Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois.
Joseph Holt and Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, Tuesday, March 05, 1861 (Fort Sumter)
From Joseph Holt and Winfield Scott to Abraham Lincoln, March 5, 1861
War Department,
March 5th., 1861.
Sir:
I have the honor to submit for your consideration several letters, with inclosures, received on yesterday, from Major Anderson of the Artillery, and Captain Foster of the Corps of Engineers which are of a most important and unexpected character. Why they were unexpected, will appear from the following brief statement.
After transferring his force to Fort Sumter, he addressed a letter to this Department, under date of the 31st. of December, 1860, in which he says "Thank god, we are now where the Government may send us additional troops at its leisure. To be sure, the uncivil and uncourteous action of the Governor in preventing us from purchasing anything in the city will annoy and inconvenience us somewhat, still we are safe." And, after referring to some deficiency in his stores in the articles of soap and candles, he adds, "Still we can cheerfully put up with the inconvenience of doing without them for the satisfaction we feel in the knowledge that we can command this Harbor as long as our government wishes to keep it."
And again, on the 6th. of January, he wrote "My position will, should there be no treachery among the workmen whom we are compelled to retain for the present, enable me to hold this post against any force which can be brought against me, and it would enable me in the event of a war, to annoy the South Carolinians by preventing the from throwing in supplies into their new posts except by the aid of the wash channel through stone river."
Before the receipt of this communication, the government, being without information as to his condition, had despatched the Star of the West, with troops and supplies for Fort Sumter, but the vessel, having been fired on from a battery at the entrance to the Harbor, returned without having reached her destination.
On the 16th. of January, 1861, in replying to Major Anderson's letter of the 31st. of December, and of the 6th. of January, I said "Your late despatches, as well as the very intelligent statements of Lieutenant Talbot, have relieved the Government of the apprehensions previously entertained for your safety. In consequence, it is not its purpose, at present, to reenforce you. The attempt to do so would no doubt be attended by a collision of arms, and the effusion of blood -- a national calamity which the President is most anxious to avoid. You will therefore report frequently your condition, and the character and activity of the preparations, if any, which may be being made for an attack upon the Fort, or for obstructing the government in any endeavors it may make to strengthen your command. Should your despatches by of a nature too important to be entrusted to the mails, you will convey them by special messengers. Whenever, in your judgment, additional supplies or reinforcements are necessary for your safety, or for a successful defence of the Fort, you will at once communicate the fact to this Department, and a prompt and vigorous effort will be made to forward them."
Since the date of this letter, Major Anderson has regularly and frequently reported the progress of the batteries being constructed around him, and which looked either to the defence of the Harbor, or to an attack upon his own position, but he has not suggested that their works compromised his safety, nor has he made any request that additional supplies or reinforcements should be sent to him. On the contrary, on the 30th. of January, 1861, in a letter to this Department he uses this emphatic language: "I do hope that no attempt will be made by our friends to throw supplies in -- their doing so would do more harm than good." On the 5th. February, when referring to the batteries &c. constructed in his vicinity, he said "Even in their present condition they will make it impossible for any hostile force, other than a large and well appointed one, to enter this Harbor and the chances are that it will then be at a great sacrifice of life:" And, in a postscript, he adds "Of course, in speaking of forcing an entrance, I do not refer to the little strategem of a small party slipping in." This suggestion of the "strategem" was well considered in connection with all the information that could be obtained bearing upon it, and in consequence of the vigilance and number of the guard boats in and outside of the Harbor, it was rejected as impracticable.
