I read this, and felt perhaps the time was right to jump in.

"General Sterling Price's staff officers had the guerrillas so stirred up from
earlier behind-Union-lines councils of war with the bushwhackers in August
that by September so much guerrilla stuff was happening all over the place
that both the guerrilla raid for horses and the revenge killing by the 4th
were hardly mentioned in the press and mostly local sources documented these
twin events. You will recall that Price's troops crossed the state line and
invaded Missouri on September 19, only about a week later. The guerrillas were
raising cain in many parts of MO to keep the Union troops tied down to enhance
Price's chances."

Good interpretation of the facts there. I see only one small problem, not with the facts, but with the numbers of irregulars and their ability or inability to motivate the population. When "Pap" Price moved north, he was hoping that the invasion of Missouri with the large numbers of troops he had would inspire the populace, particularly the Knights of the Golden Circle and affiliated Southern sympathizers, to join their ranks in droves. The concept of 'combined warfare', where irregulars and regular troops were working in coordination with one another, has been the deciding factor in many theaters of war. The French resistance during World War II gave invaluable assistance to the allied forces during and after the Normandy invasion, for instance. The problem that Price faced then as did all commanders, was the speed at which communication was possible for forces to coordinate with one another. On September 24 1864 Price was in a major battle at Pilot Knob for Fort Davidson, and Anderson's irregular calvary force was camped outside of Centralia. But there was no communication between the two. It all had to be handled in advance, and opportunities were lost. This was one of the points behind the master's thesis that was written by Major Dale E. Davis at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Add that to the fact that Price's operational tempo was too slow to capitalize on the irregular activity. Davis tells us:

"Price’s tempo was much too slow and the constant changing of objectives consumed too much
time to take advantage of the limited window of opportunity created by the guerrillas’
efforts that summer. It seems Price did not appreciate the fact that his mission had
changed and so should his plan. He first lost valuable time attacking Fort Davidson. Had
Price not taken the time to attack the garrison, he may have been able to arrive at St.
Louis before Rosecrans was able to reinforce the arsenal. Once Price turned west, the
slow progress his force made through the valley allowed Federal forces to defend
Jefferson City and organize the defenses along the Kansas border. Price seemed to still
harbor notions of inciting an uprising, but he had not seized an adequate numbers of
weapons to arm even the small number of men he did recruit. By the time he arrived in
Lexington, he had failed to secure his objectives, he faced a numerically superior force to
his front with a numerically superior force closing on his rear guard, and he had too much
non-essential plunder in his wagon train. Price faced a predicament the guerrilla forces
may have able to prevent. As Price attacked Fort Davidson, Anderson and Todd raided
Centralia, devastating Johnson’s Federal patrol. Had the guerrilla force continued their
tempo of operations of the preceding month, their actions may have diverted Federal
forces to counter their actions."

So there you have it. Slow operational tempo on the part of Price, inability to incite and capitalize on and sustain an uprising, and lack of coordination due to communication difficulties. But that's just one opinion on the subject. I'm sure there are others.