All good questions, Doyle! I agree that Mark’s Mills saved Steele, but it also did something equally important for the Rebs, which was a needed inflation of morale. Although the Rebs got a boost at Mansfield (which the Arkansans under Churchill missed), the experience at Pleasant Hill couldn’t have done much to help maintain their edge.

When one combines this with a six-mile trek back from the battlefield just to get water, the loss of a beloved colonel (Yell), and an extended return forced march, it becomes easy to realize that they would have been fairly low by the time they reached Camden.

These road weary boys had to have received a lift in morale when they realized their feint upon Camden worked, allowing cavalry to sneak around the city, thus Mark’s Mills. The CSA regained a city with no loss; they witnessed the further demoralization of the enemy, as evidenced by equipage tossed alongside the road, and, in their mind’s eye, thoroughly thrashed Steele at Jenkins’ Ferry.

Another thought is that if the Rebs had instigated a siege upon Camden, I’m not sure the surrounding countryside in early spring could have supported the besiegers.

As far as being a tactical mistake, I leave that to those more versed in military science than I. With that said, I can’t help but think, however, that Mark’s Mills was a part of a “string of events” that contributed to the stagnation of that section of the Trans-Mississippi until war’s end. This undoubtedly saved lives on both sides.

One can pose an argument that the Rebs failed to destroy Steele, but the demoralization and loss of effectiveness of Union forces accomplished almost the same thing.