Nov. 8- 9, 1861 - -Engagement at Ivy Mountain and skirmish at Piketon, Ky.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME IV [S# 4] CHAPTER XII. pp. 227- 230
NOVEMBER 8-9, 1861.--Engagement at Ivy Mountain and skirmish at Piketon, Ky.
No. 3. -- Reports of Col. John S. Williams, C. S. Army.
PIKETON, KY., November 9, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant. In reply, I have to say that no one can regret as deeply as myself the necessity of evacuating Prestonburg, but I was forced to do so from the unarmed and unorganized condition of my troops. The enemy has pressed me so hard that I have not even had time to complete the muster rolls of the companies. At Pres-tonburg we had not two rounds of ammunition, and the enemy was advancing in three columns, in front and upon both flanks. I fell back to Piketon to meet my ammunition. On yesterday I was compelled to make a fight to protect our retreat. The engagement was sanguinary, lasting about four hours. Our loss, I believe, was 10 killed and 7 or 8 wounded. The enemy's loss was heavy--could not have been less than 150 killed and a large number wounded, for the road was strewn with men and horses. We had only about 300 men. The enemy had not less than 1,500--most probably 2,000---with six pieces of artillery. They were at first checked, but on account of their great superiority of numbers they were able to outflank us, and our force was compelled to fall back. The enemy did not pursue. They are also advancing upon this place, upon the John's Creek road, from Louisa. On yesterday Captain Holliday, with a small command, met this column from John's Creek. A skirmish took place. I sent him a re-enforcement of 200 men, which checked their advance. The night was occupied in preparing to fall back in the direction of Pound Gap, but our transportation is so limited that we shall be compelled to abandon some pub-lie property. The enemy is perfectly equipped, with plenty of artillery. They are well instructed, and fight with courage. We have nothing in the world upon our side but bravery. The disparity in the loss was due alone to our position. Infantry armed with rifles are the men for this country. Cavalry is almost useless, except for picket duty.
With regard to the point at which we will be likely to meet I cannot say positively. I shall continue to fall back until I can make a stand or am re-enforced. Our route will be towards Abingdon.(*)
We have now nine companies of infantry, four of them not yet full, and five companies of mounted men, and two of these not full--making in all an aggregate of 1,100 men, poorly armed and badly clothed, and with scarcely any discipline.
Allow me to congratulate you upon your appointment.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, C. S. Army.
Brig. Gen. HUMPHREY MARSHALL,
Wytheville.
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CAMP NEAR POUND GAP, November 13, 1861.
GENERAL: Since my last report to you I have been compelled to abandon Piketon by an overwhelming force that advanced upon me in two columns, one directly up the river from Prestonburg, 1,600 strong, with a battery of six pieces, and the other from Louisa up John's Creek, a branch of the Sandy, numbering 1,860 men, with a battery of field pieces. Both of these columns converged upon Piketon.
My whole force consisted of 1,010 men, including sick, teamsters, and men on extra duty. I did not believe that the advance of the enemy would be so rapid, and hoped that the artillery and re-enforcements promised would arrive before they could disturb me at Piketon. Under this confident hope I commenced gathering supplies, explored the leather resources of the country, found them abundant, and organized a corps of shoemakers, and had them at work. Major Hawes had purchased 1,000 fat hogs and a number of beef cattle, and was making preparations to salt them. My men were badly clad and badly armed, with not a knapsack, haversack, or canteen. They carried their powder in horns, gourds, and bottles. This was our condition when the enemy commenced the advance upon us. Retreat was inevitable, but there was too much public property to be abandoned without an effort to save it. I at once ordered all the transportation possible to be collected, and sent the sick, wounded, and the live stock to the rear on the Pound Gap road, for the Tazewell route was no longer safe. I sent a small armed force immediately on the Tazewell route with written orders to turn back the artillery and all public wagons to a point of safety in Virginia. I then sent Captain Holliday, with a small mounted party, on the John's Creek road, and Captains Thomas and Clay on the River road to Prestonburg, to observe the movements of the enemy. This was on the night of the 8th. Captain Thomas discovered the advance guard of the enemy about 15 miles from Piketon. I went in person with Captains May and Hawkins, with their companies of infantry, and Lieutenant Van Hook, with 20 mounted men, to the position of Captain Thomas, near Ivy Creek. I found that Captain Thomas had burned the bridge there. The men were allowed to refresh themselves and the horses were secured in a deep mountain cave, and the whole party of 250 men moved on foot to a strong position half a mile in front of the burned bridge, here to await what we supposed to be the advance guard of the enemy's force.
I returned to our camp at daylight and met the report of Captain Holliday, who had been fired upon by an advanced guard of the enemy of about 150 men. He gave them a gallant fight, killed 8 of them, having only 1 of his number wounded and 1 horse killed. I dispatched Captain Shawn, with his own and Captain Camron's companies, to observe the movements of the enemy on John's Creek, with instructions to engage any party not more than twice his number, but not to attack the enemy's full force.
