Letter 1, Abner Doubleday's brother, note the date.
Ulysses Doubleday to Abraham Lincoln, Saturday, September 29, 1860 (News from brother Abner in South Carolina)
From Ulysses Doubleday to Abraham Lincoln, September 29, 1860
Bank of North America
New York Sept 29. 1860.
Dear Sir.
I enclose two letters from Capt. Abner Doubleday, of the 1st Regt. U. S. Artillery, whose contents will explain themselves.1 They are the last of a large number, all, until recently, pointing to the purpose of the Charlestonians to seize the forts in their harbor. The arrival, some two weeks since, of an Engineer officer to strengthen the defences of Ft. Moultrie, led him to suppose that the open boasts of Mr. Buchanan's sympathy and complicity with the treasonable intentions of the secessionists, were to be disproved by energetic action on his part. Capt. D. is from this state, and being an avowed Republican is looked on with much suspicion by the people around Ft. Moultrie; so much so, that we have strong suspicions some of his letters are occasinally opened. I send you these letters, not because it is more your business than mine to try and save the country from the disgrace, apparently so sure, but because the almost certainty of your election may give you means of information and an influence, which may avail to prevent it. Your success is simply a convenient pretext, for the desire to secede, my brother writes, has always been rampant in Charleston. I enclose you a map of his making, showing that if the forts once pass into the hands of the traitors, no revenue cutter could lie off, and blockade the harbor, for the first foul wind would drive her ashore. If the forts were properly manned, the attempt at secession, if made, (which is doubtful), would not succeed, for the duties would be collected at Ft. Moultrie, and postal and judicial advantages would be cut off, so that they would bear their present burdens and receive none of their present accommodations. Please return me as soon as convenient the letters and map. Mr. Chas. Ridgely banker, of your city knows me; in case you should have any suspicion of a hoax, please inquire of him. Considering your election as the surest means of disabusing the Southern mind of its baseless fears, I am working for your election, though I shall never have any favors to ask of you, as President
Resp'y Yours
U. Doubleday
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Letter 2
From Abner Doubleday to Ulysses Doubleday1, September 23, 1860
(Copy.)
For U. Doubleday Esq
Bank of North America
Wall Street
New York City.
Fort Moultrie, Charleston S. C.
Dear Brother ... Sept 23d 1860.
I will not write to you at present in the way I proposed for I doubt if there will be any necessity for it. A little piece of information was obtained here yesterday, which throws a new light upon the state of affairs here. I have all along been puzzled by the way the people, or rather the leaders of the people talk. Secession with (every) one I meet seems to be a foregone conclusion. They all say as a matter of course they must have the forts if they secede, and yet they do not appear to think of attacking us. They deny all intention of doing so, and no appeals are made to popular passions with reference to this place, which would be made if they really designed to take the forts with a strong hand. I think now I have obtained the key to this mystery Trescott2 is Asst. Sec of State, and before his late visit to this place was acting as Sec. that is, as one of the cabinet. Being a secessionist and a leader, besides being deeply interested as a resident of the sea-board, he would be likely to ascertain the intentions of Government if any man could. Trescott stated unreservedly in his late visit here that there would be no fighting, that the administration would withdraw the troops in the harbor and give up the Forts to the south if secession took place, but that they would put a revenue cutter or a war vessel of some kind to cruise off the mouth of the harbor to prevent any exit or entrance, and would declare Charleston not a port of entry. In addition to these, all postal and telegraphic arrangements would cease.
I do not believe the Administration have the right to give up one foot of U. S. soil to the State of S. Carolina. Castle Pinckney not only commands Charleston, but the interior passage between Charleston and Savannah.
The conversation alluded to above took place between Trescot and Col. Gardner.3 Col. G. has now adopted somoe good plans of defence in case of an attack, but they require us to have ample time for preparation and due notice which in not likely to be given.
Ordering Engineers here to put these Forts in complete order at the expense of the U. S. and then turning them over in that condition to S. C. looks rather queer.
Acknowledge the receipt of my letters alphabetically.
There is a great quantity of broken bone fever about, but we have escaped so far.
With love and regards to all
Your aff. brother
Abner Doubleday
[Note 1 ID: Abner Doubleday, erroneously credited with the invention of baseball, was a West Point graduate and member of the garrison at Fort Sumter in 1860-61. During the Civil War, Doubleday commanded a division in the Army of the Potomac and rose to the rank of major general.]