In view of these very distinct declarations, and of the earnest desire to avoid a collision as long as possible, it was deemed entirely safe to adhere to the line of policy indicated in my letter of the 16th. of January, which has been already quoted. In that, Major Anderson had been requested to report "at once" whenever, "in his judgement additional supplies or reinforcements were necessary for his safety or for a successful defence of the Fort." So long, therefore, as he remained silent upon this point, the government felt that there was no ground for apprehension. Still, as the necessity of action might arise at any moment, an expedition has been quietly prepared, and is ready to sail from New York on a few hours notice, for transporting troops and supplies to Fort Sumter. This step was taken under the supervision of General Scott, who arranged its details, and who regarded the reinforcements thus provided for as sufficient for the occasion. The expedition, however, is not upon a scale approaching the seemingly extravagant estimates of Major Anderson and Captain Foster, now offered for the first time, and for the disclosures of which the government was wholly unprepared.
The declaration now made by the Major that he would not be willing to risk his reputation on an attempt to throw reinforcements into Charleston Harbor and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well disciplined men, takes the Department by surprise as his previous correspondence contains no such estimation.
I have the honor to be, Very Respectfully,
Your Obt. Servant,
J Holt
[ Endorsement by Winfield Scott:]
Remarks of Lieut. Genl. Scott on the within.
When Major Anderson first threw himself into Fort Sumter it would have been easy to reinforce him. Fort Moultrie has since been re-armed & greatly strengthened, & many powerful new land batteries (besides rafts) have been constructed; -- hulks sunk in the principal channel, &c &c. The difficulty of reinforcing has now been increased 10 or 15 fold. First the President would allow no attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with the So Carolina commissioners; -- then we (Secretary Holt & we myself) we could not obtain permis prevail upon him & the Secretary of the Navy, to let us have a ship of war, which forced us to employ the Star of the West, & she, but for the imbecility of her commander, might have landed men & subsistence. Before the Cabinet, I next submitted (orally) either 1. That succor must be given sent by means of ships of war, fighting their way to the fort, or 2. That the Major should ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns -- that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment; bringing to merchant vessels & helping himself (giving orders for payment) &c &c or surrender. But before any resolution was taken -- Mr. Secretary Toucey, making difficulties about his vessels -- another commissioner arrived, from So Carolina, causing a farther delay. Next, after considering many plans of relief, the President, two Secretaries, Capt. Ward2 & myself settled upon the employment, under the captain (who was eager for the expedition--) of the four, or more, small steamers, belonging to the Coast Survey.-- Three, or four weeks ago I have no doubt the captain would have succeeded; but he was kept back by some thing like a truce established between the President & a number of principal seceders -- here, in So Carolina, Florida &c -- which truce or informal understanding included Ft. Pickens. [Hence a company, intended for the latter is still in the sloop of war, the Brooklyn, lying off the fort, at sea, with orders not to land till an attack shall be made by the Secessionists.]
Whether Capt. Ward, notwithstanding the great increase of Carolina batteries & the opinions of Major Anderson, Capt. Foster &c, would still be willing, or deem himself able to attempt the succor of Fort Sumter, (even for a few weeks) I cannot say; [He ought to be called for:] but it is evident that the officers of the fort have changed their opinions, with the great change of circumstances, & now see no alternative but a surrender, in some weeks, more or less, as they well know that we cannot send the third of the men (regulars) in several weeks months, necessary to give them relief beyond a few weeks, if for a day. Evacuation seems almost inevitable, & in this view, our distinguished Chief Engineer (Brigadier Totten)3 concurs -- if, indeed, the worn out garrison be not assaulted & carried in the present week.
Respectfully submitted to the President, thro' the Secretary of State
Winfield Scott
March 5, 1861.
Note. The foregoing remarks are written in the night far from my papers. W. S.
[Note 2 ID: James H. Ward joined the navy in 1823 and became one of the leading authorities on ordnance and tactics. Ward devised a plan to relieve the garrison at Fort Sumter, but it was not attempted. In 1861 Ward was killed in action while in command of the Potomac Flotilla.]
[Note 3 ID: Joseph G. Totten graduated from West Point in 1805 and had a military career that spanned over sixty years. A veteran of the War of 1812 and Mexican War, Totten was chief engineer of the army from 1838 until his death in 1864.]
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