Here are the notes I took when I read the transcripts of the courts of inquiry for McFerran and Brown re their conduct at Battle of Big Blue
Court of Inquiry for James McFerran
Testimony of 1st Lt. Thomas Doyle, Adj. 1st MSM Cav.
P. 36-37 - once the brigade had passed through Independence and formed west of the town, it halted with the 1st MSM Cav. In front. One battalion under Maj. Mullen was ordered to take the advance. He dismounted and moved forward. McFerran ordered Doyle forward to tell Mullen to hold the rebels in check. As Doyle moved to the rear to rejoin McFerran, the rest of the regiment then joined Mullen. McFerran sent Doyle forward again to examine the enemy’s position. Doyle reported that the enemy was massing on their left. (Page 36 ends) Doyle reported this to Brown. When the firing grew heavier, he asked Brown for more cavalry. Brown sent some of the 4th MSM under Maj. Kelly. Doyle accompanied this contingent to the front directed them where to form. He suggested to McFerran that a section of artillery would do some good. McFerran sent him to ask for it from Brown. Some time elapsed before the section arrived. The oficer asked Doyle where to put it. Doyle showed him but the officer put it elsewhere.
p. 38 - During this fight the regiment under Lazear was stationed in a single line of battle. McFerran remained in the rear with his staff and bodyguard where the horses were stationed. During the heavy firing he took command behind a tree. He stayed in the rear until Brown came up with the artillery.
p. 39 - McFerran received Doyle’s reports and ordered him to pass them along to Brown. He was cool and easy under fire. He was 200-300 yards behind the line of battle. He was not stationary. He was at one time behind a tree. This was after Mullen was mortally wounded and as Doyle was coming back from asking for a section of artillery.
P. 40 - at that point the regiment had been in action 15 or 20 minutes. On the 23rd the regiment was in rear of the 4th MSM, with the men holding their horses. Doyle was at the front with McFerran. He did not observe any straggling . . .
P. 41 - until after daylight when the men were allowed to go 3/4 of a mile to the rear where the forage was. Part of each squadron left, some on foot and some on horses. .It was ½ to 3/4 of a mile away.
P. 42 - the men were wheeled to the left and not in line. Some slept under their horses feet.
P. 43 - McFerran did not send orders to his officers at the front and direct the battle. Yet Doyle says that McFerran ordered him to ? And direct Maj. Mullins to swing his ? To the left and press forward into the ?
P. 44 - a moment or two before the section of artillery arrived, McFerran ordered Doyle to
p. 47 - On the 22nd they left the Sni on a road not known to Dyle until checked on the Little Blue. He estimates the distance as from 12-15 miles on the road from Lexington to Independence. When they got to Little Blue the bridge was burning. They threw rocks into the river to allow the command to cross. The rebs had put up a breastworks of logs and rocks to impede their crossing.
p. 48 - at Big Blue the rebels had cut drown trees to impede their crossing. There was timber on both banks of the river. Doyle received no orders from the line. He did make suggestions to McFerran, such as for him (Doyle) to ask Gen. Brown for reinforcements to be put in on their left.
Brown Court of Inquiry
Testimony of Gen. Alfred Pleasonton
p. 6 - He was ordered to Jefferson City about Oct. 6th
p. 8 - Pleasonton was shown an order issued to Brown at 4 a.m. He said, ".. . . but there was ample time for the order to have reached Gen. Brown and been executed." He had no personal knowledge of the time the ordered reached Brown, but that Brown made no mention of not having received it.
P. 9 - the order is shown
p. 10 - Pleasonton was afraid Brown would not execute the order promptly so he was very careful about the language of the order. He wanted no mistakes that morning since the enemy was pressing the Kansas forces. ". . . as I said before I had reason to fear that Gen. Brown would not execute the order promptly." "The brigade that had been fighting all night I knew was very much exhausted and I wanted to relieve them with fresh troops."