[Note 2 William H. Trescot was a South Carolina attorney and historian of American diplomacy who was appointed the Assistant Secretary of State in 1860. Upon South Carolina's secession, Trescot resigned from the State Department but remained in Washington and attempted to negotiate the surrender of Fort Sumter.]
[Note 3 Lieutenant Colonel John L. Gardner commanded the U. S. forces at Charleston Harbor until he was replaced by Major Rober Anderson in November 1860.]
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Letter 3
Abner Doubleday to Ulysses Doubleday, Tuesday, September 25, 1860 (Situation in South Carolina)
From Abner Doubleday to Ulysses Doubleday, September 25, 1860
(copy)
For U. Doubleday Esq
Bank of North America, Wall Street, New York,
Fort Moultrie, Charleston, S. C.
Dear Brother ... Sept 25th 1860.
A short time ago, when I saw Capt. Forster1 of the Engineers arrive here and commence work upon the Forts in the harbor, I naturally enough concluded that the President was opposed to secession and had determined to resist it. The fact that our recruits were ordered from New York, and the rumor that we would soon have large additions to our force from Old Point and Texas, increased my confidence in the Executive. These rumors would seem to be without foundation, and we thus present the attitude to the South of irritating them by fortifying against them, without sending any force to occupy the defences. Upon speaking to Forster on the subject, he laughed heartily, and said he had not the remotest idea that the President intended to act against the secessionists. He was sent down here in a hurry it is true, but it was in his opinion simply because the President having learned that England and France intended an armed intervention in Mexico, determined to prevent it by force, and thus had his attention drawn to the state of some of our Forts. At the same time Forster was ordered here, a squadron was sent to Vera Cruz, and Engineers ordered to Savannah. This would seem to confirm his view. I am aware a company of Artillery has been ordered to Augusta Arsenal, but Augusta is not a harbor, and a company of troops simply residing there and not living in a Fort could exert no influence against secession. The object is in all probability to guard against negro insurrection, as there must be many thousand stand of arms at the arsenal.
It appears to me if Government really intended to act against secessionists troops would have been sent first from Old Point, New York and Boston. Ordering 40 recruits here is not doing much. In nullification times it is said Gen. Scott2 was here with a thousand men, and had the Fort palisaded very strongly. It is certainly a compliment to Col. Gardner3 to suppose he can do with a hundred, what Gen. Scott was required to do with a thousand.
The fact that some flanking arrangements are being added to this work, and some loop holes made in the guard house, (the latter I think was done at our instigation by Capt. Forster,) has created some excitement among the country people in our vicinity. By all means try and obtain a file of the Charleston Mercury and post yourself up as to the feeling around us. You will see that that paper is very confident that the President is on their side, and this confidence is undoubtedly shared by the leaders. They have therefore no object in attacking us, and in fact regard the labor being bestowed upon the Fort as an additional present for them. Still we feel some uneasiness and they some distrust. They fear Buchanan cannot be relied upon and they do not like to see additional strength given to the Forts. Secession is a forgone conclusion with them, and they would have no hesitation in stepping in here at any moment. It will probably be a month before the sand (which now comes up to the coping) is removed, and as for the two small flanking arrangements, it will be another month before they can be finished. The Fort has a very low relief, the height of the outer wall being about that of a moderate sized room. The brick work is very ancient, the mortar in between it has become displaced; and cracks and crevices exist everywhere, so that our men consider the wall no obstacle to their ingress or egress. We have 500 yards of parapet to line, and even after our recruits arrive, if they do arrive, we will only have about 60 men to line this parapet against an attack of perhaps 1500 men, who can divide our little force by attacking on all sides. The danger we anticipate will proceed from the desire of the secessionists to commence the campaign by driving us out to give themselves a prestige. They could then magnify the exploit ad infinitum, and boast they had whipped two companies of U. S. troops with a colonel at their head, and would probably add, that they had accomplished this feat after all the resources of Engineering had been exhausted upon the work. The truth is after the sand is all cleared away, the mortar between the bricks replaced, and the bastionets built, the Fort will still need a garrison adequate in numbers to defend it. Under no circumstances am I in favor of giving it up without fighting. If no one else stands by me I will go it alone. While the bastionets are being built it is evident they will be merely steps by which people can enter the Fort. It is not until they are run up to the full height that they become of any use. I reiterate then, that our great danger proceeds from the strong desire the leaders here have to give their followers military prestige. The Forts are in such a state as to tempt them to attack. Should they conclude to act against us they feel certain the General Government cannot reach them, and that they would be sustained by the people of the State. I have no doubt the course of South Carolina will be decided upon, before this work is placed in a defensible position condition, for they only desire a reasonable proof that Lincoln will be elected to act at once, and it is my opinion they will not wait for the action of their own Legislature. I do not try to talk to the leaders now, for the bitterness is intense, and they seem incapable of discussing the question with calmness. They say they are aware it will result in ruin and distress but they dont care.
