I agree, that Lee was not specifically ordered to attack, but the Hood plan was flawed from the beginning. He was not on the field and he sent a junior commander to face an enemy, that unknown to Lee, was already established in a defensive position (Logan and Blair's Corps) because of the increased activity of the Confederate cavalry [Jackson's]. Hood told Lee to keep the Lickskillet Road open, and attack if attacked. When Lee arrived with Brown's division in the lead, Jackson's Cavalry was already being pressed by the enemy (attacked), and the inexperienced Lee decided that he would attack as he was instructed to keep the road clear for Stewart's planned attack on the enemy's left and rear on the 29th.

What Hood failed to do is manage the action by having accurate information on the enemy, clear instructions for all of the generals involved, and a contingency in case the enemy was fortified and not easily moved.

I know hindsight is always best, but the commanding general is always ultimately responsible for the actions of his subordinates. I suggest that those who would like to read the actual orders received and portions of the reports of Stewart, Hardee, Walthall, and John C. Brown describing their version of the events that transpired, William Scaife's "The Atlanta Campaign" pages 104-109, would be excellent reading.

To this day, I still have not found a clear explanation of the plan as established by Hood or an explanation of why Lee attacked except that neither had a plan and Lee was not ready for such a large command especially so shortly after arriving on the scene. In either case, the men fought as ordered in the face of ovewhwhelming odds, and once again Hood had enough men "left for another killing".