P. 11 - Gen. Sanborn was ordered to support Gen. Brown.
:"I expected to hear at day light some sort of an attack. I heard of nothing, and at day light I went to the front. I passed through troops in disorder, stragglers, troops who as ? If they were going into camp rather than into a fight. I was told that they were the 1st MSM which I knew was one of Gen. Brown’s regiments - that showed me that the brigade had not been ut into the fight as I had ordered. I went at a rapid pace to the front, and found Gen. Brown there. No attack had been made, and I didn’t see any attempt at any attack. I asked him for the reason for not making an attack.
P. 12 He relived Brown about 7 a.m. At the time "Some few skirmishers had been thrown out by Col. Winslow - a few faltering shots - that was about all - no spirit - no life - no desire to attack or do anything as it appeared to me when I came up there but had an attack been made with the command on that position and the command had been repulsed they would have been rolled up right along the road.. I considered the thing disgraceful for men pretending to be military men, to have a command in that condition."
P. 13 - Asked if he the position of Gen. Curtis’ forces, Pleasonton replied that they were at Westport. He was not sure if the rebels had commenced their attack on Curtis when he reached Brown - but "I knew they had begun at Westport before my attack was fairly under way, for I could hear the guns, the cannon."
p. 14 - Asked if he knew the regiments in Brown’s Brigade, Pleasonton said he knew the 1st and 7th well. "I stopped in Independence to make arrangements for the sick and wounded, and I think the Brigade passed through Independence while I was attending to that business."
Speaking of McFerran’s regiment, Pleasonton said, "this regiment I spoke of must have been 2 miles or more in rear of where I met Gen. Brown at the head of his command and there was a large interval in betwen where there were no troops at all."
P. 15 - he said the brigade was on no condition to receive or make an attack. Pleastonon couldn’t find any officers who seemed to have any control of the troops. He stopped and tried to rectify matters himself through his staff
p. 16 - Pleasonton’s Order #3 dated Oct. 21st was produced. Part 1: It stated that company roll calls would be held daily at reveille, at all halts, and at retreat. All absentees would be reported. By the company commanders to the regimental commanders and were to be forwarded by them to the brigade commanders and they would forward the information to Pleasonton’s HQ along with a statement by the brigade commanders reporting what they’d done about absentees.
P. 17 - .Part 2: Regimental commanders were ordered to appont a field oficer to examine these offenses committed by the men and to sentence them to punishments not exceeding one month’s stoppage of pay and one month’s imprisonment.
Part 3: While on the march each regiment was to be followed by a rear guard under command of a commissioned officer who would permit no man to leave the column without written permission from the regimental commander. Brigade commanders were ordered to do this also
Part 4: All marauding, pillaging or robbing would be punished in the most severe and summary manner by the officers
Part 5: Brigade and regimental commanders would be held to strict accountability for the observance of the above orders.
P. 19 - Pleasonton estimated that the enemy rear guard between Little Blue and Independence numbered 500 or 600 men and three pieces of artillery. There may have been more, he admits.
Asked when he reached Independence, Pleasonton replied that he left there at 3 p.m. and that he’d remained in the city for between 2 and 2/12 hours.
P. 20 - While in town or after he left town, Pleastonton gave orders to Winslow and Brown to move on and follow the enemy. Asked what fighting Brown did, Pleasonton said there was nothing beyond skirmishing.
P. 21 - asked how long Brown’s engagement lasted, Pleasonton said he hear firing off an on while he was in Independence. Asked if he heard artillery firing, he said a few shots but nothing to indicate an engagement or occasion any apprehension on his part that the enemy would make a stand there.
Asked the enemy force, he said 500 or 600 at Littl Blue that were thrown out as a rear guard until they could clear Indepdnence of their trains and stragglers and
p. 22 - that they left a larger force for this to fall back on but the whole of that force was thrown out of town by Sanborn and McNeil for it was beyond Independence that Catherwood’s regiment charged and took the guns.