As I have already stated the country people do not like to see the engineers at work here, and I doubt if the leaders like it, for our proceedings are watched by eager and jealous eyes. In the mean time I fear the negroes will become excited by vague rumors in relation to approaching hostilities. It would seem they are already becoming so. Large and disorderly crowds of them are complained of in Charleston, and they appear to be becoming unruly on the island. A man came here last night and spent the greater part of the night under the protection of the troops here, alleging that his life was in danger from crowds of unruly negroes. It may have been however, a mere accidental occurrence.
Straws show which way the wind blows, and the Secretary has ordered here a new surgeon (in place of Dr Byrne) who is a Charlestonian and a secessionist. I refer to Dr Simons who was dismissed from the army for deserting his command when the cholera was raging. He has since been reinstated through political influence.
You speak of going to call upon Breck. Pay no attention to anything he says on the subject of defence here, for his judgment is very immature, and he prides himself in taking a strange out-of-the-way view of everything around him. His opinion is not worth a farthing on any subject.
I think probably Col. Gardner would be pleased if we were ordered away from here, but every other officer would consider it a burning shame and an everlasting disgrace to give up the U. S. Forts here to these scoundrels.
Much could be done by Col. G. were he so disposed to prepare us for an attack without attracting public attention. Timber, planks, provisions, ammunition &c. could be prepared which would be of the greatest utility in case of an attack. But he will not even bring inside a light battery which is down in the gun shed and liable to be carried off at any moment, as it is several hundred yards from the Fort and is not even guarded by a sentinel. He will not mount the flank guns which are absolutely essential for the defence. Ever since I heard him say he sympathised deeply with the wrongs of South Carolina, I have distrusted him. It is true he talks against them when none of them are around, but he does not act from principle but policy. However there is little doubt but that he will make some effort at defence, if he has ample warning and the question is forced upon him. Perhaps as he sees the majority will be for it, he will go for it too, but none of us have any respect for his military opinions. He has fully resolved to do nothing unless he knows positively an attack is to be made upon us, and then I imagine it might be too late.
Returning to "our muttons" however, our safety consists in the universal belief here that the President will not act against the secessionists. All we can do I suppose is to await events. In the mean time an element is entering into the political contest here, which may have important results. The mechanics have nominated a ticket and come out strong against the ruinous competition which besets them on all sides in consequence of the education of slaves to be mechanics. Almost every planter now has his black carpenters, shoemakers &c. and these can afford to undersell the whites. The latter then wish to have a law passed preventing slaves from being employed in the mechanic arts. The vote of the mechanics may unite the poor white population and then have a controlling effect upon the question of separate State action.
Trescott4 you know is very inimical to me. He was with the officers in the billiard room when I issued the order against gambling there and as he has taken this order to himself, he will be very apt to show his hostility to me by using his present influence as Asst Sec of State against me with the Sec of War. He is very deep and wiley and I suspect I shall feel his hostility in some indirect manner.
I have kept out of trouble here so far, by not visiting anybody where it was possible to avoid it, and by avoiding all discussion. The Charlestonians believe in free discussion -- within certain limits -- but those limits are rather too narrow to suit me.
I am very much dissatisfied with Col. Gardner. He talks loudly of what he will do. He will burn every house on the island &c. but he does not really believe an attack will take place, and he does not even provide his command with provision and ammunition which will be requisite whether we are attacked or not. He ought at once to assume that we may be attacked, give each officer his specific duties, appoint a common rallying ground, and introduce into the Fort, timber for obstructions and palisades. Now, if we should be attacked, we would have to fight like a mob, without any fixed plan.
