Re: Monroe's CavalryBy:Bryan Howerton
Date: Tuesday, 5 April 2005, 5:29 pm In Response To: Re: Monroe's Cavalry (Bryce A. Suderow) Bryce, are you talking about the engagement at the Devil's Backbone on September 1, 1863, and the associated skirmishes at Scullyville and Jenny Lind?
What I get from the report of Brig. Gen. W. L. Cabell is that Monroe's regiment was one of the few he could rely on. When he mentions the "unreliable troops", I have always believed he was referring to Hill's regiment, and Crawford's and Woosley's battalions.
The command I had, which was called a brigade, consisted of Monroe�s, Thomson�s, and Hill�s regiments of cavalry, Witherspoon�s, Crawford�s, and Woosley�s battalions of cavalry, Morgan�s infantry regiment, four iron 6-pounder battery, also several little independent companies of Partisan Rangers. (Hill�s regiment, and Woosley�s and Crawford�s battalions were raised from deserters and jayhawkers who had been lying out in the mountains, and forced into service.) The aggregate of the whole amounted to over 3,000, yet, notwithstanding, I could never get into the field at any one time over 1,600 men, and never more than 1,200 of them for duty.
And,
Up to this date nearly all of Hill�s regiment, a large number of Thomson�s regiment, and nearly all of Crawford�s battalion have deserted. Morgan�s regiment was garrisoning Fort Smith, and, although a part of my brigade had always been kept detached by General Steele, and was never, up to that time, in the field with me while at the San Bois.
Indeed, it appears that Monroe's regiment, Hughey's battery and a company of Morgan's regiment performed quite well in the engagement.
General Blunt, finding out that I had abandoned the position I had on the Poteau, sent Colonel Cloud, with 1,500 cavalry, six pieces of artillery, and 40 wagons, loaded with infantry, in pursuit of me. They followed, and attacked the picket I left at Jenny Lind about 9 o�clock on the 1st day of September. The picket skirmished with their advance until they reached the foot of Backbone Mountain, about 16 miles from Fort Smith, where I had formed my command for battle. I placed Monroe�s regiment in ambush at the foot of the mountain, and placed all the different regiments en echelon along the sides of the mountain, near the road; the battery being placed so as to command the whole field of operations. The enemy came dashing up, yelling and shouting, confident of success, their cavalry in advance. When they came within gunshot, Monroe�s regiment opened fire on them, and dismounted every man except two in the front companies. The action soon became general, and, after a heavy fire of nearly three hours and a half, especially of artillery, the enemy were repulsed, with a loss of about 30 killed and from 100 to 150 wounded. My loss was 5 killed and 12 wounded. The number of missing I cannot state, as eight companies of Morgan�s infantry regiment, Hill�s and Thomson�s regiments, and Woosley�s battalion of cavalry ran in the most shameful manner. Hill�s regiment, in running, ran through the provost guard, where I had 80 prisoners under sentence for treason and desertion. These men in running carried all the prisoners off with them. Thomson�s and Hill�s regiments acted in the most disgraceful manner. The eight companies of Morgan�s regiment acted but little better. There was nothing to make these regiments run, except the sound of the cannon. Had they fought as troops fighting for liberty should, I would have captured the whole of the enemy�s command, and gone back to Fort Smith, and driven the remainder of the enemy�s force off, and retaken the place. As it was, I was forced, on account of the smallness of my force, to content myself with repulsing the enemy and protecting the public property. Leaving a party to bury the dead and take off the wounded, I, after posting a heavy picket on the battle-field, withdrew in good order, and marched to Waldron, Scott County, arriving there on the 2d of September.
I have copies of the muster rolls of Monroe's regiment for the first reporting period after the engagement (dated February 29, 1864), which report relatively few deserters between June 30 and December 31, 1863. So I don't believe that the negative comments were meant to apply to Monroe's regiment. Also, Cabell cited Monroe's regiment (but only one company of Morgan's regiment) for gallantry --
I must mention the gallantry of Captain Hughey, commanding the battery, and his two lieutenants, Miller and Henley, as well as all his men. Captain Hughey and Lieutenant Miller particularly distinguished themselves with their old iron battery. Monroe�s regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel O�Neil and Major Reiff (Colonel Monroe being sick), Captain Barry, with his company of Missouri Cavalry, Major Yell, of Morgan�s regiment, with Captains Sims� and Brooks� companies, commanded respectively by those officers, and Captain Sadler and his company deserve especial mention.
Bryce, perhaps I've been reading this wrong all this time, but I see nothing but praise in the report for Monroe's regiment. In fact, just about every report I can recall describes the regiment as gallant, professional, etc.
Some of his criticism levelled against the other units under his command is warranted, but in fact Cabell made some tactical errors which, I believe, he tried to minimize by trashing his own troops. This is a revealing paragraph from his report --
By comparing my military operations in Northwestern Arkansas (with this bad material) with that performed by other commanders in the District of Arkansas, I feel confident that it will be found that I have done as much toward the defense of the country as any other commander.
There is also the somewhat cryptic endorsement of Brig. Gen. William Steele --
The written report just received is respectfully forwarded. That the enemy had the main road to Riddle�s Station would only require that another should be taken, which is little, if any, farther, viz, the one via Lewis� store. Had that road been taken, Bankhead�s brigade would have been met by the 4th of September, and the enemy�s forces, scattered from Scullyville to Dardanelle, would have been an easy conquest. The morale of his command presents a better reason. The movement, as reported from Soda Springs to the east side of the Canadian, and again to San Bois, and finally to the vicinity of Fort Smith, was for the purpose of trying to prevent desertions, which were diminishing our strength at a rapid rate. A strict obedience to orders would have resulted better if only one regiment had remained.
On the one hand, he seems to accept Cabell's complaint about unreliable troops, yet leaves a hint of censure regarding Cabell's tactical decisions.
Of course, I could have this all wrong, and I would be interested in some further discussion by you and the others on this board.