Hi Alan,

More below:

>>>>I'm sure you are aware of specific inventories of weapons lost by Federal units involved in the Brice's Crossroads debacle, so we have a reasonable idea of what weapons were acquired by Forrest's ordnance officers. >>>>

I only have the details for the Union cavalry arms - Sharps, Merrill's, Burnsides, etc. and the Spencers of the 2nd New Jersey. I only assume that the Union infantry had Enfield or Springfield rifles.

>>>>To answer your question about Gholson's Brigade (another command quickly shipped off to Atlanta), these regiments had been raised by the State of Mississippi and then turned over to Confederate authority. It explains the deplorable condition of arms reported, and probably tells us something about equipment and supplies on hand as well.>>>>

Being state troops at this stage of the war this does not surprise me at all and it stands in stark contrast to QM invoices I have seen for the state Army of Mississippi in 1861.

>>>>Three further thoughts along these lines --

1) Bearss and other writers make mention of S. D. Lee's directive that Forrest allow the Federal expedition to advance further into Mississippi before bringing on an engagement. At first glance it seems surprising that Forrest would not prefer to fight the enemy far from any hope of reinforcement and with as many soldiers on hand as possible. Instead Forrest fought at Brice's Crossroads with only four brigades. >>>>>

While Lee does get the credit for this idea I have no doubt that Forrest thought along the same lines. Brices was closer to the Confederate supply lines and much further away from the Union. Joe Johnston used the same idea in the Atlanta Campaign but he did not fight back efectively. This plan just makes sense.

>>>>>>Recognizing that the force on hand represented most of the best-equipped and experienced soldiers available in Mississippi, perhaps Forrest decided to use what he had and strike before all his command came up. >>>>

Sun Tzu - "The good commander fights with what he has." Forrest had the advantage of a superior tactical plan - defeating each portion of Sturgis' force in detail before they could all join up - which is classic Napoleon by the way. He then had the further advantage of chossing his site for battle and playing Sturgis like a fiddle once he got there. I place a lot of blame on the Union cavalry's Grierson for not pursuing Black's patrol more agressively and for not driving on Baldwyn as well when he had vastly superior numbers at the time to do so. He gave up the initiative to a commander who would never let him get it back.

As your statement above also shows, Forrest had supreme confidence in these men and their leadership and this was based on working experience. Sure helps a lot when you know what your troops can do for you and that you don't have to look over their shoulders all the time either.

>>>>2) Forrest seems to have thoroughly armed and equipped smaller units of his command, such as his escort, Capt. Tyler's Kentucky squadron and a few others. These he held close at hand until needed for a mounted attack at a specific point. Then, after running out of options at Brice's Crossroads, Forrest sent Morton's guns forward to blast away at the Federal line.>>>>

I state in one of my lectures that Forrest used these men like Napoleon used his Old Guard - and thus the Old Guard had the best of everything including years of experience Napoleon could count on. They also had a fearsome reputation on the battlefield. So these special units were Forrest's "Old Guard" and he used them in the same manner.

The idea of the "artillery charge" was actually from French Gen. Senarmont at the Battle of Friedland in 1807 against the Russians. This was a tactic born out of necessity but it was also something used a good bit afterwards once its abilities became known. You typically did not send in guns advancing towards enemy lines without cavalry and/or infantry supporting them - but Senarmont's gunners were superior and their rates of fire tremendous. They basically blew out the Russian center - but lost heavily doing so. Quite simply, French artillery (and cavalry) was the finest of the 19th Century and greatly influenced US Army gunners for the next 100 years.

Of course Forrest never read about Friedland that I can ever find and this same tactic just came to him based on experience with guns and his great gunnery officers. Morton, who might have read about it, was still stunned at the order - but we know how it ended up - the Union center being blown out.

Rommel lead his attacks in North Africa with his mobile 88MM guns which shredded British tanks before they could engage the German tanks, and since the British Matilda was superior to Rommel's tanks of the time, that was a good thing. Yet I have not seen any proof that Rommel studied Forrest (despite the good novel of some years ago) and, more than likely, he got the idea from Napoleon.

>>>>3) Forrest's skill at gaining a tactical advantage over the enemy cannot be overstated. This is particularly true in light of Federal superiority in terms of arms, numbers and logistical resources in the field. Since most of Forrest's men were not equipped to fight on horseback, he elected to engage in selected situations where the numbers, arms available and tactical situation offered him a clear advantage. A commander who knows when and where to fight will win more often than not.>>>>

He became a master of true combined arms warfare utilizing all three service branches as a team in battle in an era where most commanders could handle only two. Thus, using certain units in a mounted capacity, others fighting as infantry and his artillery, he was able to fight his command far more effectively than his foes could for the most part.

With regards to picking your ground to fight, one only needs to look at Meade at Gettysburg and Wellington at Waterloo for two excellent examples of victorious commanders using terrain to their advantage - Brice's Crossroads is another of course.

Greg Biggs