At 1.30 o'clock on the 9th instant the enemy moved up to Captain May's position [Ivy Creek] with a force of 1,600 men and a battery of six pieces, and were received by 250 rifles and shot-guns, in point-blank range, every one of which took effect. Their column wavered and fell back, but returned in good order, and attempted to carry the pass by assault under cover of their cannon, but were repulsed again with terrific slaughter. They then withdrew beyond the range of our shot-guns, and their infantry up the hills soon outflanked our little band, compelling them to fall back behind the burned bridge. Here our force made a stand, but the enemy advanced no farther. I then ordered three more companies of infantry to sustain Captain May's command or to cover his retreat if necessary.
At 12 o'clock at night Captain Shawn reported to me that the enemy were advancing in full force on the John's Creek road with great rapidity. I then ordered Captains May, Shawn, and all the outposts in. I made a display of forces in Piketon, sent the exhausted infantry in the direction of our retreat, and waited with the balance of the command the arrival of the enemy. They came up slowly and cautiously, but were detained for an hour by Captain Thomas' company of sharpshooters, stationed near the ford, which prevented their artillery from getting into position to rake the town. As they approached I moved the rear guard of 400 men off in good order. They opened upon us a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, and were replied to by our sharpshooters. We had 1 man killed and 3 wounded, while the enemy had 6 killed.
In the Ivy fight our loss was 10 killed, 15 wounded, and 40 missing. Some of the missing men have gone back to their homes, and others join us daily. We lost Lieutenant Rust, who fell gallantly in the discharge of his duty. My first belief was that the enemy had lost but 150 men, but from subsequent information received from spies, Union men, escaped prisoners who have joined us, and others who have examined their burial ground, I am satisfied the enemy lost over 300 in killed, with the usual proportion of wounded. I cannot speak in terms of commendation too high of the gallantry of Captains May, Thomas, Hawkins, and Clay, and Lieutenant Van Hook and Sam Clay. Indeed, the officers and men behaved with so much courage and coolness that to discriminate at all would be invidious.
If we had had 1,000 men more and a battery of six pieces we could have whipped and destroyed both columns; but with the small force I had it was impossible to fight both at once, and to have exposed my whole force to one would have exposed my rear to the other. Our cartridge-boxes arrived the other day after the fight. We had powder and lead, and made our own cartridges and molded our own bullets.
The enemy have 6,000 troops near Piketon; 1,000 of them advanced 10 miles this side of that place. They have not more than 1,500 at Prestonburg. What they have below as reserves I know but little of, for all communication is cut off and the whole country is frightened out of its wits, and but few men will act as scouts or guides. I am satisfied that this large force was not moved up the Sandy merely for the purpose of dispersing the unorganized and half-armed, barefooted squad under my command. They intended to move upon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, I think, by way of the Tazewell Court-House. They fortify their positions, and have a large number of wagons. The Sandy is now navigable for steamboats to a point above Piketon.
We want good rifles, clothes, great-coats, knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens--indeed, everything, almost, except a willingness to fight. Many of our men are barefooted, and I have seen the blood in their tracks as they marched from Ivy to this place. You know what we want, general. Send such articles as we need to Abingdon. There is but little subsistence here, and I fear I shall be compelled to fall back to a point where I can subsist until our organization is perfected. We have been so constantly fighting that we have not had time to complete our muster rolls. I have now over 1,200 men. If I could make a forward movement the effect would be good upon the country.
Mr. Thomas has just received from the governor of Florida a commission as aide-de-camp, with rank of colonel. I cannot insist on retaining him from such increased rank. Send somebody else.
If the enemy should move by way of the Pound I have not a sufficient force to resist them---no artillery, no intrenching tools, nor axes, spades, or picks. If they come we will give them a fight, but this will do us no good but to destroy a few of them.
I have just learned from a spy that a steamboat arrived at Piketon yesterday with supplies to the enemy.
Major Hawes wants more money. He has bought hogs, horses, wagons, &c.
Your obedient servant,
JNO. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, C. S. A.
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NOVEMBER 8-9, 1861.--Engagement at Ivy Mountain and skirmish at Piketon, Ky.
No. 1. -- Report of Brig. Gen. William Nelson, U. S. Army.
[partial]
As I marched immediately in pursuit, I do not report what their loss was. I am told to-day that 32 dead were found. Among the wounded in our hands is H. M. Rust, late State senator from Greenup County, Kentucky. Our loss is 6 killed and 24 wounded. If I had here any cavalry I would have taken or slain the whole of them; as it was, the enemy retreated, cutting down trees across the narrow road and burning or cutting all the bridges, which are numerous. I bivouacked 4 miles beyond the Ivy Creek. It rained, and the men waded through mud and in, a heavy rain all the day of the 9th, the march being heavy and slow on account of the trees across the roads and the necessity of repairing the bridges. Last night we again bivouacked in the November rain and entered this place this morning at 9 a.m., where I found Colonel Sill, who had arrived the night previously and fired on the enemy as they were retreating. I inclose Colonel Sill's report.
Very respectfully,
W. NELSON,
Brigadier-General.
Captain GREENE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Louisville, Ky.:
OR Ser. 1, V4, p. 226