Asked how far Brown drove the rebels, Pleasonton said he passed Brown to go to the front and believed it could not have been more than 2 or 3 miles. At that time Winslow had moved to the front and Brown’s men were not moving.
p. 23 - Asked if he had halted a section of guns at Independence, Pleastonton said he could not remember. Asked if any of Brown’s brigade halted there, Pleasonton said not by his orders. Pleasonton estimated that he came up to Brown at around 6 p.m. He passed Brown and went on towards the front.
P. 24 - About dark he put Winslow’s brigade into action. He made his headquarters at the spot where Winslow first drove the rebels. He could not tell how long the firing lasted but he was content that the enemy was pushed back all night by Winslow.. Asked how far his camping place that night was from Indepdependence he replied 9 miles. He also estimated it was 3 miles from Byram’s Ford.
P. 25 - asked what he meant that Brown did not get up to the front of the 22nd as ordered, Pleasonton replied he did not get up at the commencement of the fighting at the Little Blue.
Asked if he remembered any orders to halt the ammunition train at the Little Blue, Pleasonton replied that after he crossed the Little Blue at the commencement of the fighting, he issued orders not to cross any wagons or trains until further notice. He gave another order before he reached Independence to bring up all the trains.
p. 26 - asked how far it was from his camp ground of the night of the 22nd to where he encountered the 1st MSM Cav., he replied that he supposed not more than 1/4 mile.
Asked if he personally knew who the straggling troops were along the road to Byram’s Ford he said that he did, having asked oficers . He asked of 3 or 4 parties. He personally asked some and his staf asked others. He judged that there were several squadrons scattered and straggling.
Pleasonton sent his staff oficers to look for officers to control the straggling and to arrest McFerran and to put Lazear in command of the regiment and to order Lazear to put the regiment in condition to go into action.
p. 27 - asked if he had sent an order that morning or during that night to McFerran telling him not to move until supplied with ammunition, Pleasonton said no.
Asked if he was aware that Brown’s brigade was out of ammunition, Pleasonton said no and that it was the business of the brigade commanders to take care of their ammunition. He also said he wouldn’t have accepted it as a valid excuse for it was as much his duty to be supplied with ammunition as it was to fight when ordered to do it.
P. 28 - Pleasonton was asked to elaborate what he meant when he’d said that Brown was coninually making excuses. He replied that on the 22nd Brown had stopped without orders and had tried to justify his disobedience..
Asked if Brown had stated that he was out of ammunition, Brown replied that he might have done so. However "I don’t considder that a valid excuse on the part of an officer. I have never yet found a commander or a soldier who wanted to fight who ever made any complaint about ammunition."
Asked if McFerran had told him that he was out of ammunition, Pleasonton said he did not remember.
P. 29 - asked at what time Brown made excuses, Pleasonton could remember only one time at Jefferson City the night he (Pleasonton) arrived there.
Asked if he’d ordered Brown into action before the 22nd, Pleasonton replied no because Brown had not come up so there was no opportunity.
P. 30 - asked if Brown had disobeyed any orders prior to the 22nd, Pleasonton replied no, if he had, he would have relieved him.
Asked what happened during the conversation, Pleasonton said he remembered that Brwon had not made the attack, that his command was not in a proper condition to make an attack, and that he’d relieved Brown.
Asked if he remembered that Brown attempted to make an explanation, Pleasonton said no.
p. 31 - Pleasonton was asked if he’d said "No explanations. We will attend to that another time." He replied no. He said his object was to get an attack going.
Asked if he remembered getting a written explanation, Pleasonton said he did not remember.
Pleasonton was shown a written order in Cole’s handwriting. He was asked if he’d looked at the envelope to see when it was received by Brown. He said he had not. He had only asked if it had been delivered.
Asked what the orders were concerning foraging, Pleasonton said that the subordinate commanders regulated foraging and that proper receipts should be given.
P. 33 - Asked how far his hq were from Brown’s hq, Pleasonton said it could not have been more than half a mile.
P. 34 Asked how far from the ford he found Brown, Pleasonton replied 3/4 of a mile.
Asked where the 2 mile interval in the column was, Pleasonton said it was in front of McFerran’s regiment.
