I totally agree with your comment regarding the innate genius that Forrest possessed and displayed on numerous occasions.

Just looking at his performance in the war's last 18 months reveals repeated successes, and also demonstrates his somewhat unique ability to coordinate mounted troops along side those deployed as infantry. Combined force operations at the tactical level was one of his strengths. In many, if not most of his engagements, he fought part of his force infantry style.

With a combined force tactical approach, He could accurately gauge just the right time to send in his mounted force, after the dismounted troops had softened and fixed the enemy in position. Or as he would likely say, "get the bulge on them" and then "hit them on the end."

Also impressive is Forrest's use of temporarily dismounted soldiers as infantry units. In other parts of the Confederacy, a cavalryman who lost his horse was basically lost to the service until, if and when, he could find a replacement. Forrest seems to have relied on capturing horses from the enemy, or making raids behind enemy lines to procure remounts. Forrest certainly believed in maximizing limited resources. It is quite impressive to see how he made effective use of thousands of men for the Confederacy that would have otherwise not been available.

And, we should also recall his deployment of troops as "horse marines" during the Johnsonville raid. Although unsucessful, he cleverly deployed his troops and limited artillery,and was able to capture Union gunboats on the Tennessee River. Poorly equipped mounted troops capturing gunboats is quite an achievement.

But Forrest wasn't satisfied with just their capture; and using "volunteers", he had his inexperienced men practice with the boats, and became bold enough to even carry out an unsuccessful engagement with the enemy gunboats. Showing his adaptability in tactics, it was his plan to use his "navy" to draw the enemy gunboats under his concealed shore batteries. Speaking of artillery, Bearrs in "That Devil Forrest" says that he was as great a believer in artillery as Napolean.

In my opinion, such examples give strong indication that Forrest could have been a much bigger difference maker with increased force.

With increased command and status, Forrest most likely would have been popular with the Richmond administration---yet another key to success. Contrast his self reliance in arming, equipping and even recruiting his own command with unending requests for men and material from a beleagured government by many Regular Army officers. Guess you could say that Forrest was also an adaptive realist.

Whatever description is used-cavalry, dragoons, mounted infantry [my preference] etc., Forrest was far more than just a partisan cavalry raider.