O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/Part 2 [S# 44] pp. 507-512
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 482.--Reports of Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart, C. S. Army, commanding brigade
John's records, summarized below, may be procured through the service noted in the Red enclosed box above.
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John E. Hunter
Residence Duplin County NC;
Enlisted on 3/7/1862 at Duplin County, NC as a Private.
On 3/7/1862 he mustered into "B" Co. NC 3rd Infantry
He was Killed on 6/15/1863 at Winchester, VA
Sources used by Historical Data Systems, Inc.:
- North Carolina Troops 1861-65, A Roster
Regiment lost at least 4 men killed and 13 wounded in the June 15 engagement at Winchester
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John E. Hunter, Private, Company B, 3rd Regiment North Caroline Infantry (State Troops), enlisted as a Volunteer, March 7, 1862 in Duplin County, N. C., by Lt. J. B. Brown for the duration of the war, absent sick in Duplin Co. from May 22, 1862 through Oct. 31, present at end of year 1862 muster, killed in battle at Winchester, Va. June 15, 1863, his widow, Louisa Hunter filed claim for his effects March 24, 1864, no further records
M270: Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of North Carolina
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The following is a Federal report of the actions at Winchester
WINCHESTER, VA
JUNE 13TH, - 15TH, 1863
Winchester, Va., June 13-15, 1863. 2nd Division, 8th
Army Corps. The division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. R. H.
Milroy, occupied Winchester on Dec. 25, 1862, and remained
there or in the vicinity until this engagement. It was
composed of three brigades, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. W.
L. Elliott, the 2nd by Col W. G. Ely and the 3rd by Cd. A. T.
McReynolds, with 24 pieces of artillery, about 9,000 men in
all. The fighting really commenced on Friday, June 12, as
Lee's army was moving down the Shenandoah Valley for the
invasion of Pennsylvania, with spirited skirmishes near
Middletown, Strasburg, Cedarville, and on the Front Royal
road. A little before 8 a m. on the 13th the cavalry patrols
on the Front Royal road came in and reported the enemy
approaching in force. Sharp fighting continued throughout the
day, Milroy's men gradually falling back to the Winchester
fortifications. In the afternoon McReynolds' brigade was
driven from Berryville by Rodes' division, reaching Winchester
a little after 9 p.m., and that night Milroy withdrew all his
troops to the forts north of the town. Early on the morning
of the 14th detachments were sent out toward Front Royal,
Martinsburg and Berryville and found the enemy in great
strength on all these roads. Some of the Confederates took
possession of a large brick house, surrounded by shrubbery, on
the Berryville road, from which they could fire on the men
behind the first line of works. Union skirmishers attacked
this house and drove the enemy away from it, killing 6 and
capturing 11 of the party stationed there. About 2,000 yards
in advance of the main line of fortifications was a range of
hills, known as Flint ridge, upon which a line of earthworks
was under construction. This ridge commanded the Pughtown and
Romney roads and Col. Keifer, with the 110th and part of the
116th Ohio, was sent to hold the unfinished trenches, his
position there being covered by the guns of the main and star
forts. About two hours after taking position Keifer was
attacked by at least 10,000 Confederate infantry and after a
stubborn resistance was compelled to fall back which he did in
good order and with small loss.
About 9 o'clock Sunday evening ( 14th ) Milroy called a
council of war composed of the brigade commanders. At this
council the situation was thoroughly canvassed. It was agreed
that the town was practically surrounded, that Lee could hurl
his whole army against the place if necessary to overcome it;
that by the following morning the enemy could have 100 pieces
of artillery brought to bear on the forts; and that only one
day's rations remained in the works. Under these
circumstances it was decided to make an effort to force a way
through the Confederate lines and try to reach Martinsburg.
This movement necessitated the abandonment of all the
artillery and wagons, though the quartermasters were
instructed to bring away the horses. The cannons were spiked,
the wheels of the carriages cut to pieces, the ammunition
thrown into the cisterns of the forts, and at 1 a m. on the
15th the brigades marched out in the order of their numbers,
the men carrying only their arms and the usual supply of
ammunition. The column moved up a ravine for about a mile,
when it struck the Martinsburg road. When about 4 miles from
Winchester Elliott's brigade, which was in advance was
attacked by Johnson,'s division of Ewell's corps, some 10,000
strong. Elliott threw his troops into line of battle and sent
Col. Keifer, with the 110th Ohio, into the woods to feel the
enemy. This regiment and the 122nd Ohio maintained an unequal contest for over an hour, though they held the enemy in check, silenced 2 of his guns by killing the gunners and the
artillery horses, and captured one of his caissons. Col. Ely,
with two regiments, advanced into the woods on the left, but
they were forced back by superior numbers. Firing was now
heard in the direction of Winchester, indicating that the
Confederates were approaching in the rear. To avoid being
caught between the two forces, Milroy directed his command to
divide into two columns, one of which proceeded by way of Bath
and the other by way of Smithfield toward Martinsburg. During
the engagement on the Martinsburg road McReynolds withdrew his brigade and moved to the right of the road in an effort to
reach Harper's Ferry where he arrived, accompanied by a few of
his men about noon. Milroy reported his loss as 95 killed 348
wounded and 4,000 captured or missing. The Confederate
casualties were not ascertained. A court of inquiry
investigated the conditions attending the evacuation of
Winchester and upon the evidence brought out before the court
the president rendered a decision, the concluding paragraph of
which was as follows: "Serious blame is not necessarily: due
to every serious disaster, and I cannot say that in this case
either of these officers is deserving of serious blame. No
court martial is deemed necessary or proper in the case."
Source: The Union Army, vol. 6