P. 35 - Pleasonton says he saw Brown on his horse beside the road. There were no troops on the side of the road there because the woods were thick. He did see troops in the fields on each side of the road about ½ or 3/4 of a mile to the rear of Brown’s hq. Pleasonton said he did not see any troops in motion or preparations for an attack.
Pleasonton says he did not ask Brown whether he got his orders or not because he was under the impression that he had.
Asked where Winslow’s brigade was, Pleasonton said "Still at the front. He made his attack first and had been fighting all night too."
Pleasonton says that once it got into the fight Brown’s brigade did very well, but Pleasonton supposed he lost an hour or an hour and a half because it was not in order,
"At one time I thought that we would all be driven back into the creek." That was after they’d crossed and driven the rebs from their first position.
Asked what he meant about Winslow’s brigade, Pleasonton said "I said he threw his troops in first on that side of the creek and in the general engagement they became engaged first."
Asked whether he saw troops dismounting and forming in the road (Philips regiment) Pleasonton said, "I don’t know."
p. 38 - Asked whether there was an order to Winslow that Brown was going to relieve him, Pleasonton replied that he didn’t know if the instructions were verbal or written, but he gave the same instructions to Winslow as he gave Brown.
"I saw Winslow in the morning. He and I got across the creek together, and I told him I was sorry to call upon his men to make the attack that morning, but it couldn’t be avoided and he answered ‘Well, we will do the best we can.’ A short time afterwards he came back and said, I must stop. I am shot through the leg."
Testimony of Gen. John Sanborn
testimony of J.H. Little of Brown’s staff
p. 147 - the brigade passed through Independence at a gallop, the 1st MSM Cav. In the advance. They were sent into action mounted at the railroad. When they had passed 100 yards beyond the railroad they were fired upon. The 1st MSM was deployed to the right and sharp firing began. along their whole line. The 4th MSM arrived next. Little dismounted them near the railroad by order of Gen. Brown and pointed to them where they were supposed to go. They immediately went into action dismounted. The artillery was not up, having been stopped in Independence by Col. Coles. Next the 7th MSM went into action dismounted. Finally the artillery came up and was put into position beyond the railroad at the head of a lane or turn of a road about 600 yards from the railroad.
p.148- the rebs were shelling Brown’s men and Brown’s section was replying. Brown orderd Winslow to reinforce his left with a regiment.
The enemy had the range of Brown’s artillery. Also the firing on the was very heavy, so Col. Philips with with the dismounted men and a portion of his 7th MSM were brought up to support the battery and took position on the right and rear of the battery. After the firing on the right died down, Brown sent Little to the right with an order for the regiments to press the enemy furiously or vigorously, Little could not recall which. He gave the orders to Lazear, Crittenden and Kelly.
p. 149 - He encountered these officers as they were collecting the dead and wounded of both sides. Shortly afterwards a forward movement commenced and the enemy was pressed back about 3 miles. Little thought the action began about a mile and a half from Independence. It ended a little after sundown. Next Winslow took the advance.
P. 150 - Little estimates the number of Brown’s troops who went into action at between 1000 and 1200, probably 1000. He saw a body of rebels moving to flank Brown’s left as evidenced by a dust cloud.
p. 151 - Little thought there were 2 rebel guns in their front and a third bearing diagonally on Brown’s left.
p. 152 - the command came to a halt about midnight behind Winslow’s brigade. Brown asked Little about communications between him and Winslow but the court voted not to allow such questioning. Brown told the court that he offered to relieve Winslow and take the advance. He wishes to point this out becaus Pleasonton had alleged that he was backward in doing his duty.
P. 153 - Little believed that the command camped that night about 8 miles west of Independence but could not be sure. A little before daybreak he received orders from Brown to get the command ready to move.
