Erick:

The rural nature of this area may be similar today as in 1865, but the population and agricultural production were much greater in the ninteenth century. Farms of all sizes and even a few plantations were to be found in this area. Tax-in-kind records of 1865 from this area indicate that most households provided several hundred pounds of pork, corn, wheat, and other comodities to the Confederate Commissory officers for distribution to the southern armed forces. Instead of today's acres of planted pine forests, slowly awaiting harvest for lumber, farms dotted the hills and vales of the region. By 1865 grains and livestock outweighed cotton cultivation; this was the last Breadbasket of the Confederacy. I don't have direct documentation that Jordan's and Lanier's Sipsey Mills was a commissary depot, but the quanity of commodities Croxton describes at this site directly imply that it was a concentration point for these basic commissary items. Indeed, Croxton may have had intelligence concerning this depot, and Sipsey Mills may have been the particular target of his forey across Sipsey, rather than proceding directly to Eutaw from Romulus. Croxton's mentioning of Vienna raises the possibility that he may have wanted to attempt a crossing of Tombigbee at that place in route to reach the Alabama and Mississippi Railroad.

Testimony from letters and diaries of Croxton's officers and soldiers indicate that the return to Northport was precipitated by Adams' attack and not a deliberate decision by Croxton made prior to the Confederates' arrival at Sipsey Mills. The First Brigade's abbrupt forced march northeast was less than leisurely, as a scouting party of the 8th Iowa Cavalry was abandoned by the brigadier in his haste to leave Pickens County. These troopers had to fend for themselves in making it back to the brigade, which they finally did two days later in Northport. Further, a dispatch sent by Croxton to Captain Sutherland indicates directly that the halt to feed was indeed time spent waiting on the Sutherland detachment, and the attack by Adams forced the rear guard to cross Sipsey and force march back to Northport. Local family stories of leisurly pillaging by the blue host during this halt indicate that after leaving Sipsey Mills there was little apprehension of a Confederate force twice Croxton's numbers. This directly contradicts the brigadier's report that he learned of Adams' force at Sipsey Mills. It is unlikely any personnel at that place would have been able to furnish Croxton with all the detailed information he says he learned there; Croxton likely learned about Adams' force, the locations of Jackson and Forrest,and even the fall of Selma were discovered from interrogation of the Confederate officer captured near King's Bridge, early in the evening of April 6.

I think that after he learned at Sipsey Mills that Tombigbee was unfordable at Vienna, he decided to proceed to Eutaw, but by way of back roads rather than the Selma-Columbus Road, which would be heavily traveled by Confederate couriers and scouts. Thus Croxton might have avoided detection. That is why the brigade turned northeast from Sipsey Mills to Hinton's Grove, where a secondary road connected with Clinton and Eutaw. After Sutherland caught up from Bridgeville on the Selma-Columbus Road, the brigade could have arrived in Eutaw without attracting attention. After securing (or destroying) the pontoon bridge at Finches' Ferry, preventing Forrest from pursuing him, he could have proceded to Jones' Bluff, crossed Tombigbee, and descended on the railroad. How he would have fought his way out of this predicament one can only speculate, as Confederates would have been speeding down the rails from both directions, Demopolis and Meridian, and "Croxton's Raid" would have ended much differently than it did. Of course, Adams knew of Croxton's whereabouts since late in the morning, and would have assaulted Croxton that afternoon regardless of which direction he took.