Bizarre is a good word for Confederate distribution of arms. Forrest certainly did his best to arm and equip his men as well as limited resources would allow. Others did not and their men suffered the consequences.

I'm sure you are aware of specific inventories of weapons lost by Federal units involved in the Brice's Crossroads debacle, so we have a reasonable idea of what weapons were acquired by Forrest's ordnance officers.

To answer your question about Gholson's Brigade (another command quickly shipped off to Atlanta), these regiments had been raised by the State of Mississippi and then turned over to Confederate authority. It explains the deplorable condition of arms reported, and probably tells us something about equipment and supplies on hand as well.

Three further thoughts along these lines --

1) Bearss and other writers make mention of S. D. Lee's directive that Forrest allow the Federal expedition to advance further into Mississippi before bringing on an engagement. At first glance it seems surprising that Forrest would not prefer to fight the enemy far from any hope of reinforcement and with as many soldiers on hand as possible. Instead Forrest fought at Brice's Crossroads with only four brigades.

Recognizing that the force on hand represented most of the best-equipped and experienced soldiers available in Mississippi, perhaps Forrest decided to use what he had and strike before all his command came up.

2) Forrest seems to have thoroughly armed and equipped smaller units of his command, such as his escort, Capt. Tyler's Kentucky squadron and a few others. These he held close at hand until needed for a mounted attack at a specific point. Then, after running out of options at Brice's Crossroads, Forrest sent Morton's guns forward to blast away at the Federal line.

3) Forrest's skill at gaining a tactical advantage over the enemy cannot be overstated. This is particularly true in light of Federal superiority in terms of arms, numbers and logistical resources in the field. Since most of Forrest's men were not equipped to fight on horseback, he elected to engage in selected situations where the numbers, arms available and tactical situation offered him a clear advantage. A commander who knows when and where to fight will win more often than not.