Alan,

I pulled out my lecture on Brice's Crossroads, in which I used a couple dozen sources. These included unit histories, Confederate veteran accounts, all of the Forrest bios then available, etc. and Bearss' book.

I mis-spoke on the attacking 9th Minnesota being the receiveing end of this pistol fire. They did launch a counter-attack with bayonets that I got from another source but this was against a different part of Forrest's command and later in the afternoon that the episodes that I will describe below..

Also - I am in contact with the author of a new unit history of the 9th Minnesota, who is also doing a new history of Brice's Crossroads because of all that he found for this battle that was not use by Bearss. He sent me some material a couple years ago that I incorporated into my lecture. He has not given me all of the details for obivious reasons as he wants that for his books when they come out.

There are three times when Forrest's men used pistol fire at Brice's Crossroads - two definitely and one alluded to. Two of these events were with Rucker's Brigade, one of them specifically with the 7th Tennessee Cavalry.

The first episode was when the 7th TN attacked the 7th Indiana Cavalry (themselves armed with Merrill carbines). This took place after Johnson's Brigade arrived and fell into line along the road. Bearss, on Page 74 of his Brice's book states, "Colonel Rucker, at the head of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry, advanced against the sector held by the 7th Indiana and 2nd New Jersey. As the Confederates approached the rail fence behind which the Yankees crouched, Rucker shouted for them to sling their Sharp's carbines and draw their brace of Colt's Navy six shooters."

You asked what accounts would I accept for pistols being at Brice's Crossroads? I accept this one, from a man who was there: J. P. Young's account from the unit history of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry, " Guns, once fired, were used as clubs, and pistols were brought into play..."

Later that day, it was the bayonet attack of the 81st and 95th Illinois (the action that I gave to the 9th Minnesota by mistake). The author of the new 9th Minnesota history gave me the details of the 81st Illinois capturing the Second National battle flag of the 18th Mississippi Cavalry Battalion in this attack for my flag files by the way.

Bearss, on page 91, writes, "Rucker, in response to this threat orderd his men to, "kneel on the ground men, draw your six-shooters and don't run!"

Bearss offers a third account of possible pistol use at this battle when he writes on Page 94, "Supported by the general's escort and Gartrell's Georgians, they were to sweep around the Union right, get into the Yankee's rear, and "egnage at pistol range any Federal troops" encountered between the Pontotoc Road and Tishomingo Creek." Not much point in using carbines or long rifles at pistol range when the same effect could be achieved at longer ranges and with less exposure to your men. This attack was designed as shock and awe with high-volume piostol fire being what it took to break the Federal position. You cannot get such high-volume fire from any other small arm other than breechloading repeating carbines/rifles, which Forrest did not have there that I have been able to find (and only the 2nd New Jersey Cavalry, with their Spencers, and elements of the 3rd and 9th Illinois Cavalry with their Colt repeaters, had them on the Federal side).

OR accounts are fine as we know but we also know that they often do not contain all the information to a particular event. A case in point - the Battle of Riggins' Hill, near where I live in Tennessee, is not well-detailed in Col. William Lowe's OR account at all - but it IS in the accounts of the embedded reporter from the Cincinnati Commercial who gave far more details than the commander of the Union brigade of that action. This is why we seek out as much information as posible about an action starting with the ORs but not limiting things to just them.

We all know that Forrest did use a lot of infantry long-arms since his men were based on dragoons, which also used them over history. This gave them equal firepower to Union infanry units in terms of range. But, as I alluded to already, since Forrest was always losing commands and having to raise and re-arm them all the time, I am sure he was able to become very good at getting arms whereever he could outside of the view shown by OR and inspection reports. Having seen a number of arms inspection reports, which are indeed very helpful, I again reiterate that they are only snap-shots of a particular time frame.

I was doing research at the Ft. Wayne Library on Saturday and going through the order books, etc. of the 5th Tennessee Cavalry (McKenzie's) which largely operated in eastern Tennessee until joining with Wheeler in 1864 for the Atlanta Campaign. Therein I found a recept for several hundred Colt pistols for the regiment, which was at the bottom of the Confederate supply lines in terms of where they had been fighting for most of the war. This was before they went to Georgia. Forrest's command was higher up the supply chain than the backwater of eastern Tennessee.

Greg Biggs