P. 154 - the brigade began moving about the gray of dawn. Brown sent Little to the rear to deliver the order to advance. He found the 4th and 7th MSM but could not find the 1st MSM. On the way back to Brown, Little encountered Lt. Brown. He asked him to find the 1st and order it forward. Little returned and ran into Gen. Brown who was heading down the column. Little told him that the column was in motion, except for the 1st. Brown sent him back down the column. On this second trip Little encountered Pleasonton who asked him where Gen. Brown was. Little told him that Brown was at the front and continued to the rear. Pleasonton ordered him to come back and again asked him where Brown was. Little replied again that he was at the front. Pleasonton moved forward and Little moved toward the rear.
P. 155 - Little found the 1st MSM and returned with them toward the front. He found Gen. Brown sitting horse on the left side of the road. He reported to Brown that the 1st was coming up replied, "I have been placed under arrest. You report to Col. Philips." When Little went to the front he found some of Winslow’s men on either side of the road, dismounted. Lt. Brown overtook him at the spot where the 4th MSM’s rear was.
P. 156 -Lt. Brown was the commander of Gen. Brown’s bodyguard. Pleasonton and Little ran into each other on the flank of the 4th MSM. On his passage down the line, Little spied 2 squadrons of mounted troops on either side of the road. He inquired who they were and they replied Winslow’s command.
P. 157 - Little met Pleasonton about sunrise. It was 7 a.m. or a little after when he met Brown and learned he had been relieved. The road over which Brown traveled to get to the front was broken brush woodland with some deserted fields where the movement forward began. Among Brown’s staff was a brigade quartermaster, brigade commissary, and an acting brigade surgeon. Little served as assistant adjutant general.
P. 158 - Little was not sure if Brown issued an order on the night of th 22nd to go into bivouac. He could not recollect delivering such an order. Asked if Brown had issued orders to the regimental officers against straggling, Little replied that on the morning of the 22nd Brown gave orders to the regimental commanders against straggling. This took place 1/4 from the ford while the column halted for quite some time due to the fact that the muddiness of the bank made it difficult to cross the artillery.
P. 159 - the substance of order #3 was that no straggling would be allowed and that a brigade rear guard would prevent straggling. The order communicated verbally to the troops because there was no time to issue copies. The command moved off just after the order arrived. On the night of the 22nd/23rd the command was much fatigued, jaded horses and fatigued men.
P. 160 - the men fed the night of the 21st on the Sni Bar at about 10 p.m. The horses were fed that day at noon when the men walked a mile to the rear to a cornfield and brought the forage back to the horses. The men were issued a ration the next day about sunrise of pork and pilot bread. The horses were not fed.
P. 161 - there were only 2 barrels of pork and 60 boxes of pilot bread and part of the pilot bread was isued to Winslow’s command. The 1st MSM went into the action of the 22nd mounted, but soon dismounted. The 4th and 7th MSM went into the action dismounted. The action of the 22nd caused excessive fatigue to the men in the condition they were in. They rusdhed in at the double quick over rough ground and skirmished and fought continually.
P. 162 - On the day the command left near Brownsville, they traveled about 35 miles before making camp much of it on byroads. They left at 3 a.m. on the morning of the 20th and camped between sun down and dark. They moved the next morning (the 21st) at 3 a.m.
p. 163 - On the 21st they traveled 30 miles. They stopped and fed at Lexington. They arrived at Snybar Creek at 10 at night of the 21st. The men carried corn from the fields about a mile in their rear and fed the horses. That morning they resumed the march at 1 a.m. They reached Independence about 3 p.m.
P. 164 - they halted at Little Blue while the artillery crossed, but did not feed. From Snybar to Independence about 20 miles The distance from the camp near Brownsville to Independence
was 85 miles. The 1st MSM was in action 10 to 15 minutes before the 4th MSM Cavalry got in. The 7th MSM arrived almost immediately after the 4th.