Col. Hatch, one of the most prominent and one of the best informed of the militia officers in town, showed us a place where he had scaled the wall of the Fort without the slightest difficulty. Mary said to one of her friends a lady who resides in Charleston, "that she must find some place of refuge in case of an attack." The lady colored slightly and said, with a tinge of bitterness "she did not believe they had the spunk to attack us but if they did she said come to water St. and I will take you in.
One of the principal secessionists asked Col. Gardner what he would do if a column of 500 men should attack us. He answered jestingly that he would kill 250 of them, put the rest to flight, and burn every house on the island.
If anything should ever happen here, I am certain the whole burden of this want of preparation would fall upon me. As Col. G. lives outside in an exposed situation he would be captured at once, and the command devolve upon me, without even a cartridge in the boxes of the men to meet the assault.
Where is Gen. Scott? has he nothing to say in this matter? I will write to father soon. Give my best love to him and your & Toms family and our regards to our other friends.
Your aff brother
A. D.
[Note 1 John G. Foster, a graduate of West Point and veteran of the Mexican War, was the chief engineer at Fort Sumter during the crisis of 1860-61. Foster rose to the rank of major general of volunteers during the war and held various administrative commands.]
[Note 2 Winfield Scott]
[Note 3 Lieutenant Colonel John L. Gardner commanded the U. S. forces at Charleston Harbor until he was replaced by Major Rober Anderson in November 1860.]
[Note 4 William H. Trescot was a South Carolina attorney and historian of American diplomacy who was appointed the Assistant Secretary of State in 1860. Upon South Carolina's secession, Trescot resigned from the State Department but remained in Washington and attempted to negotiate the surrender of Fort Sumter.]
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Letter 4
From Ulysses Doubleday to John G. Nicolay1, November 18, 1860
Bank of North America
New York Nov 18. 1860
Dear Sir.
Since I last wrote, enclosing letters from my brother, I have received many others from him, which, coupled with other information in my possession, left no doubt in my mind of the complicity of the President with the designs of the secessionists. I took my proofs, when the election was over, to the editor of the Evening Post, in which a series of articles has been commenced, exposing Mr. Buchanan's treason, with the hope that the publicity thus given to it, may force him to do at least part of his duty. These articles have been brought to Mr. B's personal notice, and both he and Secretary Floyd2 have denied their truth. As they are true, this looks as if they were becoming frightened, and the superseding of Col. Gardner,3 an avowed secessionist, by Maj. Anderson4 a loyal Kentuckian, seems still further to confirm this idea. My brother writes that a settled determination to have the forts, as a necessity of their positions, is evinced by the South Carolinians, who begin to ask why the President does not keep his promise to withdraw the troops. I think he is afraid, and, by directing public attention to these disclosures, hope to force him to send more troops. This would greatly simplify Mr Lincoln's position after the 4th of March. The present aspect of financial affairs here, though gloomy, is not nearly so bad as in 1857. The simple fact that our exports largely exceed our imports is a proof that in a very short time gold must flow this way from Europe in large amounts. I look to a decided and permanent improvement in less than thirty days. I do not expect any answer to this letter.
Respy Yours
U. Doubleday
[Note 1 Ulysses Doubleday was the brother of Abner Doubleday, a captain in the U. S. Army who was stationed at Charleston Harbor. Ulysses Doubleday sent copies of his brother's letters to Lincoln. See Abner Doubleday to Ulysses Doubleday, September 23 and September 25, 1863 and Ulysses Doubleday to Lincoln, September 29, 1860.]
[Note 2 John B. Floyd]
[Note 3 Lieutenant Colonel John L. Gardner commanded the U. S. forces at Charleston Harbor until he was replaced by Major Robert Anderson in November 1860.]
[Note 4 Robert Anderson]
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Letter 5
Mary Doubleday to Abraham Lincoln, [April 1861] (Cover letter)
From Mary Doubleday to Abraham Lincoln1, [April 1861]
Mr. Lincoln.
On looking over my letters I find there is little in them that would be either useful or interesting to you.
Capt. Doubleday has been exceedingly cautious in his correspondence, as many letters written have never been received; & all were liable to inspection.
I enclose a letter of the last date, & an extract.2
Should I receive anything of interest, I shall be happy to submit it for your perusal. I beg you will remember that the letter was only intended for myself.
Yours
Very respectfully
Mary Doubleday.