The cycles of organizing mounted commands, then dismounting them, then organizing newer mounted commands, and then finally, trying to dismount virtually all of them in 64-65 is difficult to comprehend from this distance in time.
Hindman's original logic seemed militarily wise in the dismounting of so many cavalry regiments to bolster the infantry and to prevent the countryside from being consumed by horses.
Of course, Van Dorn had previously done the same thing when he transferred his army to Mississippi.
And Kirby Smith came to the same conclusion in 64-65 when he began the wholesale dismounting of units throughout the Trans Mississippi.
It's these incomprehensible acts of organizing brand new mounted regiments against a backdrop of the prevailing logic of dismounting that is hard to grasp. Then again, logic was often out of place in the T/M.
In fairness to the T/M, there are similar examples in the Cis Mississippi armies, though on a smaller scale.
The mounting of the Hampton South Carolina Legion [a crack infantry outfit] of Longstreet's Corps, early in 1864, is just one example.
It's an interesting theory [to me, at least] to contemplate the potential increase in C.S.A. military power if the cavalry had been converted to infantry on a meaningful scale. And, we've all read countless examples of the difficulties in maintaining the horses of the various Confederate Armies.
Sure seems like it could have been a "win-win" [or at least "better-better"] situation.