Please understand -- the perspective in my post is that of a Southern partisan working to understand the myriad of skirmishes and small actions that occured in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee and Kentucky. Long before graduating high school, Wyeth's That Devil Forrest became one of my favorite books. I later named my first son for the famed Confederate horseman.

The point being made here involves the superiority of Northern cavalrymen when fighting on horseback. Normally their Confederate opponents carried single-shot long arms identical to those issued to infantry commands. If your point is that the Confederate government could not provide carbines, revolvers or sabers in adequate numbers for its mounted troops, I must agree. However, if you're suggesting that the only advantages enjoyed by Federal cavalrymen from 1863 forwards were superior numbers and resources, we need to go over this again.

Keith, if your feelings run in the same direction as mine, reading a little of Minty and the Cavalry: A History of Cavalry Campaigns in the Western Armies by Capt. Joseph G. Vale will be an uncomfortable experience. I'm told that Col. William B. Sipes, The Seventh Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Cavalry: Its Record, Reminiscences and Roster, provides a similar picture of the war. While I refuse to believe the mere appearance of Northern cavalrymen always created consternation and dismay in Confederate ranks, a nearly unbroken string of victories in middle Tennessee from the beginning of 1863 must have enhanced their sense of superiority.

Forrest defeated Federal infantry during this period (Thompson's Station, Brentwood, the defeat of Straight's Raid), not U.S. cavalrymen. Mounted commands led Forrest, Van Dorn, Wharton, Wheeler and John Hunt Morgan enjoyed a substantial advantage in numbers over Federal cavalry from February through May 1863. Yet Federal cavalry won almost every head-to-head encounter during that period and further into the year.

The reason could not have been better battlefield leaders, and it certainly wasn't numbers: Yankee troopers were outnumbered roughly two to one. Unless you can think of something else, it must have been due to significantly better arms and tactics.

Keith, a look at some of these small-scale actions (under 2,500 cavalrymen engaged) involving Wheeler's or Morgan's men during this period will illustrate my point (no pun intended). Federal leaders could select the arms necessary to suit tactical needs on the battlefield, something Forrest could not do. Saber charges worked quite well in certain circumtances, which I'll describe if you wish. Here's a paragraph from the Schiller article which describes it in general terms --

Like the 8th Illinois, though, the 7th [Pennsylvania] learned some important lessons in that instructive year of 1862. The regiment rarely, if ever fought together, but its battalions were sometimes united for a scout or action. Their enemy was usually detachments of cavalry under the command of John Hunt Morgan or Nathan Bedford Forrest. Unlike Confederate General Joe Wheeler, Morgan and Forrest scorned the sabre and fought with rifles and pistols. Although the Confederates had the upper hand at first, Union cavalry continued to use both sabre and firearms. Throughout 1862, the 7th and the other regiments that eventually made up Minty’s Brigade (4th US, 4th Michigan, and 3rd Indiana (battalion)) were increasingly involved in actions with the enemy that required dismounted carbine tactics and/or sabre charges. They learned that there were times a sabre charge worked and times that a carbine was the superior choice. Learning the difference eventually allowed them to gain the advantage over the Rebel cavalry.