Thanks for bringing up this forgotten battle of the Atlanta Campaign.

I grew up in Atlanta, lead tours there and have studied this campaign for over 25 years.

Hood, as overall commander, does bear responsibility for SD Lee's actions on July 28th. SD Lee bears the biggest load to be sure and when I do my Atlanta Campaign lectures he gets pretty hammered by me for his disjointed attack that replicates what he did at Tupelo.

I will take issue with Ron's statement that Hood's plan for the Battle of Atlanta was poor however. It was not - it was very well conceived and with a combined arms element (Wheeler going after Decatur) to boot. Had he won that battle the Army of the Tennessee would have been severely smashed and Sherman, who was not a fighter, would have had to rethink his plans for the city - perhaps even falling back to do so.

Where Hood erred in that attack, which he stated later was inspired by Clancellorsville, was his execution of it. When you are conducting a flank or envelopment attack you need to fix the enemy's front in place with attacks designed to do just that. Lee did this at Chancellorsville. Hood did not and he lead his attack with Hardee's flanking Corps instead of Cheatham's central corps.

As we know, McPherson stopped Dodge's 16th Corps from smashing the Georgia RR towards Stone Mountain, as ordered by Sherman, and moved them to extend and refuse his left flank. He made the right call for it was the two divisions of that corps that were in line when Walker and Bate came out of the woods thus denying a flank attack. As the rest of the AOT fought in echelon to the left, it was the later afternoon attack by Cheatham that smashed a 6 brigade hole in the Union center. What stopped that attack was John Logan, (McPherson being KIA earlier) rallying troops and pulling two brigades from Dodge's Corps to lead the counterattack. The hole was eventually sealed.

So all things being equal, if Cheatham attacks first, as he should have, and the same hole is created in the Union line (and nothing exists to prove this otherwise) and THEN Hardee comes out of the woods after two brigades were taken from the Union left to deal with the center, Dodge's corps is down to a division being hit by 2 CS divisions which probably would have shoved the Union line back. With a hole in the center and the flank being rolled up, the Army of the Tennessee would have been in deep trouble.

So it was not Hood's plan at fault - it was his execution of it.

As for Ezra Church, the CS plan was to gain the high ground (such as it is) and establish an anchor line there for Stewart's Corps to move to a flank attack against Sherman The ridges there are north of the Lickskillet Road and would have protected it. Once Lee sees Federal troops on that high ground I think he felt that in order to obey his orders he had to drive them off - but did so without properly organizing an attack in conjunction with Stewart. As it was he was soundly defeated attacking Federals in a position they chose to defend - which usually doe snot work out well for attackers.

SD Lee was more than a brigade commander before this - he also commanded a cavalry division in the Dept. of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana and rose to command that department when Bishop Polk was sent to Georgia in May, 1864 with his corps. I am not that much of a fan of his but we worked very well with Forrest in the Brice's Crossroads campaign although he bungled Tupelo as we all know.

As for Hood's choices, I find it interesting that Lovell was considered - which Joe Johnston wanted earlier in 1864. I think Cheatham performed well at corps level in the Battle of Atlanta and earned the chance to keep that command I think. He was loved by his troops and since soldier morale with its leadership is critical, I think he would certainly not have been any worse than SD Lee was.

One thing to keep in mind with the Confederate Army of Tennessee - no commander of that army was EVER allowed to hire and fire whom they pleased - like RE Lee was able to do in his army. Jeff Davis bears a HUGE blame for the command debacles of this army. When Bragg wants to fire Polk after Kentucky (as I would have done), Davis blocked it. As Steve Woodworth in his excellent book "Jefferson Davis & His Generals" argues, Polk was the cork in the command bottle that keep far better commanders like Stewart and Cleburne in lower grades when they should have been promoted earlier into division command so that by 1864 their time in grade experience would have been substantial.

I often wonder what might have happened in Georgia had Joe Johnston had Hardee, Cleburne and Stewart as his corps commanders and had Forrest as his chief of cavalry (send Wheeler to hold Mississippi). Even an non-aggressive general like Johnston might have been inspired to be more aggressive with these capable subordinates.

But it all goes back to Davis keeping Polk in grade until the odds were so stacked that even he had to move him from the AOT to Mississippi finally.

The Army of Tennessee defended the vastly more important portion of the Confederacy - its agricultural and industrial heartland - and its commanders were never allowed to pick and choose who they wanted without meddling from Jeff Davis. If Davis ever wonder why he lost his war all he had to do was look into a mirror.

Greg Biggs