroad bridge, when the enemy abandoned the pursuit; it was then dark. We arrived in camp on Big Blue about midnight, where the entire force was concentrated. Throughout the entire engagement on Little Blue I was ably assisted by the field officers of the Eleventh, viz, Lieutenant-Colonel Plumb, Majors Anderson and Ross (the latter had two horses shot under him), as also my adjutant, Lieutenant Taber, together with those already named of other regiments. The entire command behaved with the utmost coolness and gallantry, commanding officers of companies vieing with each other in the discharge of their duties. I regret to say that in this engagement Captain N. P. Gregg, Company M, Eleventh, received a severe gunshot wound in the right arm which is likely to disable him for life. The captains is one of the best officers in the service and it is to be hoped that he will yet be spared for future fields of operations. the enemy, and giving up to them a line of stone walls rendered the movement a dangerous one, and had it not been for the command already referred to, under Colonel Walker, opening a flank fire by my directions, I question much if the retreat would not have been a fatal one and yet it had to be done, as the ammunition train by some mistake was away in the rear, where I joined it, and supplied my command anew. By this time the entire command had fallen back, and the Second Brigade, as ordered, formed a new line of battalion the east side of Independence. About this time Captain Hunton, with his company (H) of the Eleventh, joined the command. The captain had, by my order the day previous, been sent up Little Blue about four miles to guard a ford and check the enemy, which he did in his usual gallant style, never abandoning his position, although pressed, in a manner isolated, and knowing we were being driven back on his left. The covering of the retreat from this point was given the Second Brigade, and to Companies B and H was the work assigned, under my own supervision. The enemy was held for some time at bay. A skirmish was kept up in the streets of Independence and as far as the railroad bridge, when the enemy abandoned the pursuit; it was then dark. We arrived in camp on Big Blue about midnight, where the entire force was concentrated. Throughout the entire engagement on Little Blue I was ably assisted by the field officers of the Eleventh, viz, Lieutenant-Colonel Plumb, Majors Anderson and Ross (the latter had two horses shot under him), as also my adjutant, Lieutenant Taber, together with those already named of other regiments. The entire command behaved with the utmost coolness and gallantry, commanding officers of companies vieing with each other in the discharge of their duties. I regret to say that in this engagement Captain N. P. Gregg, Company M, Eleventh, received a severe gunshot wound in the right arm which is likely to disable him for life. The captains is one of the best officers in the service and it is to be hoped that he will yet be spared for future fields of operations. Report of Thomas Moonlight in OR Vol. 41, Pt. 1, pages 592-593

Moonlight’s Memoirs: On the morning of the 21st the enemy came down on us, flushed with what they considered a victory at Lexington and eager for the fray. The bridge was burned and the advance, for a short time, checked. Having an operator with me the line cut I dispatched him to inform Gen. Curtis how matters stood, and as I never saw the operator again, do not know if my message was returned. I held my ground for about an hour, but my force was too small to guard the flanks, and I was reluctantly comepelled to fall back, fighting in voiolation of orders.

As I had already violated my instructions, I thought I might do a little more. In fact, I determined to make Little Blue a battlefield, orders or no orders, for every day, every mile, that ewe delayed the advance of the enemy kept him that much longer of out Kansas, truly giving the militia time to make the scene of action and the Missouri troops, under Pleasanton, following Price’s army, an opportunity to close on him, and the sequel proved the correctness of my position.

Having marched on the open part of the country, with only fences to impede my movements, the command was splendidly dismounted, the horses were left in the rear and the enemy were charged back in return. For over a mile did we drive them, having their dead and wounded strewing the ground. Then we held them until re-enforcements under Genl. Blunt came up to my assistance by which time there was scarcely a round of ammunition in my command. We supplied its place, however, by shouting defiance at the enemy. About 3 p.m. the retreat was ordered to Independence, and on the route I overtook the ammunition train, supplied each man with 80 rounds, and was again ready for any emergency.

As the division reached Independence the sun was setting, and although we endeavored to find a good position for defense, was compelled to continue the retreat. The brigade was here given the point of honor and danger and we fought the enemy in the streets of Independence until [page 35 ends] dark, allowing the command time to take up position on Big Blue. It was near midnight ere we reached a field of corn and threw ourselves to the hard ground to sleep. Wagon & camp equipage were not (and very properly too) allowed to any brigade. General Moonlight’s Civil War in Arkansas Historical Quarterly, Spring 2003, pp. 35-36.