Stephen,

"Did you not check my sources?"

Which sources? You provided Blackstone, which is only partially useful since we are dealing with specific Constitutional law, not basic common law.

I am also familiar with Jeff Davis' work, but fail to see how it is a unquestionably reliable source (especially since it was a justification of his actions) of what Chase was thinking in a case that was never ruled on.

"#1. The 14th ammendment was passed after April 1865. Any crime commited before this was (not)a crime because it had not become a crime at the time committed. That is the way American Law works, it is called Expo facto. It is a legal rule set by common law. All of the United States law follow common law ruling. (Blackstone on Common Law)"

The issue of ex post facto is specifically listed in Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution...as a limitation of the states.

In any case, I just want to clarify, are you arguing that the 14th amendment could not legitimately play a part in Davis' case---at all---because it was passed after the war was over?

"This is common sense. Chase was not an idiot, he release Davis because of this."

I ask again, where is your evidence that Chase released Davis because he supposedly saw secession as legal? I'm not looking for your belief, but evidence of what Chase was thinking.

Everything I have found says the opposite---that Chase believed Davis had been treasonous, but decided against taking the case for other legal and political reasons. For instance, Michael Les Benedict writes, in his law review article "Salmon P. Chase as Jurist and Politician" (emphasis added):

"Chase manifested his antipathy to proscription by his reluctance to preside over the trial of Jefferson Davis, which was to take place before the circuit court of appeals in Virgina, on Chase's circuit. His refusal to participate in the circuit court proceedings as long as the South REMAIND UNDER MARTIAL LAW delayed the trial for over a year, and he continued to delay matters thereafter, finding it difficult to schedule the time in light of his Supreme Court duties. When the government and the district judge agreed to releas Davis on bail in May 1867, Chasels ally Greely was first on the list of sureities.

"The following mont, Chase, from the bench, offered an exegesis on amnesty. In "Shortridge & Co. v. Macon," HE CONFIRMED THAT WAGING WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WAS TREASON; THE FACT THAT THE CONFEDERACY HAD ACQUIRED THE STATUS OF A DE FACTO BELLIGERENT DID NOT EXCULPATE OFFENDERS. But, [Chase ruled]

"'Wise governments never forget that the criminality of individuals is not always or often equal that of the acts committed by the organization with which they are connected. Many are carried into rebellion by sincere though mistaken convictions.... When the strife of arms is over, and such governments...address themselves mainly to the work of conciliation and restoration, and exert the prerogative of mercy,...complete remission is usually extended to large classes by amnesty.'"
(Michael Les Benedict, "Salmon P. Chase as Jurist and Politician," Northern Kentucky Lawr Review, Fall 1993, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 133.)

In other words, Chase saw secession as treason, but since the war had been over and the country was trying to rebuild, he embraced amnesty.