P. 165 - The 1st MSM was fired on shortly after crossing the railroad. They then dismounted and the advance of the line after that was steady. The troops of the 7th and 4th went into action at the double quick dismounted. He estimates the distance from Independence to the railroad at a mile and a half. The 1st MSM had advanced some hundred yards beyond the railroad when they were fired on. They dismounted and deployed on the right. The nature of the fight was that the enemy that the enemy steadily fell back.
p. 166 - there was a stubborn resistance by the enemy until towards sun down when the enemy retired rapidly on their horses. The stubborn resistance occurred when the 1st MSM engaged the enemy 1900 yards from the railroad and continued at intervals for an hour, during which times the feds did not advance. Little observed dust indicating the rebels triios were about a mile to the left, attempting to flank them.
p. 167 - the line of dust on the road measured 2 to 3 miles. Little saw another line of dust on the Westport road. Little believed there was one rebel cannon the left of his line because of the richoshet of shot on the field and from reports he was sure there were 2 pieces in the immediate front. Judging from the cannon captured from the enemy he believed the guns in front were 9 pounders. He repeated his belief that the stubborn resistance lasted an hour.
P. 168 - Little says the artillery was engaged during the latter portion of the hour. The troops had been engaged. The troops had been engaged nearly an hour when the artillery came up.
He estimated that the enemy began falling back at about 4 p.m. And they fell back rapidly for 3 miles.
p. 169 - Gen. Winslow’s brigade came up while the fight was still going on. Brown ordered Winslow to put troops on the left to support the left. Brown may have ordered a regiment moved to the right as well, but Little was not sure.
P. 170 - Little did not know when Pleasonton’s order reached Brown. The first he knew of it was when Brown ordered the troops to move forward. That order was given to Little. A very little time was spent in giving the order to the 7th MSM. This was at the gray of dawn.
p. 171 - Little estimated the time at 5 minutes. He delivered the order to the 4th MSM almost immediately. It was still so dark that you couldn’t distinguish one person from another. It was 3 miles from Brown’s headquarters at the front and the 2 regiments.
P. 172 - the 4th and 7th moved immediately. He stated that the sun rose that morning between 6:30 and 7 a.m.
P. 173 - Little overtook general Brown at 7 a.m. or a little after. By that time Winslow had moved further towards the front.
p. 174 - after traveling to the rear, Little galloped to the front to see Gen. Brown. He estimated it took him 10 minutes to reach Brown in his new position. He saw McFerran’s regiment on his way back to the front.
p. 175 - the cloud of dust that he spotted, Little believed it was retiring, not advancingt.
P. 176 - Winslow’s troops were between 1/4 and ½ a mile in advance of Brown’s second headquarters. Some of his men were skirmishing and advanced a very little way. The remainder of his brigade were bivouacked and scattered along either side of the road in the woods.
p. 178 =- Brown woke little about half an hour before daylight.
p. 179 - A very little after sunrise Little saw Gen. Sanborn at Brown’s headquarters, the hq where he stayed all night. In the conversation Sanborn said something about turning the enemy’s position at the Blue. Gen. Brown was mounted but had not moved forward yet, Little thought.. They also discused the formation of the ground on the other side of the Blue. About thst time Brown sent him to look for McFerran’s 1st MSM.
p. 180 When he delivered the order to move forward, Little found the officers of the 7th awake.
P. 181 - and 4th MSM awake. The commanding oficer of the 4th was awake3 too. The 1st MSM was not in the immediate rear of the 4th. There was a gap between the 4th and 1st. He never did find the 1st that night. On his first mission, Little was absent from Brown about half an hour. He told Brown that the 4th and 7th were in motion. But that he could not find the 1st.
P 182 - Little told Brown he could not find the 1st. a very few minutes later Brown sent Little out back to look for them. On the first trip, Little spent a half hour from the time he left Brown till he returned.
183. Several minutes after he left Brown the second time, Little met Gen. Pleasonton on the road.
Testimony of Private Robert Bonham, Co. C, 4th MSM Cav., Brown’s Orderly.
