"Like Bob, I tend to believe inspection report figures. First, let's not assume that average Southerners had ready cash to spend on handguns. Even more useful shotguns and 'sporting rifles' are not found in great abundance in Alabama county surveys for any sort of weapon. Next, ordnance officers would not requisition ammunition for weapons not carried on their records."

I agree, too. However, even though I also mentioned the issue of few prewar records showing arms in the hands of citizens, this must be taken with a grain of salt. The purpose of knowing how many arms were in a county was usually for tax purposes. I think that the number of arms was greatly under-reported to avoid taxation. In one county, for example, only two handguns were reported! I find that very hard to believe, especially given the county in which this was reported.

"It's also not realistic to assume that every man in the ranks carried some sort of arm. Obviously that was the goal, but the Confederacy was never flush with small arms. Jefferson Davis mentioned lack of arms as his reason not to seek new volunteers in October 1861. Even after Europeans imports, home industry and battlefield captures allowed a substantial increase in size of Confederate armies, some units still remained woefully short of firearms. For instance, Grady McWhinney ("Attack and Die") mentions that the 41st Mississippi attacked Federal positions in the Round Forest at Murfreesboro TN mainly armed with sticks."

Again, that is consistent with what I have found...more men than arms. This was usually not a problem, though, as at any given time a huge percentage of any command was not "able for duty". The bigger problem was the fact that such large numbers were not able for duty at any given time. Often times, regiments were entering battle at 1/3 of full strength, even though the rolls would show them at full strength if the men were all available.

"Normal arms attrition and battlefield losses reduced available supplies. Also, due to arms shortages, the Army of Northern Virginia required a soldier being furloughed or sent to a hospital to leave his arms and equipment in camp. Experience showed that if a man died or was discharged from service while away, any firearm in his possession was lost to his unit. This policy was probably implemented in the western armies as well."

Keep in mind, though, that there were also battlefield pickups. This was a common after battle assignment, to go scour the field for arms. And from what I have seen, large numbers were acquired in this way.

"Sabres were useful in a mounted charge directed against another mounted unit or a disorganized (routed) force on foot. Such opportunities were few and far between, so by 1863 most Southern horsemen had discarded these somewhat dated weapons."

Well, I guess this is one major point of this discussion. Many would take your statement a step further, and state that *no* sabres were in use by mid-war. I think that enough evidence has already been presented to disprove that. I think that it may be overbroad to state what most Southern horsement did as a group. It just varied to much from command to command. In particular, I maintain that what Forrest's troops did cannot be inferred from what Wheeler's troops did, and vice versus. The tactical approach to warfare (as well as the day-to-day discipline) is just too varied between these two commanders.

It is unlikely that Forrest's troops used any kind of manual, at all. Forrest is said to have been able to counter any enemy movement by his innate ability to understand the tactics of cavalry, without any formal training "by the book". This is the very reason that he is called a military genius.

Wheeler, on the other hand, did few things "by the book" and so his troops may not have used any manual, either.