You may me right. Johnston may well have thought early on, at least in the back of his mind, that holding the line in Kentucky was hopless. And if he did think that he made every effort to do what he could in spite of that.

In early Jan he tells Richmond that he's laying in 4 months of supplies. As late as the last week in Jan, after the battle of Mill Springs he is pleading with Richmond to sent reinforcements from New Orleans. Sounds like a man who's hoping against hope that he can still save or at least delay things till spring.

In any event at what point he begins considering the possibility of a fall back he seems to have kept to himself. At some point, however, he must have started to quietly plan seriously a detailed evacuation of Bowling Green. Removing perhaps as many as 75 heavy guns from the forts in Bowling Green and maybe as many as an additional 90 field pieces from the brigades around Bowling Green would not go unnoticed.

On the other hand, even with the 8 days from the fall of Henry and the Covington House Memo to Valentines day when the Feds arrived,it didn't leave a lot of time to move so much ordinence without some prior planning.

So just when he did begin seriously formulating evacuation plans is a matter of speculation. Reading between the lines of history at best reveals a commander who waited till the last possible moment to make a decision.

By pre-positioning Buckner at Russelville it shows, at least to me, that he's still hedging his bet and trying to keep every option open to the last.