P. 187 - Brown stopped and made camp late in the evening.
P. 188 - the troops in front of Brown’s hq were Winslow’s. Bonhm thought they were 2 pieces of artillery. Brown woke Bonham and told him to go to the front and to see if Winslow’s men were moving. Bonham rode to the head of Winslow’s column returned and reported to Brown that they were in the same position they had been in. Bonham had accompanied Brown to Winslow’s HQ the previous night where Brown had an interview with Winslow.
P. 189 - the distance from the head of Brown’s column to the head of Winslow’s was 3/4 of a mile. Winslow’s men were sitting around fires on the morning of the 23rd. After reporting that Winslow had not moved, Bonham went to sleep for a bit, but Brown again woke him and sent him up the line again. Bonham saw the artillery had not moved and told Brown that it was in the same place.
p. 190- Brown told Bonham to call Lt. Brown and tell him to have his company ready to march. He told Bonham to saddle his horse and Bonhams own horse. While Bonham was saddling Brown’s horse, Brown told him to call Peter Cramer, acting chief bugler of the brigade and tell him to sound to horse. Bonham delivered the order and Bonham sounded to horse. The call was repeated along the line. Bonham noticed that fact because the day before that the call’s were not repeated by the vairous regimental buglers and he had sent Bonham back that dday to Col. Philips to have all bugle calls repeated at the time they were sounded at headquarters. When Bonham spoke to Cramer it was not yet daylight.
P. 191 - There were as many as 2 bugle calls repeated. A few minutes lat4er Cramer sounded the call to move forward. When the column moved Gen. Brown was at the head of the column. By then it was the dawn of day. Bonham believed that the 2 pieces of artillery had begun moving forard a few minutes before Brown’s brigade moved forward. Brown and Bonyam came to Winslow’s forces after traveling ½ to 3/4 of a mile. The men and their horses were all along the road.
P. 192 - the road was crowded with Winslow’s men and at one time they had to pass through a field on one side of them and then came into the road where there was thick brush and timber. They had to push Winslow’s men to one side of the road to get through. By trotting they reached the head of Winslow’s column a little after sunrise.
193 - Brown could not have moved more rapidly considering the condition of the road and the amount of troops that blocked it. Phillips’ regiment was a little way behind the escort. Philips arrived at the front only a few minutes behind Brown. At this point, Genn Brown moved and Philips dismounted his regiment.
p. 194 - Just after Philips’ regiment dismounted, Gen. Pleasonton arrived. The regiment was deploying into line and preparing to move out. Pleasonton rode up to Brown and said, General Brown, you are moving your command most disgracefully sir. Your men are scattered all along the road. Why don’t you throw your men in and drive those fellows out of there? There are but a few of them. I ordered you to be here at daylight and attack the enemy. You can consider yourself under arrest and go to the rear." Gen. Brown made a reply that Bonham could not hear. Pleasonton replied, "No sir. I don’t want any explanation. Go to the rear as I ordered you. We will hear about that afterwards. There is no trouble about the men fighting if you will allow them to fight."
P. 195 - Brown and Bonham started to the rear immediately. . Going to the head of Winslow’s column, Bonham noted that the character of the country was rough rolling country, with low timber, scrubby oak, brushy road. He noticed troops which were not Brown’s, some going to the front and some by the side of the road.
P. 196 - At the time Pleasonton spoke to Brown, Bonham was no more than 2 rods away. He was sitting on his horse behind Brown. Brown was facing the road and Pleasonton came up the road. Thus Brown was between Bonham and Pleasonton and facing away from Bonham. He was able to hear Pleasonton because P spoke in loud voice and Brown did not speak as loud. Bonham was sure he got the purport of what Pleasonton said if not the precise words he spoke. Bonham understood Pleasonton to say that Browwn HAD moved his command most disgracefully this morning, Sir."
P. 197 - On his way to the rear with Brown after Brown’s arrest, Bonham observed Winslow’s men, some leading horses, some were going down the road. The judge advocate asked if in fact in some cases the men in the two brigades were side by side
p. 198 - Bonham thought it might have been an hour before between the fist time he went to the front to see if Winslow had moved and the second time. Between the 2 trips he went and laid down.