Dear Sir,

I respectfully disagree. Grant's line of communication (supply line) was secure between Chattanooga and Nashville. Only a real threat to that supply line would have caused any displacement of the entire Army. Forrest was having to build a force after being relieved of it in late September 1863. The best chance of the AOT having any success of in interposing itself on the Federal supply line came in early October 1863 when Bragg ordered Wheeler to do his raid. However, the raid lacked focus, and a clear task and purpose. If he had sat in the Sequatchie Valley a few days and Bragg had followed Wheeler's force with some infantry then the story would have been different.

The AOT was in too bad of shape from December 1863 to March 1864 to be of any real threat. The avenues of approach to Chattanooga would not have afforded steathy approach. The Federals had done a good job of having both passive and active observation on these avenues of approach.

Longstreet's force did not have the strength to take the offensive itself and with the force that went from Chattanooga to Knoxville to reinforce Burnside, Longstreet was in danger of being isolated and destroyed in detail.

Here again we go back to Bragg dividing his force in the face of an enemy force with superior numbers. General Lee could get by with it because he knew his subordinates and their limitations but Bragg did not.

Respectfully,

Gerald D. Hodge, Jr.
Niota, Tennessee
War Between the States Historian
Historian: 39th Georgia Infantry Regiment
Web Master: http://39thGAVOLINFRGT.homestead.com/39thHomepage.html