According to this article, the officer assigned to fly it, one Capt. John Randolph Bryan, said: “It was nothing but a big cotton bag, coated over so as to be air-tight, and intended to be inflated with hot air, as gas was a thing not to be had in those days and in those places.” (Source: John Randolph Bryan, “Balloon Used for Scout Duty: Terrible Experiences of a Confederate Officer,” Southern Historical Society Papers 33 (1905).)
This particular balloon’s last flight was on May 5, 1862 when, during a launching mishap, the balloon swooped out of control first over Union and then Confederate lines, where it was shot at, and finally came to rest on the shore of the York River. It was never used again, but that didn’t end the Confederate experience with ballooning.
Dr. Edward Cheves bought up all the silk he could lay his hands on in Savannah and Charleston and experimented with sealing processes to make the bag gas tight. The balloon arrived in Richmond in late June 1862, the location of the Richmond Gas Works, the only gas source in the South. Unlike the Union balloonists who had portable gas generators, Porter Alexander (apparently an experienced aeronaut) wrote, “I had it filled with gas and towed down the James River by a little armed tug, the Teaser.” Unfortunately, the Teaser ran aground and it, along with its precious cargo, were captured by a Union gunboat.
The balloon was cut into pieces by the Union troops and sent home as souvenirs. Years after the war, this article says, Longstreet wrote: “The capture of the Teaser was the meanest trick of the war and one which I have never yet forgiven.” (Source: Longstreet, “March Against Pope,” P.513.)
As noted by the author, “the Confederate Army was one of the first organizations in the world to face an enemy with an aerial capability.” The author notes that the South, having no historical models to emulate, used common sense and materials at hand to develop countermeasures that other military services fielded in response to the introduction of the airplane years later.
Horky’s conclusion is interesting:
“It is tempting to speculate that the Confederate experience in the American Civil War influenced later armies in their quest to develop effective air defenses. However, it should be noted that the Union employment of balloons in that conflict is generally considered an irrelevant, if interesting, episode in the history of air power. Thus it follows that the South’s passive and active antiaircraft activities were outside the continuity of counter-air warfare. Of course, future research may establish a connection. Yet the most likely explanation of the similarity of Civil War and early 20th century antiaircraft operation is that there were certain basic principles, easily identifiable, governing the conduct of such activities.”
Article includes 88 footnotes/sources.