Comdg. First Division, Western Department, Columbus, Ky.:
GENERAL: Since my dispatch of the night of the 5th I have continued my steps of precaution and preparation for defense without intermission. Details in respect to them are at present unnecessary.
My call upon the militia for re-enforcements has been responded to with spirit and alacrity, but, as was to have been expected, in a manner somewhat tumultuous, and in no light degree troublesome in disposing of the forces thus furnished. By last evening something more than 1,000 men had assembled here, and about an equal number reported themselves in several more distant neighborhoods as assembled and awaiting instructions. By that time I learned from my scouts that the enemy had ceased to advance and were probably falling back a little. Finding that I was thus allowed more time for preparation, and that the militiamen, as well those who had arrived here as those on the way had left home so hurriedly as to be very ill-supplied with arms, deemed it best to direct them to return home, and there organize, arm, and prepare for service as well and as speedily as possible, and having done this, as they will be able in a day or so, and reported, to await my orders, with the exception of about 100, who are sufficiently prepared here. They have all followed this direction, to an extent at least to assure me that within a week from this day I shall have within three days’ march of this place at least 3,000, probably more, men at my command, and as well prepared for service as the means of the country will allow; by which I mean that while every man will be armed with some sort of a gun-for I will have no others-yet they will be far from uniform in this respect, and many will be rather poorly armed, owing to the scarcity of guns of every kind, and especially of good ones, in this part of the country.
Companies thus organized and prepared I have agreed to receive into the service for thirty days from the time they report to me, to be subject to my orders during that time. I adopted this course and this term for these reasons: 1st, Within that time, if at all, it seems obvious to me I shall have to engage the enemy here or hereabouts; 2d, It is the only source from which I can calculate on re-enforcements of any kind within that time; 3d, Without such re-enforcements the handful of troops I have here is wholly inadequate to resist such a force as we know the enemy have in striking distance and as there can be no doubt they will bring against me if they come at all; 4th, I have made neither preparation nor calculation for a retreat, that being out of the question, as it would open our State to invasion, the very thought of which is not to be entertained for a moment, there not being one among my little band who does not feel that in holding this place he is holding the very door to his own domicile, within which are wife, children, and friends, and who would not deem himself criminal, as well as craven, if he could weigh his own life against the importance of maintaining it; 5th, within that time you will be able to order what other and better course should be pursued.
Of the forces under my command I briefly report-for there are so few of them that a brief report will cover them easily-
1. My own cavalry regiment, seven companies, number 460, and are stationed for purposes of observation, convenience of supplies, &c., between this and Pitman’s Ferry, with several companies at and near the ferry, throwing forward scouts, &c. In this service it is very constantly occupied and has been all summer and fall, until pretty well used up.
2. Colonel McCown’s five companies of infantry (raw troops), men and officers, number 378, indifferently armed and but slightly trained.
3. Major Desha’s four companies infantry number 238, in the same condition as McCown’s.
This is my whole permanent force. In addition, for this emergency, {p.685} I have stopped here in passing and retain for the present Captain Roberts’ company, about 60 men, nominally artillery, but without a battery, but armed and pretty well drilled as infantry, and about 150 recruits for the army, brought here by Major McCray and Captains White and Kykendall, and retained here by me, as is Captain Roberts’ company; altogether about 1,286 men. Of these, owing to much sickness, casualties, necessary details for guards, nurses, &c., as you will readily apprehend, I cannot, as I have ascertained by careful examination, count on more than 600 for fighting service. All even of these must be regarded as raw, inexperienced, and poorly disciplined, and indifferently armed. I may say that I have no artillery, for, although there are six pieces-four iron 6-pounders and two brass 4-pounders-here, they were repudiated by General Hardee as worthless, and are, so far as I can judge, quite so for any active or reliable service. They are so ill mounted, &c., that they cannot be used at all for flying artillery. In my destitution of such things and for this emergency, however, I shall do what I can with them by placing them in positions to cover the approaches to this place; and as Captain Roberts is the only officer here who knows anything at all about artillery, I have put him in charge of them.
I have in the first part of this letter said all I need say about the probable militia re-enforcements.
As to the supplies here, the amount of which seems to have been greatly exaggerated to you-mentioned by you in one of your letters as probably $500,000 worth-though I am satisfied not more than one-half perhaps not more than one-third of that, I have not deemed it necessary or proper to remove them lower down the river, for the reason that I don’t intend to abandon the place, and if we are to perish for the want of the timely aid that ought to have been given us if retained here at all, we will all, men and supplies, perish together; the enemy shall never have them.
I have been unable to hear from General Thompson since my last dispatch to you of the night of the 5th, though at that time and the night after I wrote to him. My messengers ought to have returned last night, but I have no news of them. Reports are here, I know not how reliable, that he has either had an engagement with the enemy at or near Bloomfield or that upon their approach he has retired south and east. If I don’t hear from him by to-morrow morning I will send again to ascertain.
Inclosed I send you a militia order and the proclamation of the Governor of Arkansas.** To the latter I invite your attention. It looks well enough on paper that I am to have so large an auxiliary force, but you need not be told that it gives nothing at all for present purposes, and promises only what will be received, if at all, in small portions at a time and a good while hence.
MONDAY MORNING, November 11.
I had written so far last night when reports reached me that induced me to pause until something more reliable should come from my scouts in time for this dispatch. At 1.30 o’clock this morning a dispatch from my outpost at Pitman’s Ferry, 20 miles north, to this effect:
The scouts send in word that they have reliable intelligence that there are 300 infantry and 150 cavalry at Rives’ Station, on Black River, 35 miles north of Pitman’s {p.686} Ferry Also that there is a strong infantry force-7,000-at Greenville, 15 miles north of Rives’ Station.
This is confirmatory of the previous reports during the day, so far as it is reliable. Allowance must of course be made for natural exaggerations, &c., and I am doing all I can to ascertain the truth, and prepare as well as I can for whatever it may prove to be.
Not hearing from General Thompson, I have dispatched an intelligent and trusty messenger on the best route to that officer to learn what I can.
I am not without hope, of course, that what I have done and the views I here add will meet your approval, viz, that what force I have here is wholly insufficient for any useful purpose of either attack or defense, but only a provocation, and, coupled with the supplies here, an inducement to the enemy to attack us. It seems obvious to my mind that if any force at all is to be kept here or on this line it ought to be at least three if not four times as large as it is. Either make it strong enough to sustain itself or abandon it altogether. Arkansas has some twenty-two regiments in the field and some nineteen of them are in other States, while next to none are left to defend her own frontier where most exposed.
If these views are not approved I respectfully suggest that I be superseded in command over here at once. It would indeed, it seems to me, be better to do this anyway, by sending some one of the brigadier-generals to take charge. It is a brigadier’s command, and should be his responsibility, which I am daily growing more and more distrustful of my competency to sustain. Besides, indications of failing health admonish me that the public interests here would be better provided for by other and abler hands.
In haste, but from careful consideration of all I have said, I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
SOLON BORLAND,
Colonel, Commanding.