The general plan was to defeat Hooker's army on Union soil and maybe push on to Baltimore or Philidephia, levy contributions, and take possession of the land, not to hold it but to show to the world a display of power.

On the evening of the 27th Lee had heard Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was advancing by way of Middletown, and he, Lee, took measures to concentrate his forces, and ordered Ewell to move his troops back to Chambersburg; but on reflection, the order was modified. "In the absence of cavalry," says Lee, "It was impossible to ascertain his [the enemy's] intentions; but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountain." Longstreet thought that this would "draw [Hooker] into battle, in keeping with the general plan of the campaign and at the same time draw him off from the travel of our trains," and so advised Lee. Lee thought so too, and directed Ewell, if practiable, to move to Heidlersburg; and then, either directly to Cashtown, or by the turnpike at Gettysburg. "The advance of the enemy to the latter place," Lee says, "was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the COMFORT OF THE TROOPS." [a slower march]

"The Story of the Civil War, Livermore, 1933.

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David Upton