Doyle made a post a few days ago trying dispell a missed opportunity by Ewell at Gettysburg on the first day. Below is his post.

"Again Harry Pfanz's "Gettysburg, The First Day" dispells the mythology that Ewell had any "oppertunity" at all. That the terrain, the City of Gettysburg itself, and the state of the men after battleling Howards 11th Corp, did not permit Ewell to capture Culp's Hill on that first day. According to Pfanz much of that mythology of "Give me one regiment and I will take that Hill" came from one man who did not even have a command at Gettysburg, but was a supernumerial returning from convelence leave and attached to Ewell's corp."

I've read Pfanz's books on Gettysburg and they are very detailed accounts of the fighting that took place. They don't however look at the why's and if's of the Pennsylvania Campaign. I urge to everyone to check out "Last Chance For Victory, Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign" by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. These two scholars take a look at what happened in Gettysburg in a more modern style of investigation. It is by far the best book I have ever read on Gettysburg. At the end of the book Bowden and Ward list and discuss at length 17 reasons why the Confederates were defeated at Gettysburg. At least 4 of the reasons are directly related to Ewell's lack of action and his interpretation of orders on the first day. Read below.

"Spread out before Second Corps was a sight few of its members had beheld and none would again see. Broken and routed remnants from the two Federal corps were streaming up the incline of Cemetery Hill, the area’s dominant terrain feature. Some of Ewell’s aggressive brigadiers urged him to pursue the visibly disorganized enemy. This belief was seconded by many lower ranking officers and men who knew they needed to deliver one final thrust to finish the days work. Two messengers, Walter Taylor and James Power Smith arrived with orders from General Lee to keep up the pressure against the reeling foe and take the high ground south of town. At least three soldiers (Isaac Trimble, Tom Turner, and Robert Early) provided Ewell with first hand information that Culp’s Hill, a short distance to the east, was unoccupied and could easily be seized. Its capture would compromise the Federals gathering on Cemetery Hill and cut the enemy’s lifeline along the Baltimore Pike immediately behind it. Yet Dick Ewell, veteran of many fields and Stonewall Jackson’s protégé, did nothing."

So Doyle, to discount Isaac Trimble as a convelecent with no command is an insult. Trimble took command of Pender's troops after he was wounded on the second day. Trimble himself was wouded and captured by the Federals during Pickett's (Pettigrew's) Charge. ( My GG Grandfather was in the 11th North Carolina Infantry a unit that was engaged all three days) I'll cement my opinion on Ewell with another quote from this excellent book.

"Of all human events, war is more unforgiving for the wasting of time than any other endeavor. When Dick Ewell road into Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 1, the defeated Federals needed time more than anything; time to retreat, time to rally, time to shake off the tentacles of demoralization, pick up a rifle, and stand back in line. Time. And by failing to act as ordered Ewell gave it to them by the bucket full. It was during the few suspenseful and fleeting hours between Second Corps’ triumph on the fields north and west of Gettysburg and when the final waning rays of light disappeared that a golden opportunity to achieve a decisive victory north of the Potomac River was allowed to slip away. The consequences of Ewell’s negligence rippled into the battle’s second and third days.

Richard Stoddert Ewell’s failure to pursue the foe he and his troops had vanquished was one of the most costly errors in American military history."

So it would appear from these statements that after eight of the nine brigades of Ewell's Corps had completely routed Howard's Eleventh Corps and dealt over 70% casualties to Reynold's First Corps including the killing of the corps commander himself, that Ewell was content to sit back and watch the Federals make the next move. It is my opinion that Ewell, much like A.P. Hill was a far better commander on the division level than on the corps level.

Keith