The question of why Van Dorn moved east may be a little more complex than it appears. I was in Washington earlier this year, and looked at some of the Van Dorn papers, especially a copybook of letters and telegrams, in the National Archives and Records Administration. I append below three transcripts that suggest tha Van Dorn's original intention was to defend the Mississippi River Valley and that he considered it impossible for any army to campaign in Northern Arkansas. Certainly he was keeping Richmond informed of his planning and movements.

On March 17th he Telegraphed Albert S. Johnson, with a copy to the Secretary of War:

Van Buren Ark, March 17 1862

I am at Van Buren with the army preparing to march to Pocahontas - will get off by the 22nd. - and will reach Pocahontas by the 7th. or 8th. of April. With 15,000 men - I will operate to assist the army on the Mississippi. It is reported that the Enemy have left Arkansas for Springfield - I will know positively tomorrow or next day. The country in this vicinity will no longer support an army.

Have any troops been ordered to report to me other than those called for by me from the States of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas?

Earl Van Dorn

Maj Genl.

A courier was being dispatched to Richmond at this time, for another letter of the 18th. was addressed to Secretary Benjamin and marked "Confidential":

Head Qrs Trans Miss Dist

Van Buren, March 18 1862
Sir

I avail myself of the opportunity offered me by the departure of Dr. O. B. Knobe for Richmond, to inform you that the entire army I marched against the enemy some days since, is now in camp a few miles from this place, and that I shall march in a few days time for Pocahontas to make a junction with whatever force that may be assembled at that point. It is my intention then to fall upon the force of the Enemy in the vicinity of New Madrid or Cape Giradeau, and attempt to relieve Genl Beauregard - and if practicable , I shall march on St. Louis, and thus withdraw the forces now threatening this part of the State of Arkansas. The army can not be subsisted here any longer, neither do I think that the Enemy can make any serious demonstrations from here until later in the spring. I send several thousand cavalry off in a few days, via Forsyth on White River, to burn up the depots of the enemy at Springfield, and to destroy his immense trains which go to and fro nearly unguarded. They will then join me at Pocahontas. I shall order Pike to operate in the Indian Country west of here - to cut off trains - annoy the Enemy in his marches, and to prevent him as far as is possible from supplying his troops from Missouri and Kansas - he can not supply them here. I have debated the movement in my own mind, and think that it is the best I can make. I attempted first to beat the Enemy at Elk Horn, but a series of accidents entirely unforeseen, and not under my control, and a badly disciplined army defeated my intentions......

[The rest is about Pea Ridge]

On March 21st., Van Dorn wrote to Beauregard:

Head Qrs Trans Miss Dist

Van Buren, March 19 1862
General,

I march my first Brigade towards Jacksonport, Ark, tomorrow. All the troops here will march in a few days to the same point - I will probably have on White River by the 10th or 12th of April, twenty thousand men or more - and about 70 pieces of Artillery. It was my intention to attack the forces near New Madrid and Point Pleasant from the North by Greenville - what do you now advise? There is an army of about 20,000 men of the Enemy's, north of this in Arkansas - but they can not be subsisted long - nor do I think they can do much harm in the west - We can not subsist here - I think it is more important to save the Mississippi River.

Answer me at once, please. I start for Little Rock the day after tomorrow.

D. Maury AAG.

I will be interested to see any comments on this material,

Tony Brown