Obviously, this is all pure speculation, but it's interesting to consider how things may have gone if a few desicions had been made differently. In my opinion, with Bragg's bungling of the gains made by Kirby Smith's advance and victory at Richmond, (as well as his own had he blocked Buell's path into Louisville), the West, and the War itself, was irrevocably lost. Had Bragg been removed earlier, or Davis' hatred of Beauregard not precluded him from receiving a major command in the West, who knows how things may have turned out. Aside from the North's massive advantage in both manpower and resources, Confederate strategy helped doom it's chances from the start, or at least from mid-1862 on. What Davis termed a "offensive-defensive" was, in effect, a passive-defensive, with hugely outnumbered and ill-equipped forces being widely dispersed over a vast area, with far too few troops attempting to defend too many points, with the result that NONE could be effectively protected. Had Bragg mercifully left this Earth prior to Perryville, or even in early 1863, perhaps another commander, more bold (which was required) and with a grasp of what the South was facing, maybe something could have been accomplished. Had the forces you speak of, including those at Vicksburg, been consolidated, along with most of the scattered cavalry commands-maybe under Forrest?- maybe the War's Western Theater could've been shifted farther to the north, delaying any operations into the Deep South for many months to come, and with a few more Southern victories, who knows? Maybe enough losses, along with possible foreign recognition, could have changed the outcome of the 1864 election or brought about a different result that we can't even conceive of now. I mentioned Beauregard for a particular reason: Have you ever read of his plan for an advance toward Louisville? If you don't have access to ORs I can copy the letters I'm talking about, because it is very interesting. Let me know. With the little Frenchman in overall command, Forrest with a mounted force of say 18-20,000, and maybe Cleburne commanding a corps, one can't help but wonder what may have been possible. Also, if Beauregard's plan for a campaign into KY toward Louisville been put into execution, perhaps with Longstreet's idea of an "Offensive Strategic-Defensive Tactical" operation, such as he wanted Lee to follow during the Gettysburg Campaign, they just might have pulled it off. I'd like to hear what you think, and if you'd like I'll copy Beauregard's letter for you. Post when you can, or email me at gabbardhistories@yahoo.com. I'll look forward to hearing from you.

MJG