The seventh article declares, that the ratification of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution, between the states ratifying the same.
It was attempted to obtain a resolve that, if seven states, whose votes in the first branch should amount to a majority of the representation in that branch, concurred in the adoption of the system, it should be sufficient, and this attempt was supported on the principle, that a majority ought to govern the minority; but to this it was objected that, although it was true, after a constitution and form of government is agreed on, in every act done under and consistent with that constitution and form of government, the act of the majority, unless otherwise agreed in the constitution, should bind the minority, yet it was directly the reverse in originally forming a constitution, or dissolving it — that, in originally forming a constitution, it was necessary that every individual should agree to it, to become bound thereby, and that, when once adopted, it could not be dissolved by consent, unless with the consent of every individual who was party to the original agreement—that, in forming our original federal government, every member of that government (that is, each state) expressly consented to it—that it is a part of the compact, made and entered into in the most solemn manner, that there should be no dissolution or alteration of that federal government without the consent of every state, the members of, and parties to, the original compact — that, therefore, no alteration could be made by the consent of a part of these states, or by the consent of the inhabitants of a part of the states, which could either release the states so consenting from the obligation they are under to the other states, or which could in any manner become obligatory upon those states that should not ratify such alterations. Satisfied of the truth of these positions, and not holding ourselves at liberty to violate the compact, which this state had solemnly entered into with the others, by altering it in a different manner from that which, by the same compact, is provided and stipulated, a number of the members, and among those the delegation of this state, opposed the ratification of this system in any other manner than by the unanimous consent and agreement of all the states.
By our original Articles of Confederation, any alterations proposed are, in the first place, to be approved by Congress. Accordingly, as the resolutions were originally adopted by the Convention, and as they were reported by the committee of detail, it was proposed that this system should be laid before Congress, for their approbation. But, sir, the warm advocates of this system, fearing it would not meet with the approbation of Congress, and determined, even though Congress and the respective state legislatures should disapprove the same, to force it upon them, if possible, through the intervention of the people at large, moved to strike oat the words " for their approbation," and succeeded in their motion; to which, it being directly in violation of the mode prescribed by the Articles of Confederation for the alteration of our federal government, a part of the Convention, and myself in the number, thought it a duty to give a decided negative.
Agreeably to the Articles of Confederation, entered into in the most solemn manner, and for the observance of which the states pledged themselves to each other, and called upon the Supreme Being as a witness and avenger between them, no alterations are to be made in those Articles, unless, after they are approved by Congress, they are agreed to, and ratified, by the legislature of every state; but by the resolve of the Convention, this Constitution is not to be ratified by the legislature of the respective states, but is to be submitted to conventions chosen by the people, and, if ratified by them, is to be binding.
This resolve was opposed, among others, by the delegation of Maryland. Your delegates were of opinion that, as the form of government proposed was, if adopted, most essentially to alter the Constitution of this state, and as our Constitution had pointed out a mode by which, and by which only, alterations were to be made therein, a convention of the people could not be called to agree to and ratify the said form of government without a direct violation of our Constitution, which it is the duty of every individual in this state to protect and support . In this opinion all your delegates who were attending were unanimous. I, sir, opposed it also upon a more extensive ground, as being directly contrary to the mode of altering our federal government, established in our original compact; and as such, being a direct violation of the mutual faith plighted by the states to each other, I gave it my negative.
I was of opinion that the states, considered as states, in their political capacity, are the members of a federal government — th;tt the states in their political capacity, or as sovereignties, are entitled, and only entitled, originally to agree upon the form of, and submit themselves to, a federal government, and afterwards, by mutual consent, to dissolve or alter it — that every thing which relates to the formation, the dissolution, or the alteration, of a federal government over states equally free, sovereign, and independent, is the peculiar province of the states in their sovereign or political capacity, in the same manner as what relates to forming alliances or treaties of peace, amity, or commerce; and that the people at large, in their individual capacity, have no more right to interfere in the one case than in the other — that according to these principles we originally acted in forming our Confederation. It was the states as states, by their representatives in Congress, that formed the Articles of Confederation ; it was the states as states, by their legislatures, who ratified those Articles; and it was there established and provided that the states as states (that is, by their legislatures) should agree to any alterations that should hereafter be proposed in the federal government, before they should be binding; and any alterations agreed to in any other manner cannot release the state from the obligation they are under to each other by virtue of the original Articles of Confederation. The people of the different states never made any objection to the manner in which the Articles of Confederation were formed or ratified, or to the mode by which alterations were to be made in that government: with the rights of their respective states they wished hot to interfere. Nor do I believe the people, in their individual capacity, would ever have expected or desired to have been appealed to on the present occasion, in violation of the rights of their respective states, if the favorers of the proposed Constitution, imagining they had a better chance of forcing it to be adopted by a hasty appeal to the people at large, (who could not be so good judges of the dangerous consequence,) had not insisted upon this mode. Nor do these positions in the least interfere with the principle, that all power originates from the people; because, when once the people have exercised their power in establishing and forming themselves into a state government, it never devolves back to them; nor have they a right to resume or again to exercise that power, until such events take place as will amount to a dissolution of their state government. And it is an established principle, that a dissolution or alteration of a federal government doth not dissolve the state governments which compose it. It was also my opinion that, upon principles of sound policy, the agreement or disagreement to the proposed system ought to have been by the state legislatures; in which case, let the event have been what it would, there would have been but little prospect of the public peace being disturbed thereby; whereas the attempt to force down this system, although Congress and the respective state legislatures should disapprove, by appealing to the people, and to procure its establishment in a manner totally unconstitutional, has a tendency to set the state governments and their subjects at variance with each other, to lessen the obligations of government, to weaken the bands of society, to introduce anarchy and confusion, and to light the torch of discord and civil war throughout this continent. All these considerations weighed with me most forcibly against giving my assent to the mode by which it is resolved that this system is to be ratified, and were urged by me in opposition to the measure.